New Zealand and the World

The following sections are included:

• Dedication
• Acknowledgments
• About the Editors
• About the Contributors
• Contents

The aim of this book is to provide the reader with an overview of New Zealand’s international relations. New Zealand is a relatively small and isolated settler society. Yet it is a country that has often shown an international presence that is out of proportion to the modest spectrum of national economic, military and diplomatic capabilities at its disposal…

This chapter considers the role of the University of Otago Foreign Policy School in shaping the evolution of New Zealand’s foreign policy between 1966 and 1976. First, it will consider the establishment and organisation of the School during its first decade. The second part outlines a conceptual model developed by Michelle Hale Williams to help assess the impact factor in public life. In the third section we examine the role of the School in facilitating public and political debate in New Zealand. The fourth part examines the interaction between the School and the foreign policy institutional environment within New Zealand. The fifth section considers the relationship of the School with New Zealand foreign policy-making during the period under review. The final section provides an overall assessment and concludes that the role of the School in its first decade was most clearly shown in expanding the parameters of public engagement with foreign policy issues at the agendas and institutional levels.

Thirty-two years ago, New Zealand’s Labour Prime Minister, David Lange, made the University of Otago Foreign Policy School his stage on which to declare to Bob Hawke, Margaret Thatcher, the Reagan White House and his own officials that, to quote Thatcher, he was “not for turning”. New Zealand was about to become nuclear free—it did on 9 June 1987…

In April 2015, 2000 New Zealanders gathered at Gallipoli to commemorate the landings on the peninsula that began an eight-month-long and ultimately unsuccessful struggle. Like the men they honoured, they had come from the “Uttermost Ends of the Earth”, the inscription on the New Zealand Memorial standing atop the highest point attained by the Allies during the campaign, ChunukBair. They heard the Prime Minister, John Key, state during his oration that “Our losses and achievements here and elsewhere in the First World War, had a profound effect on New Zealand’s view of its abilities, its identity and, ultimately, its sovereignty”. His predecessor Helen Clark during her first visit, in 2000, had referred to Gallipoli having “a special meaning”. It was here, she claimed, that “New Zealanders began to develop their own unique identity”, a continuing development. Five years later she stated that “It was here that our young nations began to become of age. It was from here that we began to think of ourselves as not just servants of the British Empire, but as distinct national entities. Thus, out of catastrophe, each of our nations emerged with a new sense of certainty about our own destiny and our place in the world”. The common theme in these statements is that Gallipoli has a key place in the development of the New Zealand nation…

Many influences, external and internal, shape a country’s identity. There is no single definition. There can be, for example, a clear difference between what a country affirms itself to be (large powers often expect their own self-assessment to be widely accepted) and how other countries might actually perceive that country. Furthermore, just as the context for international affairs frequently shifts, there is also, for most countries, more than one identity internationally. Certainly, New Zealand’s identity in the South Pacific tends to differ significantly from its identity on the global stage. Identity is influenced by such things as originality, values, reputation, relationships and transformational change in the international system.

In essence our exports need to reduce in weight and become heavier in knowledge and value. To achieve this we need a vibrant and well integrated innovation system which is capable of creating wealth from ideas. (Clarke, 2002, p. 32)

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• The People of New Zealand
• New Zealand’s Place in the Asia-Pacific
• Linking People and Place
• Conclusion: Beyond Trade and Towards People and Place
• References

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Asia-Pacific: An Overview
• Economic Integration
• Asia-Pacific: The Security Dimension
• Economic and Security Integration: Moving Along Different Paths
• Implications for New Zealand: Challenges and Opportunities
• References

The following sections are included:

• Setting the Scene
• The World Trade Organisation, APEC’s “Open Regionalism” and New Zealand Trade Policy
• Three Watershed Events and a Sea-Change for New Zealand’s Trade Policy Environment
• The Push for Inclusion in East Asia
• Revival of the Trans-Pacific Dimension
• Renewed Uncertainty
• References

In 1999, in a presentation to the University of Otago Foreign Policy School entitled “Polanyi revisited: globalisation and its contradictions in the new millennium”, I argued that

Several decades later, the title would read “Polanyi revisited: the implosion of neoliberal globalisation”. The contradictions that Karl Polanyi articulated in his iconic book The Great Transformation (Polanyi, 2001) have become more explicit and widely recognised. He insisted that economic relations, politics and ideology do not exist in a social vacuum. The economy is embedded in the social, and the social purpose of the state is to give effect to that reality. Polanyi attributed the collapse of the previous era of laissez faire to the futility of attempts to disembed the social from the market. He described a “double movement” that provided the catalyst for change: as unrestrained market forces wreaked havoc, social forces within nation states organised to protect themselves. Polanyi emphasised the spontaneous, localised resistance of communities whose lives had been turned upside down…

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• New Zealand’s “Pacific Identity”
• New Zealand’s Strategic Interests in the Pacific
• Conclusion
• References

Like cousins, or even siblings, the relationship between New Zealand and Australia often seems to be defined by family things: things that the two countries share and which sets them apart from the rest of the world. Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), New Zealand–Australia closer economic relations (CER), endless sporting rivalries, slights and triumphs, niggling resentments and genuine grievances with one another encapsulate the rivalry, antagonism, support and closeness that is more often than not found in a family. This gives the relationship a feeling of self-containment. That is, from both sides of the Ditch the New Zealand–Australian relationship seems as if it exists in a little trans-Tasman world of its own. But of course there are limits to this sense of intimacy: both New Zealand and Australia have always been profoundly shaped by the world beyond — and, as we see, there have always been real differences in the way the two countries have approached that wider world…

In September 2016, New Zealand lost one of its most influential public intellectuals. Emeritus Professor Ranginui Walker’s careful analysis of the condition of Māori provided significant political and cultural critique of New Zealand and New Zealanders and directly informed how we have come to see ourselves. His clear identification of the causes of Māori marginalisation and restricted participation in national life was deemed radical when first pronounced and yet has shaped the work of the nation and our present political landscape, including how we present ourselves on the international stage. His pronouncements were unflinching and he never steered away from confrontation and speaking truth to power. His acuteness of thought and word remained with him till the end and there was always an urgency in his work. As a Māori academic, I acknowledge the significant debt I have to him. His intellectual labour provided the foundation for mine and the work of many others…

In 1993 when I gave a paper at the University of Otago Foreign Policy School on “The Influence of Individuals and NGO’s on New Zealand Foreign Policy Making 1943–1993” (Trotter, 1993), I was able to report that the 1980s had been a period of intense social and political ferment; the peace movement was at its zenith; the left of the New Zealand Labour Party had achieved the Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987 and the right of the party had introduced “Rogernomics”. In many ways, the influence of the anti-nuclear movement on New Zealand’s foreign policy peaked during this time.

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Globalisation, Foreign Policy and New Zealand/Aotearoa State Identity
• Conclusion
• References

On Sunday 10 March 2002, locals noticed unmarked Gulfstream jets flying into Queenstown airport in the South Island of New Zealand. During the next few days, there was unusual activity at a nearby resort, where bodyguards enforced strict security and shadowed a group of casually dressed men (NZ Herald Staff Reporters, 2002; Suskind, 2006, p. 83; Sutton, 2002; New Zealand Press Association, 2002). Six months after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks at New York; Washington, DC; and Pennsylvania, intelligence chiefs from the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—nations comprising the so-called “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance — were gathering for a meeting of unusual significance. As Pulitzer Prize-winning author Ron Suskind puts it in his book, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11: On Monday morning, the team that would fight the global “war on terror” settled in for a long day at the end of the earth: an inconspicuous stone house on the edge of a resort on an island with more sheep than people. (2006, p. 83).

According to one of those present, whom Suskind quotes in his book, George Tenet, the then-director of America’s Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA, began by telling the meeting: “Gentlemen, we are at war”. “This,” Tenet continued, “is a challenge unlike any other we’ve faced. It is a challenge which redefines the way we work, the way we think, the way we act…. We must work as one,” Tenet said, once his opening was complete. “As for CIA, I can tell you this. There is nothing we won’t do, nothing we won’t try. The shackles, my friends, have been taken off”. (2006, pp. 82–83)

It is certainly no secret that “taking off the shackles” in the post-9/11 world has led to numerous instances of demonstrably illegal acts by the CIA and some of the CIA’s partners in the Middle East and Europe (Mayer, 2005; Grey, 2007; Mazzetti, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2015; Center for Constitutional Rights, 2015). Nor are the misdeeds of US military personnel in places like Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prison unfamiliar to the public. What is less well-known are the actions (or inactions) during America’s so-called “war on terror” of smaller Western nations like New Zealand — nations widely respected for their commitment to human rights and the observance of international law…

In 1974, the incoming Malaysian High Commissioner presented his credentials to the Government of New Zealand. After the customary greetings, the High Commissioner designate addressed the Governor General and said, “…New Zealand is set like a jewel far across the South Pacific Sea, unencumbered with borders, a population at peace with itself and enjoying the many benefits of wealth generated by maritime trade, and the sea itself…”. Such perceptions of New Zealand echo notions of the fabled city of Atlantis…

I want to start by stating the glaringly obvious. In international relations, size matters. It is not the only thing, but in reality the bigger you are, and the more resources you have, the more options you have. New Zealand currently has a population of around 4.5 million. That is about 0.06 per cent of all the people in the world. Our economy makes up about 0.29 per cent of the world economy. And as you know, the majority of New Zealand’s trading markets are thousands of kilometres away…

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Structural Determinants — The Return of Geopolitics?
• Domestic Determinants — Domestic/Democratic Politics and Alliance Rejuvenation
• Resocialisation, Identity and Transnational Security Challenges
• Conclusion
• References

In 1966, the National party Government released a Defence White Paper which was unequivocal about who the potential enemy was: “In the longer term (the 1970s and beyond) the greatest threat to New Zealand’s interests, and to our own security, comes from the growing power of an uncompromising China” (New Zealand Government, 1966, p. 8)…

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• The Iraq War and Its Implications
• The Structure of the Intelligence Cycle
• Controversial Questions
• Conclusion
• References

The following sections are included:

• The Context of National Security
• The Changing Nature of National Security
• Intelligence
• The New Zealand Case
• Oversight and Accountability
• Conclusion
• References

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Institutional Lag
• Foreign Policy Realignment
• Issue Linkage
• The New Zealand Intelligence Community
• Methodology
• The Bolger Years
• The Shipley Government
• The Clark Government
• The Key Government
• Conclusion
• References
• Recommended Other Sources

Over the course of the 20th century, New Zealand gradually evolved from a colony with close ties to the United Kingdom to become a sovereign nation in its own right. While New Zealand’s foreign policy outlook was initially still strongly influenced by Great Britain and later, during the Cold War years, by the United States, New Zealand began to place greater emphasis on its own views and interests, even when they differed from those of its close friends and allies. In other words, the transformation in New Zealand’s political status also brought about an increasingly independent stance in New Zealand’s foreign policymaking. This chapter traces New Zealand’s foreign policy into the 21st century and analyses it in relation to the competing theoretical frameworks that have dominated the discipline of International Relations, namely realism, liberalism and constructivism. The aim is to identify longer-term trends in the overall foreign policy direction that New Zealand has taken over the decades. This chapter focuses on three broad foreign policy strands: national security, trade as well as New Zealand’s contribution to multilateral efforts undertaken within the framework of the United Nations (UN). While New Zealand likes to portray itself as a liberal country that primarily pursues moral foreign policy objectives, recent governments have become increasingly guided by realist concerns for New Zealand’s economic interests, leading to decisions that have, at times, come at the expense of some of the country’s liberal values.

I will begin with some context and nomenclature.

On 16 October 2014, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly elected New Zealand to be a member of the UN Security Council. The two other contenders, Spain and Turkey, were decisively beaten. New Zealand gained 145 votes in the first ballot. Three quarters of the UN membership supported New Zealand — far above the threshold of 129 votes required for election. Spain and Turkey were relegated to a runoff, passing through two further ballots before Spain eventually prevailed. Turkey had won an overwhelming victory in its previous campaign in 2008, getting 151 votes. However, in 2014, it could only garner 60 votes. By any standards, this was an historic victory for New Zealand…

New Zealand has been an active and sometimes influential player in international environmental negotiations. This has been for two broad reasons. First, being a good international citizen has been important to governments of whatever political persuasion, reflecting expectations of New Zealand society. That is seen in New Zealand’s successful campaigns to win a seat on the United Nations Security Council. Second, because of the importance of the environment to New Zealand, the country has had a logical interest in related global issues…

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Putting New Zealand into Perspective: A “Small, Trade-Dependent Country”?
• Taking Stock of EU–New Zealand Relations
• Beyond Brexit: The Potential for Closer EU–New Zealand Cooperation
• References

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• Diplomatic Background
• New Zealand and the PLO at the UN in 2012
• New Zealand and the PLO at the UN in 1974
• Conclusion: Palestine and the UN in the Construction of New Zealand’s International Identity
• Addendum: UNSC Resolution 2334: Rupture and Repair in New Zealand–Israel Relations 2016–2017
• References