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What does “sovereignty” mean to a small country such as Singapore? We did not seek independence but had independence thrust upon us. I have been told that Mr Lee Kuan Yew once said, “Small island states are a political joke.” That quote implies a concept of sovereignty based on which our founding fathers sought independence within Malaysia rather than alone…
In the 1960s and 1970s, and up to the 1980s, our neighbours never tired of referring to Singapore as “the Israel of Southeast Asia”. It was not meant to be a compliment…
Bilateral relations, which I take more generally as international relations, affect Singapore’s politics. The most important foreign policy decision we have ever taken was to join Malaysia. It was also the most serious foreign policy miscalculation we have ever made. And in that apparent paradox lies the genesis of independent Singapore’s politics. Speaking in the Singapore Legislative Assembly on 5 March 1957, Mr Lee Kuan Yew said, “In the context of the second half of the 20th century, of 20th century Southeast Asia, island nations are a political joke.” A political joke. Now, Mr Lee made that statement during a debate on what position to take during the constitutional talks to be held in London. It reflected his conviction, and the conviction of his comrades, that merger with Malaya was the only practical way forward if Singapore were to completely shake off colonial rule.
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I’m not going to talk in these initial remarks about any specific case, whether it’s the Malaysian elections or Indonesia elections, or any other country in Southeast Asia. I’ll be happy to give my views on specific cases during question time…
The general reader may find this an odd question. Foreign Service Officers (FSO) ought to know that the answer is far from straightforward.
Diplomats do diplomacy, but what is diplomacy? There are probably as many answers as there are diplomats as the rich diversity of experiences chronicled in this volume vividly illustrates…
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My subject is the major transitions that are occurring in East Asia, and which I believe will have global consequences. It is evident, it’s almost a cliché, that the world is undergoing a profound transition of power and ideas. The modern international system was shaped by the West, who prescribed its fundamental concepts, established its basic institutions and practices and influenced all major developments. While that era is now drawing to a close, no one can predict the future and we do not know what will replace the Western shaped and dominated system. But we can at least glimpse some of the issues that will have to be confronted going forward. For the last 200 years or so, the core issue confronting Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, was how to adapt to a Western defined modernity. In fact, the very concept of modernity is Western. Only a handful of countries, almost all in East Asia, have successfully met the challenges, and ironically, this Western dominated system is now being transformed by the very transformations forced upon these countries by the Western system…
Singapore is a unique country in many ways. One of our less discussed peculiarities is that although there can be few countries more exposed to and dependent on the international environment than we are, the level of public interest in and understanding of foreign policy is not high. Indeed I sometimes think of us as rather parochial. I must confess that for much of my career as a Foreign Service Officer I found it convenient to practise my trade without the distractions and complications of public attention that bedevil the diplomats of other countries. But I have since come to the conclusion − and not just because I am now safely retired with no executive responsibilities − that this is not only unsustainable, but undesirable.
US-China relations set the tone for East Asia: when they are stable, the region is calm; when they are roiled, the region is uneasy. In time the same will hold true, I believe, for other regions as well. US-China relations will certainly be a, if not the, central pillar of any new post-Cold War international order.
In my last lecture I argued that the chief priorities of both the US and China are internal and both therefore want to avoid war or serious conflict as they seek a new modus vivendi with each other. At the same time neither will cease to pursue their interests. On a global scale, China is not a clearly revisionist power. But Beijing clearly wants to reclaim something of its historical centrality in East Asia. The US has emphasised that it intends to remain an East Asian power. The strategic challenge for China is therefore how to shift the US from the very centre of the East Asian strategic equation and occupy that space, but without provoking responses from the US and Japan that could jeopardise Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. For the US the strategic challenge is how to accommodate China, while reassuring friends and allies that it intends to hold its position without stumbling into conflict. In Southeast Asia, US-China competition in the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as a proxy for the broader strategic adjustments that are underway.
As I stand here before you, at least three different things are happening simultaneously: what I think; what I say to convey what I think which, because of the limitations of language or by design, will not always be the same as what I think; and what you hear and understand of what I had intended to convey, which is again not necessarily the same thing. Misunderstanding of some degree is inherent in all human communication; indeed in all human perception. One might call this the “Rashomon phenomenon” after the title of the short story by the Japanese author Ryunosuke Akutagawa. Human rights and democracy more than other subjects are particularly susceptible to this phenomenon. Anything really “universal” ought to be less prone to misunderstanding. In fact the evidence of our senses tells us that the most salient characteristic of the world we live in is diversity, not universality.
Singapore is in much better shape than in 1965. Our economy is more robust and diversified, linked by a network of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) to the major economies. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is strong and deterrence keeps our neighbourhood honest. We enjoy good relations with all the major powers. We have a wide and respected diplomatic network. Our city is safe with public services provided at a level of efficiency that is the envy of other cities. Of course, we are not perfect and as Mr Lee Kuan Yew has observed, Singaporeans are also champion grumblers.
The following sections are included:
The following sections are included:
The following sections are included:
The following sections are included:
The following sections are included:
What does “sovereignty” mean to a small country such as Singapore? We did not seek independence but had independence thrust upon us. I have been told that Mr Lee Kuan Yew once said, “Small island states are a political joke.” That quote implies a concept of sovereignty based on which our founding fathers sought independence within Malaysia rather than alone…
There is a story about an employee of the United Nations Secretariat out for a walk with his young son on a balmy spring morning along First Avenue in New York. As they passed the United Nations Building, they paused and the man said, “Look, that's where your father works.” “Wow” exclaimed the boy, clearly impressed. Oscar Niemeyer's magnificent creation, glistening in the spring sunlight with the East River behind and colourful flags of many nations fluttering in the breeze in front, is a sight to stir even the most jaded heart. “How many people work there, Papa?” asked the boy. The man paused for thought, then replied, “about half”…