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Edge states have been a backbone of our understanding of the experimental basis of the quantum Hall effect for quite some time. Interestingly, this comprises a quantum system with well defined currents and particle trajectories. The role of trajectories in quantum mechanics has been a problematic question of interpretation for quite some time, and the open quantum dot is a natural system in which to probe this question. Contrary to early speculation, a set of well defined quantum states survives in the open quantum dot. These states are the pointer states and provide a transition into the classical states that can be found in these structures. These states provide resonances, which are observable as oscillatory behavior in the magnetoconductance of the dots. But, they have well defined current directions within the dots. Consequently, one expects trajectories to be a property of these states as well. As one crosses from the low to the high field regime, quite steady trajectories and consequent wave functions can easily be identified and examined. In this talk, we review the current understanding and the support for the decoherence theory.
Zurek's existential interpretation of quantum mechanics suffers from three classical prejudices, including the belief that space and time are intrinsically and infinitely differentiated. These compel him to relativize the concept of objective existence in two ways. The elimination of these prejudices makes it possible to recognize the quantum formalism's ontological implications — the relative and contingent reality of spatiotemporal distinctions and the extrinsic and finite spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world — which in turn makes it possible to arrive at an unqualified objective existence. Contrary to a widespread misconception, viewing the quantum formalism as being fundamentally a probability algorithm does not imply that quantum mechanics is concerned with states of knowledge rather than states of Nature. On the contrary, it makes possible a complete and strongly objective description of the physical world that requires no reference to observers. What objectively exists, in a sense that requires no qualification, is (i) the trajectories of macroscopic objects, whose fuzziness is empirically irrelevant, (ii) the properties and values of whose possession these trajectories provide indelible records, and (iii) the fuzzy and temporally undifferentiated states of affairs that obtain between measurements and are described by counterfactual probability assignments.