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The rapid fall of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia on January 14, 2011 has not only sparked a wave of uprisings across the Arab region, but has also raised many questions about the rotes of socio-economic inequality, youth unemployment, corruption, and government oppression in the making of the Tunisian uprisings. This paper argues that what seemed to be an island of stability in the region was in fact a ticking time bomb that was set off by Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010. It further argues that the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime could not have taken place had it not been a leaderless revolt. As a result, the paper provides a critical analysis of the making of the Tunisian revolution by investigating the key factors that maintained stability, and the mechanisms that set the stage for the uprisings. In doing so, the analysis reveals the radical social transformation that took place since the early 1990s leading to the breakdown of the social contract, and the gradual drift of the middle class away from its implicit support of the Ben Ali regime. The new political landscape opens up a real opportunity for democratic transformation, vibrant civic engagement, and sustainable economic revival. Therefore, our analysis would be incomplete without a careful look at the new dynamic between the forces of political Islam, secularism, and the middle class. Finally, the paper closes with a summary and some concluding remarks.

The neoliberal planning theory, the subject of the paper, is derived from the policy substantiation of the neoliberal development ideology. The theory is built on participatory principles in the context of market force ruled by informality. This planning perspective has had the potential to sustain the imperial space economy associated with Africa since the mid-19th century. Neoliberal planning theory is regarded as a theory that seriously questions its planning cognate purports as it indicates the outlook for contemporary planning initiatives, perspectives and frameworks. This paper argues that this trend is potentially antithetical to the rhetoric of African renaissance and postulates a change in development ideology as an entry point for appropriate planning option for Africa.

The Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) faces monumental challenges derived from institutional and financial accountability, as well as the ability to deliver on its promises of increased economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, China is resolute in cementing its economic position in the global market and expanding its regional influence. The main justification for instituting AIIB is to provide secured loans to underdeveloped Asia-Pacific countries ineligible to obtain funds through other global financial institutions. However, by lessening loan barriers, AIIB’s approach threatens to give rise to regional economic volatility — a vice adamantly despised under the Bretton Woods system. The pivotal element that defines AIIB’s outcome is a well-diversified cofounding member cohort insistent on implementing sound regulatory measures. AIIB needs a divergent membership that considers the socio-economic determinants of individual requestors, allowing for well-diversified and well-balanced opinions on operating principles. Without this element China might be subjugating its clients, the Asia-Pacific countries, to yet another form of manipulation that was shunned under the Bretton Woods system. Would this be another subtle attempt of Chinese influence for a stake in regional hegemony under a guise of alleviating the impoverished regions of Asia-Pacific? Transparency, emphasis on operating principles enacted with democratic accord and accountability should serve as guiding blocks of the well-diversified cofounding cohort. These measures would hold China to its vows of increased prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, which it is attempting to deliver through AIIB. This paper examines the advantages of the AIIB as well as drawbacks that could place the Asia-Pacific countries into another “golden straitjacket” if these propositions are not taken into consideration.

In Cathonomics: How Catholic Tradition Can Create A More Just Economy, Anthony Annett provides an account of Catholic social teaching, mainly encapsulated in papal encyclicals from 1891 to the present day, as a value system for economic policy-making in the contemporary world. He argues that values and ethical principles embedded in Catholic social teaching are a better basis for economic policy than the frameworks of “neoclassical” or “neoliberal” economics, with respect to goals such as human rights, inequality and environmental protection. This review evaluates Annett’s arguments in the context of other approaches to providing moral foundations for economic policy, and with respect to the state of current economic thinking. It also considers issues embedded in the difference between “religious economics” and the “economics of religion,” the role of religious reasons in public policy, and underlying conditions of power.

This chapter begins by addressing the food, energy, and water trilemma. A critique of the impact of neoliberalism that traces the transition from industrial to financial capitalism follows. The trade-off arising from improvements in living standards and environmental impact is then explored. In a context where socioeconomic and cultural differences result in conflicting views of what is virtuous, there is a problem of trust. The central proposition is that a new frame grounded in New Institutional Economics (NIE) is required. Fintech and distributed ledger technology (DLT) offer a unique way of building the essential institutional infrastructure required to overcome the problem of trust. Examples showing how fintech can address climate change follow. Whilst these initiatives are to be applauded, new international institutional infrastructure is required to enable fintech to realise its potential. Examples of future possibilities are presented. The chapter concludes by making the case for a new paradigm that prioritises international cooperation because unrestrained competition will lead to rising temperatures, mass migrations, and the collapse of civilisation as we know it.

Current debates over the future direction of the reform agenda in post-crisis East Asia have to be set in the broader context of the global debate about the role of ideas and ideology in shaping economic policy-making. Particular ideas gain primacy at one stage, but may fade at another juncture, especially at times of crisis (Blyth 2002). The core argument of this paper is that the contest of ideas in economic policy-making can evolve independently of their intellectual merit and empirical credibility. Political interests shape and mediate the process within which policy debates unfold. In the case of post-crisis East Asia, the notion that the political economies of the region need to be fundamentally reformed to re-ignite the ‘economic miracle’ of the pre-crisis era does not stem from a politically neutral, dispassionate and intellectually rigorous analysis of what went wrong in the recession-inducing 1997 financial crisis that engulfed the region. On the contrary, it represents an attempt to re-invent orthodoxy in the domain of economic ideas and ideology by a global policy community that is profoundly influenced by the US, the key international financial institutions (IFIs) over which it exerts such authority, and financial sector interests associated with ‘Wall Street’ (Beeson 2003: 305–326; Woods 2003: 92–114)…

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the importance and impact of scientific advice on the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is a subject worthy of more than one book, so the topic is confined to the question of “herd immunity” or “mitigation”: a strategy considered in the United Kingdom (UK) during the early appearance of the virus in the first months of 2020. This chapter also considers definitions of science and problems within science itself and how these have impacted considerations of herd immunity during the first months of the pandemic. The relationships between the scientists who have advised the government, the politicians involved, and the impact this has had on the scientific advice given and implemented are discussed, as are the problems regarding the concept of “following the science”. The practise of herd immunity is outlined, as are attitudes to these in the UK in the first quarter of 2020. Finally, the position of science and scientists in relation to the responses to COVID-19 is considered in the broader political and ideological context of 21st century Britain.

We focus on the global norm of the supermarket through interorganizational relationships between supermarkets and suppliers, customers, governments, and beyond. Our matter of concern is the supermarket and its intertwined supply chains as an extensive force of neoliberal economic expansion. This supermarket and the ways in which these relations of power matter are explored critically from the perspective of Gaia as multiple stories of what is called the critical zone (CZ). Explicit, hidden, and invisible forms of power legitimize the supermarket as an anthropocentric force of good, enacting the power of its narrative in relation to our behavior, preferences, and knowledge. We argue that the supermarket is a creative and destructive force that is becoming ever more impossible to sustain and in serious need of reorientation, reconfiguration, and transformation of its material-discursive relations in alignment with the economy of the CZ sooner rather than later. Thus, we respond to the new climatic regime and its demand for grounding — down to earth!

The ideology of neoliberalism serves to obscure the true costs of neoliberal influence on university campuses. In recent decades, for example, university faculty have increasingly come to be viewed as “employees” serving “clients,” a move that serves to centralize power in the workplace, undermine academic independence, and justify increasing faculty workloads. These trends are bad news for faculty with disabilities, including those who live with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), because they have served to perpetuate ableism in the academic workplace. This chapter includes a brief autoethnographic account of academic work life written from the perspective of a faculty member who lives with ADHD. It concludes with a call for a two-pronged response to neoliberal demands for hyper-productivity. Such a response would combine appropriate workplace accommodations with the promotion of modes of self-care that prioritize critical reflection.

This chapter aims to provide a critical examination of the China Model of development. This chapter has three parts: first, a discussion what the major characteristics of the China Model are and why it is attractive to developing countries; second, an argument that researchers should not take the China Model for granted as its constituents are highly contested, and the term “Beijing Consensus” ironically belies the fact that there is no consensus on how to characterize China's developmental experience over the past thirty years; third, an analysis of the implications of the China Model for developing countries by examining the following three questions: (1) How can researchers move beyond the ideological fault line in the China field? (2) Why does the China Model work while other models such as neoliberalism and state socialism fail? (3) Can the China Model be copied?