Narrow Results

In (2008), McMorris and Powers [A characterization of majority rule, J. Classif.25 (2008) 153–158] proved that a hierarchical version of majority rule is the only consensus function satisfying restricted decisive neutrality, symmetry, monotonicity, and is biprofile nontrivial. We show that this result can be extended to any finite median semilattice $X$ such that $X$ is not a lattice, the height of $X$ is greater than one, $X$ contains at least two atoms, and $X$ satisfies a condition we call special.

The way in which an opinion rejecting reform can finally become the consensus of everyone was studied by Galam (2002) in a probabilistic model. We now replace his clusters by those formed via random percolation by letting particles diffuse on a lattice. Galam's rejection of reform is reproduced below the percolation threshold, whereas at and above the threshold, approval of a reform also becomes possible.

The local majority rule is extensively accepted as a paradigmatic model to reflect the formation of opinion. In this paper, we study a model of opinion formation where opinion update rule is not based on the majority rule or linear selection probability but on a strengthen selection probability controlled by an adjustable parameter β. In particular, our proposed probability function can proximately fit the two extreme cases–linear probability function and majority rule or in between the two cases under different values of β. By studying such model on different kinds of networks, including different regular networks and complex networks, we find that there exists an optimal value of β giving the most efficient convergence to consensus regardless of the topology of networks. This work reveals that, compared with the majority rule and linear selection probability, the strengthen selection probability might be a more proper model in understanding the formation of opinions in society.

This paper establishes an analytical framework for cooperative public choice games. In a cooperative public choice game under unanimity rule, all the players who belong to the only coalition will equally divide the cooperative payoff surplus, the equilibrium public choice is the one which can bring about the maximum cooperative payoff among all the public choices. In a cooperative public choice game under majority rule, compared with other public choices, the public choice with maximum comparative payoff will finally win the required majority of votes because of its greatest capability of attracting the intermediate team. When in a public choice game under majority rule there are more than two public choices which can bring about the maximum comparative payoff to the supporter coalition, the equilibrium choice will be the same one in the same public choice game under unanimity rule.

This paper introduces information asymmetry, cooperation and payoff compensation mechanism into public choice games, and establishes an analytical frame for information asymmetric cooperative public choice games. This paper examines the coalition formation and the distribution of the cooperative payoff under the equilibrium public choice (if it does exist) in an information asymmetric public choice game under unanimity rule and those in an information asymmetric public choice game under majority rule, respectively. Arrow [1951] and Sen [1970] assumed that there is no cooperation and payoff compensation mechanism in a public choice game, and showed that rational individuals with individual sovereignty could not reach consensus on any public choice. This paper shows that, even in a public choice game of information asymmetry, the cooperation and payoff compensation mechanism may lead to the coalition equilibrium, the achievement of equilibrium public choice, and the distribution equilibrium of cooperative payoff of the coalition which supports the equilibrium public choice, whether the public choice games are under unanimity rule or under majority rule.

This area of research tries, through the introduction of politics in economic models, to explain the existence and the extent of anti-trade bias in trade policy. The two main approaches, namely, the median-voter approach and the special-interest approach are surveyed. Certain applications of these approaches to policy issues, such as trade agreements, the issue of reciprocity versus unilateralism in trade policy, regionalism versus multilateralism, hysteresis in trade policy and the choice of policy instruments, are discussed. Finally, the empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy is surveyed. The new literature that employs a more ‘structural’ approach is emphasized.