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The spread of disinformation in online social networks (OSNs) poses a significant threat to maintaining normal social order. It is important to understand when and how intervention measures can control the spread of disinformation. We propose a novel information spreading model called susceptible, exposed, negative-infected, positive-infected, recovered population (SENPR) to describe the disinformation dynamics in OSNs under the intervention strategy. The model in this study considers that the susceptible population in the network is transformed into an exposed population through the influence of two information-dissemination methods that affect other susceptible people in the network. Subsequently, the stability of the model was analyzed to verify the validity of the obtained theoretical results. Finally, the influence of different parameters on the spread of disinformation is described, and corresponding management strategies to suppress the spread of false information in emergency situations are discussed. The results show that word-of-mouth is the main mode of communication in the “development” and “burst” stages of information spreading. The earlier the intervention is implemented, the sooner the number of people affected by word-of-mouth begins to decline and the sooner the spreading of disinformation reaches the saturation and decay stages.

本文嘗試比較兩個危機管理模式，其一是香港家庭福利會“綜合家居照顧服務隊”在2003年SARS 於牛頭角下邨及淘大花園爆發時，總結和歸納出來的一個“危機管理實戰模式”。另一個是 Gonzalez Herrerom 及 Pratt (1995) 建立的一個“危機管理概略模式”。實戰模式更針對其缺漏加以修正和完善，嘗試把概念和實戰經驗融合。經修正後，“實戰模式”的實用性，應可推及至由其他傳染病引致的危機管理上。

This article compared two crisis management models. One of the models — 'crisis management practice model' is formulated from the practical crisis management experiences of the integrated home care service center during the SARS attack in 2003. It is based on the service delivery in the two most affected areas, the Lower Ngau Tau Kok Estate and the Amoy Garden. The other model is a four-phase 'crisis management conceptual process model' developed by Gonzalez Herrerom and Pratt (1995). The practice model is further consolidated, enriched and refined in view of the Gonzalez Herrerom and Pratt's model to integrate the conceptual and practical aspects. Its applicability can be extended to other crisis caused by outbreak from other infectious diseases.

This economic research was based on the literary analysis, various empirical studies and statistical versus qualitative research in 500 problematic companies mainly in the East of Slovakia. Businesses received about 100 questions about innovation management, innovation support, strategic planning, roadmapping, risk management, etc. These statistical results were completed by the expert consultations in 2018–2019. Based on the research results, it can be concluded that these problematic companies are mainly micro-companies with up to 10 employees (mostly Ltd.), mainly in the construction, engineering, automotive, rubber, and plastic industries. These companies are dominated by piece and series production. The use of RM processes was minimal and only applied in larger companies (TR ≥ 500 000 €). The roadmapping processes have been greatly simplified and unsystematic, mainly based on the requirements of business owners or top managers.

How do state leaders use crisis management to strengthen state infrastructural power? What explains the strategic choices of a state’s selective institutionalization of crisis measures? Crises offer unique opportunities for state-building, yet the role of crisis management in consolidating state power is underexamined. This paper explores these important issues by examining how the Chinese government has deployed wartime-like measures in battling the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and COVID-19. While authorities in China have adopted unconventional measures in managing the crises, they have selectively normalized ad hoc practices and institutionalized certain measures to strengthen state infrastructural power once they have ended or been temporarily contained. Drawing on the frameworks of rational choice and historical institutionalism, our analysis suggests that the central government normalizes or institutionalizes measures that help to consolidate its control of the bureaucracy and enhance regime legitimacy.

Intensifying US–China rivalry has heightened the risk of accidental crises that might spiral out of control. Even as President Biden continues much of the Trump administration’s confrontational approach to China, senior Biden administration officials agree on the strategic imperative of improving the risk reduction mechanisms between Beijing and Washington. Though the odds of armed conflict arising from deliberate provocations may be low, the risks of spinoff crises in China’s periphery and accidental crises in emerging domains like space and cyberspace have grown in recent years. Amid growing geopolitical and geoeconomic tensions, better crisis management serves the interests of China, the United States, and the world at large. Beijing should maintain its effective deterrence by upholding the “security through mutual trust” principle and laying out clear red lines. It should also resist Washington’s efforts to include illegitimate interests and conduct risk reduction mechanisms and promote multilateral security talks on the codes of conduct in space, cyberspace, and other emerging domains.

The crises that have occurred over the last decade revealed the rapidly changing array of threats that the world is facing. Whether we are talking about natural disasters, pandemics, terrorism, armed conflicts or financial crises, the crises that the world is facing today possess characteristics that are distinct from conventional crises. Besides dealing with these acute crises, the world is also faced with slow-burning or creeping crises, such as antibiotic resistance and greying population; these crises take time to develop but have damaging, irreversible effects if no immediate action is taken. The changing dynamics of modern crises raise new challenges for crisis management and leaders must be prepared to manage them. Although modern crises are increasingly unforeseeable and unpredictable, leaders are expected to have anticipated their occurrence and to mitigate the risks and damages. This chapter highlights five key points leaders should note about managing modern crises, and recommends five key approaches to managing them, centring around building resilience in people and systems to anticipate and prepare for these modern crises.

The five earlier chapters introduced the basic foundation (co-existence of order and complexity, sensitive dependence on initial conditions, complexity <=> presence of in-determinism and unpredictability, necessities to change, the intelligence paradigmatic shift, structural reform, complex adaptive systems and dynamic, and some other fundamental and critical properties/characteristics involved) of the complexity theory and intelligent organization (IO) theory. This chapter introduces the global/holistic complexity-intelligence strategy (with two macro-paths) of the IO theory (although, some sub-strategies/models have been mentioned or partially analyzed in earlier chapters). The new strategy attempts to provide more comprehensive linkages and coverage on some specialized aspects indicating that human organizations must be led and managed differently in the current context because of high complexity density. In this chapter, three sub-strategies of the holistic complexity-intelligence strategy that is vital for nurturing highly intelligent human organizations (iCAS) are examined. They are namely, organizing around intelligence, nurturing an intelligent biotic macro-structure, and the integrated deliberate and emergent strategy.

The intelligence/conscious-centricity aspect begins with a deeper analysis on human level intelligence and consciousness, complexity, collective intelligence, org-consciousness and their associated dynamics relative to that of some other biological species (swarm intelligence), as well as other physical complex adaptive systems (CAS) characteristics. It has been observed that human interconnectivity, interdependency, selforganizing communications, truthful engagement, complex networks, collective intelligence, orgmindfulness, orgmind, and emergence can be significantly dissimilar. The four different perspectives of organizing around intelligence are examined.

Next, the intelligent biotic macro-structure (introduced earlier in Chapters 3 to 4) that resembles a highly intelligent biological being, and is more effective at exploiting information processing and knowledge accumulation, and a smarter evolver are more deeply scrutinized. There exists a high synchrony between organizing around intelligence and the presence of a biotic macro-structure. Thus, the advantages and significance for intelligent human organizations to possess such an inherent biotic macro-structure to better exploit certain biological and complexity associated characteristics and dynamics (including intelligence-intelligence linkage, complexity-centricity, complexity-intelligence linkage, more efficient natural decision-making node, information processing capability, learning and adaptation, knowledge acquisition and creation, organizational neural network, artificial node, and structural and dynamical coherency) to compete more effectively and efficiently in the current ‘raplexity’ context is also illustrated. In addition, the uniqueness and roles of artificial information systems (artificial nodes) is further examined.

Finally, the integrated deliberate and emergent strategy is scrutinized with respect to its significant association with the co-existence of order (deliberate planning, determinism, completeness and predictability) and complexity (continuous nurturing processes, in-determinism, unpredictability, unknown unknowns, risk management, new opportunity, crisis management, self-transcending constructions, futuristic and emergence) — in particular, highlighting the criticality of the deliberate and emergent auto-switch (better ambidexterity). Currently, the holistic integrated smarter evolver and emergent strategist approach is absent in most human organizations.

Fundamentally, effective leadership is associated with its ability to achieve collective goals (agents and their organization, stability-inducing capability) and organizational sustainability, irrespective of the nature of the organizations (leadership capacity <=> relational capacity <=> unifying capacity). The mismatch of the bureaucratic mindset and its associated hierarchical/administrative leadership with the changing situation is escalating. Basically, the presence of an adaptive leadership is beneficial. In this respect, the collectiveness capacity and relational capacity of the organization are critical attributes. It has been recognized that the intense and quality of these two capacities is highly dependent on both the thinking and attributes of the leaders, as well as the other interacting agents (including non-actors, and quality of leader–agents exchanges). Overall, a high leadership capacity and organizational mental cohesion is a key necessity. In general, the success of today’s global turbulence can only be achieved through global mental cohesion.

In order to achieve this, fresh insights beginning with constructive intelligence-intelligence linkages is required. In the present state, it is significant to note that for any categories of human organizations (economic, social, education, political, and military) their agents (employees, citizens, members, stakeholders) are possessing redefined attributes (principles, values and expectations), due to better education, quick access to information, and high interconnectivity. This profound transition (supported by intensive usage of mobile/social media technology) transformed some other attributes including autonomy/ independency, autopoiesis, self-centricity, self-organizing communications, interdependency, symbiosis, and other self-organizing capabilities. Consequently, current human beings are more sophisticated interacting agents. Hence, leading these ‘transformed’ agents is drastically different from leading traditional setups. Agent-centricity is a new vital attribute that required deeper attention, and one commonality among agents at all levels must be achieved — stability-centricity (agent-centricity <=> intelligence/consciousness-centricity + stability-centricity).

The more intelligent, complex adaptive, and nonlinear evolving dynamic is driven by the intrinsic intelligence/consciousness of the individuals, and the collective intelligence and org-consciousness of the organization (anticipatory, adaptive capacity), as well as local spaces/ complex networks — the presence of networks (formal and informal) is becoming more dominant, and this development renders elevating collectiveness capacity (consensus and collaboration) at organizational level more complex. Apparently, coupled with the influence of the knowledge-intensive, fast-changing, more complex environment, and the modified agents’ attributes, an immense shift in strategic thinking, leadership attributes, governance characteristics, management abilities and operational style in the new generation of leaders is inevitable. In general, the leader–follower gap has been narrowed, and their relationship (relational parameter) is more complex and nonlinear, again, confirming that intelligence/consciousness-centricity must be a key focus of the new leadership.

In such a situation, a deeper insight into complexity is inevitable. In this case, a better comprehension of leadership strategy and organizational dynamic can be acquired by ‘bisociating’ some properties of the complexity theory, and the different perspectives of complexity-intelligence linkages. The resulting evolutionary model to be introduced in this chapter is the intelligence leadership theory/strategy for iCAS. In this model, an intelligence leader must recognize that a fundamental capability of intelligence is stability enhancement. Concurrently, an intelligence leader must be an effective lateral/collective actor (always encompassing agent-agent, intelligence-intelligence, agent-network, agent-system, and network-system linkages; and the intrinsic leadership capacity of all agents, and collective leadership capacity of networks and the organization) with a new set of attributes (encompassing enabler, smarter evolver, and unifying, emergent strategist and synergist capabilities).

Hence, an effective intelligence leader must possess certain relevant or appropriate attributes of the traditional leadership, as well as a set of new complexity-intelligence related attributes that can better ensure the survival of the agents, integrate networks, and elevate the resilience, and sustainability of the organization (achieving higher coherency, synergy, constructionist effect, self-organizing capacity, emergence-intelligence capacity, unifying capacity and organizational mental cohesion) — (constructionist effect <=> innovation and creativity) — that is, focusing on continuous acquisition of capacities improvement is critical. In addition, with this paradigmatic shift, possessing the latent leadership capability is highly beneficial.

This chapter introduces the system for crisis management in Sweden. Over the last century, Sweden has gone from being a poor European backwater to being among the countries with the highest human development in the world. The droughts and harsh winters that killed thousands and drove numerous Swedes to emigrate in the past are mere distractions today and the contemporary system for crisis management is designed to deal with a broader variety of crises than the ones triggered by natural hazards. The system is based on the principles of responsibility, parity and proximity, and distributes sector and area responsibility for crisis management to numerous actors. It is built to a great extent on collaboration between these actors, which is challenging but working relatively well in the cultural context of consensus-seeking and compliance to official guidelines and accepted rules of engagement. However, the system is in itself ambiguous in the sense of distributing responsibility to all kinds of actors and then focusing almost exclusively on public actors in legislation, guidelines and practice. There is also often a gap between policy and practice concerning how area responsibility is exercised, and a lack of clarity in current sector specific legislation.