From Republic to Emirate: Afghan Transformation and Afghanistan–China Relations

Introduction

Afghanistan’s foreign policy toward China has been evolving since the 1950s. Afghanistan recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1950, and the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1955.¹ In 1960, the Bilateral Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression Treaty between China and Afghanistan was signed, and the Afghanistan–China border was officially settled in 1964.² Over the past few years, China’s aspirations in Afghanistan have primarily focused on economic interests. Traditionally, Afghanistan has been a low diplomatic priority for China. Nevertheless, Beijing has actively engaged with Afghanistan along its western borders, particularly following the U.S. military drawdown that began in 2014.³ The complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 presented an even greater opportunity for China in Afghanistan.⁴

Following the collapse of the Communist regime in Afghanistan in 1992, the Taliban movement surged in response to the civil unrest fueled by Mujahedin factions fighting over power. Despite serving as the de facto government of the country, the Taliban was only officially recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.⁵ Mullah Muhammad Omar, according to some Taliban insiders, was chosen as their commander not because of his political or military capability but his religiosity and unwavering adherence to Islam. As he commented on his mission to a Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yousufzai, “we took up arms to achieve the aims of the Afghan Jihad and save our people from further suffering at the hands of the so-called Mujahedin; we had complete faith in God Almighty, we never forgot that He can bless us with victory or plunge us into defeat.”⁶

Reeling from the 9/11 attacks in 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush launched the War on Terror and deposed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Throughout the 20-year deployment, the number of U.S. troops increased from an initial 1,000–2,000 in 2001 to a maximum of 110,325 in 2011.⁷ However, the state-building and counterinsurgency efforts made by the United States in Afghanistan failed to prevent the Taliban’s resurgence. After capturing the last few major cities such as Jalalabad in the east and Mazar-e-Sharif in the north, the Taliban eventually took Kabul under its control in August 2021.⁸

While the Chinese government has maintained diplomatic relations with successive Afghan governments since 2001, it has never severed ties with the Taliban.⁹ China, due to its geographical proximity and significant demand for natural resources, is well positioned to play a major role in Afghanistan’s national development.¹⁰ During his visit to China in 2014, President Ashraf Ghani stated, “we view our foreign policy as a bundle of relations, the thickness or thinness of which depends on mutual trust and respect for our sovereign right to make choices that serve the interests of our people, the region, and the world.”¹¹ To gain political and economic support and avoid isolation, Afghanistan has been prompted to strengthen ties with its neighbors and other global stakeholders. As Afghanistan entered a new phase with the drawdown of coalition forces in 2014 and the full withdrawal of U.S. troops in August 2021, how have domestic and external factors transformed Afghanistan’s foreign policy toward China?

This paper reveals that successive Afghan governments have provided China with a unique position in their foreign policies. Following the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2021, China has increased its bilateral engagement with the Taliban government. Leveraging its geographical advantage, China continues to advocate for investment in Afghanistan’s mines and infrastructure to help rebuild the country’s economy. In the long term, Afghanistan and China need to establish trade zones and expand bilateral commercial ties along their thin border at the easternmost tip of the Wakhan Corridor. As a major regional and global power, China can fully leverage its influence to implement trust-building measures and foster regional consensus, helping to avert a proxy conflict in Afghanistan.

New Chapter in Afghanistan–China Relations

Historically, Afghanistan has long been within the sphere of China’s neighboring diplomacy. Beijing tends to prioritize its interests and adopt a utilitarian approach, allowing little room for ideology in its diplomatic relations with Kabul.¹² In 2009, U.S. President Obama introduced a strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, urging Afghanistan’s neighbors — particularly China — to provide greater attention and support to Afghanistan.¹³ In reality, this marked the first time the United States openly expressed its desire for China to take on a larger role. Following this, China’s varied collaborations and initiatives continued, culminating in the appointment of Mr. Sun Yuxi, former Chinese ambassador to both New Delhi and Kabul, as the special envoy to Afghanistan for the first time in July 2014.¹⁴

As a result, 2014 is often regarded as a defining year for China’s relationship with Afghanistan. Beijing made it clear to both friends and opponents that, unlike the aftermath of the Soviet exit, it would not remain on the sidelines and allow the country to descend into civil war.¹⁵ Instead, China strengthened its relationship with the Taliban to encourage their participation in peace talks. Following his victory in 2014, President Ghani outlined five circles of foreign policy, prioritizing relations with neighboring countries, Islamic states, Western nations such as the United States and those in Europe, Southeast Asian countries, and overall engagement with international organizations.¹⁶ Ghani’s foreign policy aimed to establish a forum for cooperation across five spheres, and his visit to China marked the beginning of a new phase in bilateral relations.¹⁷ According to Li Qingyan, a research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies, Ghani sought to improve bilateral relations with China for two key reasons. On the one hand, close cooperation between China and Pakistan can lead to a breakthrough in the deadlock of the peace process; on the other hand, it highlights China’s contribution to Afghanistan’s economic recovery.¹⁸

China’s engagement with Afghanistan since 2014 has primarily focused on three areas. The first is aid cooperation. On October 28, 2014, China signed a statement with Afghanistan to increase its aid to the country. In that year alone, the Chinese government provided non-reimbursable aid worth 81.7 million dollars, followed by an additional 245 million dollars over the next 3 years. Between 2001 and 2013, China’s total aid to Afghanistan amounted to approximately 326.7 million dollars.¹⁹ Consequently, China’s expansion of aid to Afghanistan marked a significant policy shift. The second area of focus is strengthening Afghanistan’s role in regional integration. On October 31, 2014, China hosted the fourth Foreign Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan. During this event, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang emphasized that Afghanistan’s integration into regional cooperation is a priority for China. Additionally, in support of political reconciliation and peaceful reconstruction, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and the broader region.²⁰ Third, China has developed its relations with the Taliban and actively participated in Afghan peace talks since 2014, a role it had rarely assumed in the past. In late 2014, China sponsored peace talks in Kabul between the Taliban and the Afghan government. During his visit to Pakistan in February 2015, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that China would support the Afghan government in achieving peace with various political groups, including the Taliban. The second round of peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government took place in China in the latter half of 2015. In 2016, Mr. Wang reiterated China’s commitment to supporting efforts to revive Taliban peace negotiations.²¹ However, China was unable to broker a peace deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban due to a lack of unity in regional consensus.

In this context, Chinese officials intensified their communications with the Taliban as the American military presence in Afghanistan diminished. China views the Taliban as an essential component of Afghanistan’s political future and recognizes its associated security concerns. Conversely, the Taliban government sees Beijing as a crucial investor and a key player in establishing its international legitimacy.²² Ultimately, despite their divergent ideologies and objectives, both Beijing and Kabul recognize the advantages of collaboration in this intricate interplay of geopolitical, security, and economic concerns.

Since the Islamic Emirate’s reclamation of power in 2021, Afghanistan’s regional ties have undergone significant transformation. To politically and economically support the fledgling regime, China, Russia, India, Iran, and Uzbekistan have convened in regional forums, addressing the challenges of political isolation and unrecognition faced by Afghanistan. In particular, China’s engagement with Afghanistan has the potential to significantly impact the country’s economic growth.²³ As Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi stated, the Taliban government has adopted a balanced and economically focused course.²⁴ Similarly, at the meeting of the Economic Commission in Kabul, Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Economic Commission Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar declared that eradicating poverty and unemployment is a top priority for Afghanistan.²⁵

As the world’s second-largest economy, China is among the few nations maintaining diplomatic missions in Afghanistan. The Afghan Foreign Ministry recognizes Sino-Afghan ties, particularly Mr. Zhao Xing’s nomination as Beijing’s new ambassador to Kabul, as a significant step forward with a positive message. China has consistently encouraged Afghanistan’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and has taken measures to restore frozen state assets to the country. In return, China has secured various diplomatic priorities, including the lavish welcome extended to Ambassador Zhao by the Taliban government.²⁶ Chinese President Xi Jinping accepted the credentials presented by Maulvi Asadullah Bilal Karimi,²⁷ with China’s Foreign Ministry officially recognizing him as Afghanistan’s ambassador.²⁸ Consequently, the Islamic Emirate expresses confidence that its interactions with China will elevate diplomatic relations between the two nations, marking the beginning of a new chapter in their partnership.²⁹

Afghanistan–China Economic Cooperation

As a landlocked country, Afghanistan lacks adequate communication and transportation infrastructure. President Ghani once envisioned Afghanistan as a regional hub for trade, transit, and peace, planning to establish a 76-km transportation link between the Wakhan Corridor and China’s far-western Xinjiang Autonomous Region to foster closer ties. Despite political isolation and economic sanctions hindering its ability to leverage its geo-strategic position, Afghanistan still holds significant potential to become an effective regional economic hub.

Afghanistan has the potential to become a key hub for energy trade in the region. According to President Ghani’s analysis, the country continuously works to enhance its gas resources, with gas pipelines serving as vital instruments for a rejuvenated Silk Road. Additionally, Afghanistan is rich in water resources, which are crucial for electricity and energy commerce. While South Asia faces a power deficit, Central Asia is a major energy producer. Afghanistan could generate up to 2,000 MW of electricity solely from its water resources.³⁰ Additionally, the Afghan government aims to extend energy pipelines, including those from Iran to China, which will necessitate transnational cooperation.³¹ Following the U.S. military withdrawal, the Taliban are tasked with managing Afghanistan’s water resources for both agriculture and power generation. Efforts to control water include utilizing resources from the Amu River through the Qush Tepa Canal and addressing conflicts with Iran over the Helmand River. The Qush Tepa Canal, which stretches 280 km and measures 100 m in width, aims to irrigate 500,000 ha of land across the Balkh, Jawzjan, and Faryab provinces. This 60 billion Afghanis project, being executed by the Afghanistan National Development Company, is fully funded by national revenues.³² Approximately 4,000 men are currently working on the excavation of this canal. Seamus Duffy believes that the project’s completion will significantly reduce wheat imports and represent a crucial step toward achieving self-sufficiency.³³

Without Afghanistan’s irreplaceable role as a communication hub, Central and South Asian states cannot fully leverage each other’s potentials and capabilities. Since the inauguration of President Ghani, Afghanistan has successfully reinvented itself, shifting away from the region’s previous “points of linkage” strategy. As a result, all regional countries have come to understand that no development plans will be viable without Afghanistan’s active participation.³⁴ Afghanistan can play a crucial role in realizing large-scale economic initiatives, including infrastructure development, energy pipelines, and trade corridors, by leveraging its strategic position as a communication hub. In this context, making the BRI a reality would represent a significant advancement in Afghanistan’s transformation, creating a legacy that both Chinese and Afghan leaderships can take pride in.³⁵ Undoubtedly, integrating Afghanistan into the BRI will yield substantial benefits for both Afghanistan and the broader region, enhancing economic connectivity while promoting political stability and regional cooperation. A significant initial step was the signing of a railway connectivity agreement among five nations — Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Iran, and China — on December 9, 2014.³⁶ In October 2017, Afghanistan became a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Following this, Afghan Finance Minister Eklil Hakimi met AIIB President Jin Liqun to explore opportunities for financial and technical support for Afghanistan’s solar energy and infrastructure projects.

China has committed to taking on a major economic role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.³⁷ During a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2014, President Ghani sought potential Chinese investors to enhance Afghanistan’s growth, particularly in the mining sector. A 3-billion-dollar deal has already been negotiated by a Chinese state corporation to develop a 5-million-ton copper deposit at Mes Aynak, located near Kabul.³⁸ Speaking at Tsinghua University, President Ghani illustrated that “cultural, political, and economic integration rendered European conflict unthinkable, yet the long-standing conflict in Asia persists. If we focus on continental-wide integration, we can establish a cohesive Asian continental economy.” He further emphasized that “China, India, and Russia require extensive infrastructure, and China lacks sufficient raw materials, which is where Afghanistan comes into play.” Clearly, the Silk Road plays a crucial role in this integration effort.³⁹

Since changing its foreign policy following the U.S. military drawdown, Afghanistan has entered a new era of rapprochement with its regional neighbors. To modernize its economy, the country urgently requires foreign capital. During the third meeting of foreign ministers from Afghanistan’s neighbors in March 2022, held in Tunxi, Anhui, China, all stakeholders pledged to support Afghanistan’s economic recovery through humanitarian aid, connectivity, commerce and trade, agriculture, energy, and capacity building.⁴⁰ To be precise, China is uniquely positioned to play a constructive role in the rehabilitation of Afghanistan, given its geographical proximity, capabilities, and rising ambitions for regional stability.⁴¹

Notably, Afghanistan possesses natural resources valued between 1 trillion and 3 trillion dollars, including oil, natural gas, copper, gold, cobalt, iron, lithium, and other precious stones. These resources represent a significant source of wealth and income for the nation, which can help alleviate hunger, reduce poverty, and lessen reliance on foreign aid.⁴² Exploiting Afghanistan’s natural resources may pose challenges due to the country’s infrastructural deficiencies. However, both Chinese and Taliban officials agree that China is the primary partner, as it is willing to invest in Afghanistan and support its reconstruction efforts.⁴³ To avert economic and humanitarian disasters in Afghanistan, the Taliban have crafted a foreign policy aimed at attracting foreign capital from regional states, such as China, while facilitating the execution of regional projects, including the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline, the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000), and the Trans-Afghan Transport Corridor.⁴⁴ Chinese investment in infrastructure projects, including roads, railways, and energy pipelines, could unlock Afghanistan’s economic potential and integrate the country into regional markets.

However, Chinese investments in Afghanistan will largely depend on the Islamic Emirate’s assurances of security. Beijing will remain cautious as long as significant security risks threaten these investments. Given its security concerns, China is closely monitoring the evolving situation in Afghanistan. As Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili from the University of Pittsburgh argues, China’s engagement in Afghanistan is driven by necessity.⁴⁵ In January 2023, a deal was reached between Afghanistan and China for the extraction of Qashqari oil, marking the first such agreement since the Taliban regained power.⁴⁶ From an economic perspective, Kabul has become more attractive due to Chinese investments by state-owned companies, including the Mes Aynak mine, oil extraction in the Amu River basin, and the construction of a 216 million dollar industrial park in Deh Sabz, New Kabul⁴⁷ as well as the inflow of Chinese merchants. On another note, both Jiangxi Copper Corporation and the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) have approached the exploitation of the Mes Aynak mine and the construction of the railway with caution, despite receiving security assurances from the Islamic Emirate.

Overall, Afghanistan–China economic cooperation holds significant promise for promoting development and stability in both Afghanistan and the broader region. However, this cooperation must be managed responsibly to ensure that all parties involved benefit. There is increasing concern regarding China’s exploitation of Afghanistan’s resources. Analyzing China’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan reveals a preference for multilateral approaches over purely bilateral ones, with the Qashqari oil extraction project serving as a noteworthy example. In the long run, China should consider investing more in essential infrastructure beyond just mineral projects.

Afghanistan–China Security Cooperation

Surrounded by Central and South Asian countries, as well as those in the Middle East, Afghanistan plays a crucial role in regional security. Achieving long-term peace and stability in Afghanistan will require a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of conflict, including political disagreements, economic disparities, and social instability. Traditionally, China’s security interests in Afghanistan are closely tied to securing its western borders. In light of this, some experts have proposed a strategy that incorporates limited economic involvement in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, provided it aligns with China’s regional economic ambitions.⁴⁸ According to Zohra Mohammadzai, China has made significant progress in the security domain while also pursuing its commercial interests in Afghanistan. As China takes steps to enhance Afghanistan’s security, its economic approach is transitioning toward a more integrated economic-security strategy.⁴⁹

Since the United States and its allies began withdrawing some of their troops in 2014, China started collaborating more closely with the Afghan government,⁵⁰ amid concerns that Afghanistan could be used as a launchpad for strikes on China’s Xinjiang.⁵¹ Consequently, China announced the delivery of military aid during the visit of a high-ranking Chinese military delegation in 2016, and has since consecutively sent special envoys to Afghanistan, including Mr. Sun Yuxi (2014–2015), Mr. Deng Xijun (2015–2020), Mr. Liu Jian (2020–2021), and Mr. Yue Xiaoyong (2021-present).⁵²

During his visit to China in October 2014, President Ghani agreed that Afghanistan would not permit any activities threatening China’s security on Afghan territory. Senior Chinese diplomat Kong Xuanyou also stated that President Ghani had pledged to firmly support China in its fight against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).⁵³ In July 2021, following a meeting between Taliban delegates and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Beijing deemed the Taliban government qualified to secure China’s western borders and contain the Islamic State–Khorasan (IS–K). It appeared that China had obtained certain pledges from the Taliban to help keep Islamist groups out of Xinjiang.⁵⁴ Beijing continues to press the Taliban for assurances that Afghanistan will not become a safe haven for the ETIM.

The complete withdrawal of foreign troops has sparked a new wave of regional engagement in Afghanistan. A stable Afghanistan will enable China and other neighboring countries to contribute to the country’s economic reconstruction.⁵⁵ Beijing’s key security interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia include securing the BRI, safeguarding critical cross-border infrastructure projects, combating the “three evils” of terrorism, extremism, and separatism, and eradicating the ETIM. To achieve these objectives, China must build bilateral and multilateral partnerships through platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA).⁵⁶

According to Niva Yau, an expert on China’s regional policies, when Beijing states that it seeks to build regional consensus and manage Afghanistan, this does not imply that all countries will work together. Instead, it involves developing a common set of goals and strategies that each country in the region can pursue independently. As Yau points out, China aims to establish itself as the driving force behind the regional, and eventually global, administration of Afghanistan’s affairs.⁵⁷ Afghanistan can adapt to various geo-strategic scenarios if the country is secure enough; otherwise, its role will be significantly diminished.⁵⁸ Consequently, bolstering security in Afghanistan is crucial for realizing its greater geopolitical significance, as well as for the stability and development of the nation. By addressing security issues and fostering collaboration among its neighboring countries, Afghanistan can actively influence regional dynamics and promote peace and development.

In general, China’s security engagement with Afghanistan is driven by two primary objectives: to foster Afghanistan’s stability and to exert political influence that rivals the interests of other powers, including India and the United States.⁵⁹ Afghanistan’s isolation is detrimental not only to itself but also to the entire region, leading to increased starvation, immigration, drug production, and drug trafficking. As the country continues to grapple with political isolation and economic sanctions, Beijing’s support is crucial. However, Beijing expects more from Kabul in terms of protecting Chinese citizens and combating terrorists and separatists. There is a prevailing argument that China will not launch BRI projects in Afghanistan or expand its economic footprint until the Islamic Emirate addresses China’s security concerns.⁶⁰ Therefore, to secure the necessary infrastructure development for mineral extraction in Afghanistan, the Islamic Emirate must embrace China’s legitimate demands for the protection of its security interests.⁶¹

Conclusion

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s first visit to China marked a milestone in Afghanistan–China relations following his inauguration and the initial withdrawal of foreign troops in 2014. This visit opened a new chapter in bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the two nations. During the Republic era, China’s engagement was primarily focused on addressing security concerns in Afghanistan and acting as a broker between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Despite concerted efforts, these endeavors did not yield tangible results.

While since 2021, China has significantly intensified its engagement with Afghanistan to guarantee its security and economic interests. The intensity of China’s diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan might not last for long, for both sides bear their respective objectives in mind and have yet established a strategic partnership. While the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan aims to boost domestic economy through revenues from mineral extraction and expects China to politically recognize the country, China seeks to fulfil its prior promises of economic support to guarantee continued access to the country’s untapped natural resources when monitoring its security conditions. As a result, a long-term strategic partnership will be needed to address China’s security concerns and lay the foundations for Afghanistan’s economic growth.

However, since China still holds its doubt about Afghanistan’s long-term stability and particularly the covert relations between the Islamic Emirate and the United States, the trust deficit can hinder potential Chinese investment in Afghanistan. Consequently, the Taliban government needs to adopt moderate policies that are conducive to promoting political stability and regional interactions. What’s more, the Taliban government should also demonstrate its commitment to peace and stability, in order to incentivize Chinese investment in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. By doing so, Afghanistan will embrace more opportunities to transform itself into a more autonomous and stable nation, both politically and economically.

Notes