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The rapid urbanization in China has led to a substantial expansion of construction activities, causing notable energy consumption and a consequent rise in CO₂ emissions. This study proposes an approach to assess CO₂ emission efficiency in China’s construction industry by integrating data envelopment analysis cross-efficiency and the Nash bargaining game, considering CO₂ as a fixed-sum undesirable output. The study identifies Jiangsu and Beijing as top performers, establishing benchmarks for other provinces. In contrast, Inner Mongolia displays the lowest efficiency. Generally, most provinces exhibit room to improve environmental efficiency in the construction sector. The study provides policy implications and tailored suggestions for specific provinces.

In a centralized decision-making environment, the central unit supervises all the operating units’ production activities and focuses on achieving the overall goals of the entire organization from a global viewpoint by allocating available resources to them. However, all the current models about resource allocation under the centralized decision-making commonly exhibit the non-unique optimal solutions and neglect the competition and trade-off among all the DMUs to maximize the individual aggregated output of each DMU. This phenomenon makes the allocation result imbalanced and unacceptable to all the DMUs. To overcome this problem, this paper introduces Nash bargaining game theory to develop a new centralized resource allocation model which not only takes into account the overall goals of the organization from an overall perspective, but also considers competition and trade-off among all the DMUs. Finally, an empirical example is used to demonstrate the applicability of our proposed approach. The results show that our Nash bargaining game model not only guarantees the uniqueness of the optimal resource allocation results, but also improves the balance of the resource allocation result, which makes it acceptable to all the DMUs.

A mobile community can be composed of multiple mobile devices through D2D (Device-to-Device) network. In many cases, these mobile devices cannot conveniently connect to the Internet, for various reasons. To overcome this obstacle, one solution is to let the mobile devices cooperate with each other through a D2D-enabled network, forming a mobile community that, as a whole, may be able to autonomously execute the tasks requested by its members. To maximize the overall benefits of mobile communities, this paper proposes a novel task allocation approach, EDTG (Energy-aware and Deadline-constrained Task allocation using Game theory). In mobile communities, energy consumption is responsible for the largest part of the cost. Energy management can lead to performance degradation and even be perceived as a bottleneck, while load balancing between devices can improve service performance and resource utilization to the largest extent. EDTG has considered both the inevitable performance constraints at each device and a method based on the connectivity of graph theory, in order to narrow down the search scope of optimal target mobile devices where requested tasks can be executed. The “Bargaining Game” method is designed and exploited to obtain the final task allocation solution. Final experimental results demonstrate that compared to existing approaches, EDTG ensures high-performance task execution and reaches the goal of maximizing the overall benefits to some extent, by achieving better energy savings and exploiting load balancing between devices.

The paper is a kind of generalization of Rubinstein bargaining model. Rubinstein assumed that preferences of the players were constant in time, and he analyzed models in which preferences of each player were defined either by constant discount rate or by constant bargaining cost. In this paper, a bargaining model is presented, in which preferences of each player are expressed simultaneously by sequence of discount rates and sequence of bargaining costs varying in time. The results presented in the paper concern subgame perfect equilibria. There is a theorem concerning sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Moreover, some theorems presenting forms of subgame perfect equilibria for various cases of the model analyzed have been proved here. A possibility of delay in reaching an agreement is also considered in the paper. If we analyze a class of strategies, that depend on the former history, a delay can appear for some models. The adequate examples are presented. In the paper, some applications of the bargaining model are also described.

In the literature of cooperative game theory, it is often assumed that there is only one coalition composed of all the players other than the dummies in a cooperative game of complete information, although the coalition formation is examined and the equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF) was defined in a repeated cooperative game of incomplete information. On the other hand, the blocking approach only provided several possible ranges of the distribution scheme of the cooperative payoff of a coalition in a cooperative game with agreements implemented by a third party, and the single point solutions provided are usually collectivistic.

This paper examines the coalition formation in a cooperative game with agreements implemented by a third party, and provides the existence proof and an algorithm of the coalition equilibrium; moreover, this paper analyzes the equilibrium of the bargaining game on the distribution of the cooperative payoff of a coalition under the coalition equilibrium, and examines the distribution scheme of cooperative payoff of a coalition.