Narrow Results

We clarify the role of the Born rule in the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics by deriving it from Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts, translated into the following mathematical statement: a quantum system described by a noncommutative C*-algebra of observables is empirically accessible only through associated commutative C*-algebras. The Born probabilities emerge as the relative frequencies of outcomes in long runs of measurements on a quantum system; it is not necessary to adopt the frequency interpretation of single-case probabilities (which will be the subject of a sequel paper). Our derivation of the Born rule uses ideas from a program begun by Finkelstein [17] and Hartle [21], intending to remove the Born rule as a separate postulate of quantum mechanics. Mathematically speaking, our approach refines previous elaborations of this program — notably the one due to Farhi, Goldstone, and Gutmann [15] as completed by Van Wesep [50] — in replacing infinite tensor products of Hilbert spaces by continuous fields of C*-algebras. Furthermore, instead of relying on the controversial eigenstate-eigenvalue link in quantum theory, our derivation just assumes that pure states in classical physics have the usual interpretation as truthmakers that assign sharp values to observables.

Quantum gravitational effects suggest a minimal length, or spacetime interval, of order of the Planck length. This in turn suggests that Hilbert space itself may be discrete rather than continuous. One implication is that quantum states with norm below some very small threshold do not exist. The exclusion of what Everett referred to as maverick branches is necessary for the emergence of the Born Rule in no collapse quantum mechanics. We discuss this in the context of quantum gravity, showing that discrete models (such as simplicial or lattice quantum gravity) indeed suggest a discrete Hilbert space with minimum norm. These considerations are related to the ultimate level of fine-graining found in decoherent histories (of spacetime geometry plus matter fields) produced by quantum gravity.

More general probability sum-rules for describing interference found in quantum mechanics (QM) were formulated by Sorkin in a hierarchy of such rules. The additivity of classical measure theory corresponds to the second sum-rule. QM violates this rule, but satisfies the third and higher sum-rules. This evokes the question of whether there are physical principles that forbid their violation. We show that in a theory that is indistinguishable from quantum mechanics in first and second-order interferences, the violation of higher sum-rules allows for superluminal signaling, essentially because probability measures can be contextual in such theories.

The Transactional Interpretation offers a solution to the measurement problem by identifying specific physical conditions precipitating the non-unitary ‘measurement transition’ of von Neumann. Specifically, the transition occurs as a result of absorber response (a process lacking in the standard approach to the theory). The purpose of this Letter is to make clear that, despite recent claims to the contrary, the concepts of ‘absorber’ and ‘absorber response,’ as well as the process of absorption, are physically and quantitatively well-defined in the transactional picture. In addition, the Born Rule is explicitly derived for radiative processes.

In the libertarian “agent causation” view of free will, free choices are attributable only to the choosing agent, as opposed to a specific cause or causes outside the agent. An often-repeated claim in the philosophical literature on free will is that agent causation necessarily implies lawlessness, and is therefore “antiscientific.” That claim is critiqued and it is argued, on the contrary, that the volitional powers of a free agent need not be viewed as anomic, specifically with regard to the quantum statistical law (the Born Rule). Assumptions about the role and nature of causation, taken as bearing on volitional agency, are examined and found inadequate to the task. Finally, it is suggested that quantum theory may constitute precisely the sort of theory required for a nomic grounding of libertarian free will.

Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability theory are extended to conditional probabilities among distinct (and sometimes intertwining) contexts. Formally, this amounts to row stochastic matrices whose entries characterize the conditional probability to find some observable (postselection) in one context, given an observable (preselection) in another context. As the respective probabilities need not (but, depending on the physical/model realization, can) be of the Born rule type, this generalizes approaches to quantum probabilities by Aufféves and Grangier, which in turn are inspired by Gleason’s theorem.

In the last five years of his life Itamar Pitowsky developed the idea that the formal structure of quantum theory should be thought of as a Bayesian probability theory adapted to the empirical situation that Nature’s events just so happen to conform to a non-Boolean algebra. QBism too takes a Bayesian stance on the probabilities of quantum theory, but its probabilities are the personal degrees of belief a sufficiently-schooled agent holds for the consequences of her actions on the external world. Thus QBism has two levels of the personal where the Pitowskyan view has one. The differences go further. Most important for the technical side of both views is the quantum mechanical Born Rule, but in the Pitowskyan development it is a theorem, not a postulate, arising in the way of Gleason from the primary empirical assumption of a non-Boolean algebra. QBism on the other hand strives to develop a way to think of the Born Rule in a pre-algebraic setting, so that it itself may be taken as the primary empirical statement of the theory. In other words, the hope in QBism is that, suitably understood, the Born Rule is quantum theory’s most fundamental postulate, with the Hilbert space formalism (along with its perceived connection to a non-Boolean event structure) arising only secondarily. This paper will avail of Pitowsky’s program, along with its extensions in the work of Jeffrey Bub and William Demopoulos, to better explicate QBism’s aims and goals.

Non-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics set themselves the task of developing a self-consistent and empirically adequate version of quantum mechanics that does not make use of the projection postulate (or collapse of the wavefunction). Only unitary evolution is allowed in these interpretations, so that superpositions are always maintained during evolution—even in measurements. In this paper we discuss how this deterministic mathematical scheme can be brought into accordance with the usual statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. In particular, we investigate how the Born probability rule fits in.

We present a very general geometrico-dynamical description of physical or more abstract entities, called the general tension-reduction (GTR) model, where not only states, but also measurement-interactions can be represented, and the associated outcome probabilities calculated. Underlying the model is the hypothesis that indeterminism manifests as a consequence of unavoidable uctuations in the experimental context, in accordance with the hidden-measurements interpretation of quantum mechanics. When the structure of the state space is Hilbertian, and measurements are of the universal kind, i.e., are the result of an average over all possible ways of selecting an outcome, the GTR-model provides the same predictions of the Born rule, and therefore provides a natural completed version of quantum mechanics. However, when the structure of the state space is non-Hilbertian and/or not all possible ways of selecting an outcome are available to be actualized, the predictions of the model generally differ from the quantum ones, especially when sequential measurements are considered. Some paradigmatic examples will be discussed, taken from physics and human cognition. Particular attention will be given to some known psychological effects, like question order effects and response replicability, which we show are able to generate non-Hilbertian statistics. We also suggest a realistic interpretation of the GTR-model, when applied to human cognition and decision, which we think could become the generally adopted interpretative framework in quantum cognition research.

In the libertarian “agent causation” view of free will, free choices are attributable only to the choosing agent, as opposed to a specific cause or causes outside the agent. An often-repeated claim in the philosophical literature on free will is that agent causation necessarily implies lawlessness, and is therefore “antiscientific.” That claim is critiqued and it is argued, on the contrary, that the volitional powers of a free agent need not be viewed as anomic, specifically with regard to the quantum statistical law (the Born Rule). Assumptions about the role and nature of causation, taken as bearing on volitional agency, are examined and found inadequate to the task. Finally, it is suggested that quantum theory may constitute precisely the sort of theory required for a nomic grounding of libertarian free will.

We show that the extended Bloch representation of quantum mechanics also applies to infinite-dimensional entities, to the extent that the number of (possibly infinitely degenerate) outcomes of a measurement remains finite, which is always the case in practical situations.