Globalization, Firms, and Workers

The following sections are included:

• About the Editors
• Acknowledgments
• Contents

Ann Harrison has devoted her career to path-breaking empirical research that explores the intersection of international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and the consequences for workers and firms. Many of her studies focus on emerging markets, such as India and China. She is particularly concerned about the impact of opening up economies on worker welfare. Does a trade reform leave workers better off? Does it reduce or increase inequality? Are multinational firms benevolent agents who raise wages in host economies? Or, do they exploit loopholes in regulations to drive a global race to the bottom? One interviewer characterized her work as giving a voice to the voiceless, especially workers in sweatshop industries or multinational firms who were not the focus of academic studies in the past…

We examine the impact of recent trade reforms. Although employment in the average private sector manufacturing firm was unaffected, there were significant employment losses to exporters and highly affected firms. Parastatals increased employment by hiring low-paid temporary workers. Many firms did not adjust wages or employment. We examine two possible explanations. First, barriers to labor market mobility could have impeded adjustment. Second, we develop a model of labor demand which allows for imperfect competition and endogenous technological change. Our results suggest that although labor markets were flexible, many firms cut profit margins and raised productivity rather than reducing employment.

During the 1980s in Mexico the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers widened. The authors assess the extent to which this increased wage inequality was associated with Mexico’s sweeping trade reform in 1985. Examining data on 2,354 Mexican manufacturing plants for 1984-90 and Mexican Industrial Census data for 1965-88, they find that the reduction in tariff protection in 1985 disproportionately affected low-skilled industries. Goods from that sector, the authors suggest, may have fallen in price because of increased competition from economies with reserves of cheap unskilled labor larger than Mexico’s. The consequent increase in the relative price of skill-intensive goods could explain the increase in wage inequality.

This paper explores the relationship between wages and foreign investment in Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States. Despite very different economic conditions and levels of development, we find one fact that is robust across all three countries: higher levels of foreign investment are associated with higher wages. However, in Mexico and Venezuela, foreign investment is associated with higher wages only for foreign-owned firms - there is no evidence of wage spillovers leading to higher wages for domestic firms. The lack of spillovers in Mexico and Venezuela is consistent with significant wage differentials between foreign and domestic enterprises. In the United States, where the evidence suggests some wage spillovers from foreign to domestic enterprises, wage differentials are smaller.

In recent years, economists and other social scientists have devoted extensive research efforts to understanding the widening wage gap between high-skill and low-skill workers. This paper focuses on a slightly different question: how has globalization affected the relative share of income going to capital and labor? Using a panel of over one hundred countries, this paper analyses trends in labor shares and examines the relationship between shares and measures of globalization. Contrary to recent literature, the evidence suggests that labor shares are not constant over time. Over the 1960 to 2000 period, labor shares in poor countries fell, while shares in rich countries rose. These changes in labor shares are driven by changes in factor endowments and government spending, as well as by traditional measures of globalization, such as trade shares, exchange rate crises, movements in foreign investment, and capital controls. In particular, the results suggest that rising trade shares and exchange rate crises reduce labor’s share, while increasing capital intensity, capital controls and government spending increase labor’s share.

Governments often promote inward foreign investment to encourage technology “spillovers” from foreign to domestic firms. Using panel data on Venezuelan plants, we find that foreign equity participation is positively correlated with plant productivity (the “own-plant” effect), but this relationship is only robust for small enterprises. We then test for spillovers from joint ventures to plants with no foreign investment. Foreign investment negatively affects the productivity of domestically owned plants. The net impact of foreign investment, taking into account these two offsetting effects, is quite small. The gains from foreign investment appear to be entirely captured by joint ventures.

Firms in developing countries cite credit constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment. Direct foreign investment may ease credit constraints by bringing in scarce capital. Alternatively, if foreign firms borrow heavily from domestic banks, they may crowd local firms out of domestic capital markets. Using firm data from the Ivory Coast, we test whether: (1) domestic firms are more credit constrained than foreign firms, and (2) whether borrowing by foreign firms exacerbates domestic firm credit constraints. Results provide support for both hypotheses. We also find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less financially constrained than other domestic enterprises.

Firms often cite financing constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment. Global capital flows, by bringing in scarce capital, may ease host-country firms’ financing constraints. However, if incoming foreign investors borrow heavily from domestic banks, multinational firms may exacerbate financing constraints by crowding host-country firms out of domestic capital markets. Combining a unique cross-country firm-level panel with time-series data on restrictions on international transactions and capital flows, we find that different measures of global flows are associated with a reduction in firm-level financing constraints. First, we show that one type of capital inflow—direct foreign investment (DFI)—is associated with a reduction in financing constraints. Second, we show that restrictions on capital account transactions negatively affect firms’ financing constraints. We also show that DFI inflows are associated with lower sensitivity of investment to cash flow for firms without foreign assets and for domestically owned enterprises. Finally, the results indicate that these effects are stronger for low-income than for high-income regions.

This paper examines how industrial policy – specifically tariff liberalization and tax subsidies – affects the magnitude and direction of FDI spillovers. We examine these spillover effects across the diverse ownership structure of China’s manufacturing sector for 1998 through 2007. We find that tariff reforms, particularly tariff reductions associated with China’s WTO ascension, increased the productivity impacts of FDI’s backward spillovers. Tax policy – both corporate income and VAT subsidies – has seemingly drawn FDI into strategic industries that spawn significant vertical spillovers. We conclude that liberalization measures during the critical 1998–2007 period on balance served to enhance productivity growth in Chinese industry.

Critics of globalization claim that firms are being driven by the prospects of cheaper labor and lower labor standards to shift employment abroad. Yet the evidence, beyond anecdotes, is slim. This paper reports stylized facts on the activities of U.S. multinationals at home and abroad for the years 1977 to 1999. We focus on firms in manufacturing and services, two sectors that have received extensive media attention for supposedly exporting jobs. Using firm-level data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in Washington, D.C., we report correlations between U.S. multinational employment at home and abroad. Preliminary evidence based on the operations of these multinationals suggests that the sign of the correlation depends on the crucial distinction between affiliates in high-income and low-income countries. For affiliates in high-income countries there is a positive correlation between jobs at home and abroad, suggesting that foreign employment of U.S. multinationals is complementary to domestic employment. For firms that operate in developing countries, employment has been cut in the United States, and affiliate employment has increased. To account for firm size, substitution across firms and entry and exit, we aggregate our data to the industry level. This exercise reveals that the observed “complementarity” between U.S. and foreign jobs has been driven largely by a contraction across all manufacturing sectors. It also reveals that foreign employment in developing countries has substituted for U.S. employment in several highly visible industries, including computers, electronics, and transportation. The fact that there were U.S. jobs lost to foreign affiliates in key sectors, despite broad complementarity in hiring and firing decisions between U.S. parents and their affiliates, helps explain why economists view the impact of globalization on U.S. jobs as benign despite negative news coverage for declining industries.

Using firm-level data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, we estimate the impact on U.S. manufacturing employment of changes in foreign affiliate wages. We show that the motive for offshoring and, consequently, the location of offshore activity, significantly affects the impact of offshoring on parent employment. In general, offshoring to low-wage countries substitutes for domestic employment. However, for firms that do significantly different tasks at home and abroad, foreign and domestic employment are complements. These offsetting effects may be combined to show that offshoring by U.S.-based multinationals is associated with a quantitatively small decline in manufacturing employment.

We link industry-level data on trade and offshoring with individual-level worker data from the Current Population Surveys from 1984 to 2002. We find that occupational exposure to globalization is associated with significant wage effects, while industry exposure has no significant impact. We present evidence that globalization has put downward pressure on worker wages through the reallocation of workers away from higher-wage manufacturing jobs into other sectors and other occupations. Using a panel of workers, we find that occupation switching due to trade led to real wage losses of 12 to 17 percentage points.

During the 1990s, anti-sweatshop activists campaigned to improve conditions for workers in developing countries. This paper analyzes the impact of anti-sweatshop campaigns in Indonesia on wages and employment. Identification is based on comparing the wage growth of workers in foreign-owned and exporting firms in targeted regions or sectors before and after the initiation of anti-sweatshop campaigns. We find the campaigns led to large real wage increases for targeted enterprises. There were some costs in terms of reduced investment, falling profits, and increased probability of closure for smaller plants, but we fail to find significant effects on employment.

Recent trade theory emphasizes the role of marker-share reallocations across firms (“stealing”) in driving productivity growth, whereas previous literature focused on average productivity improvements (“learning”). We use comprehensive, firm-level data from India’s organized manufacturing sector to show that market-share reallocations were briefly relevant to explain aggregate productivity gains following the beginning of India’s trade reforms in 1991. However, aggregate productivity gains during the period from 1985 to 2004 were largely driven by improvements in average productivity. We show that India’s trade, FDI, and licensing reforms are not associated with productivity gains stemming from market share reallocations. Instead, we find that most of the productivity improvements in Indian manufacturing occurred through “learning” and that this learning was linked to the reforms. In the Indian case, the evidence rejects the notion that market share reallocations are the mechanism through which trade reform increases aggregate productivity. Although a plausible response would be that India’s labor laws do not easily permit market share reallocations, we show chat restrictions on labor mobility cannot explain our results.

Using a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises in China between 1998 and 2007, we show that industrial policies allocated to competitive sectors or that foster competition in a sector increase productivity growth. We measure competition using the Lerner Index and include as industrial policies subsidies tax holidays, loans, and tariffs. Measures to foster competition include policies that are more dispersed across firms in a sector or measures that encourage younger and more productive enterprises.