Narrow Results

How do territorial disputes affect bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) between claimant states? Using a difference model, we find that a regime’s position on the South China Sea (SCS) significantly impacts Chinese FDI. We used a novel dataset on firm registrations in the Philippines, finding that the annual number of new firm entrants with Chinese investment significantly increases when maritime border disputes are stabilized. In contrast, we observe that conflictual relations in the maritime borders tend to decrease the number of new firms. We also notice that disputes do not influence FDI from non-claimant states.

A joint Taiwanese-U.S. field experiment was conducted in the South China Sea (SCS), entitled the South China Sea Oceanic Processes Experiment (Taiwan)/Non-Linear Internal Waves Initiative (US) (SCOPE/NLIWI), the ocean acoustics portion of which occurred during April 12–22, 2007. The acoustics objective was to quantify the temporal and spatial variability in acoustic propagation characteristics on the continental shelf in the presence of locally-generated and trans-basin nonlinear internal waves (NLIW). Broadband (400 Hz center frequency) m-sequence signals transmitted nearly continuously by a source moored near the seabed were received by vertical line arrays at 3 and 6 km range. The acoustic transect was oriented approximately parallel to the wave fronts of the shoaling trans-basin NLIW's which had crossed the deep basin from their origin in the Luzon Strait. The acoustic propagation variability due to strong vertical and horizontal refraction induced by the very large NLIW's creates an extremely complex acoustic field as a function of time and space. Experimental data and numerical acoustic propagation modeling results are presented to (1) examine and estimate the contribution of internal wave induced horizontal refraction to the received acoustic field; and (2) to quantify the range of propagation angles relative to the internal wave fronts within which strong horizontal refraction occurs and 3D propagation models are required to accurately predict the range- and depth-dependent acoustic propagation.

The deformation of nonlinear internal waves (NLIW) from depression to elevation waves during the shoaling process has been attributed to three key factors: wave amplitude, mixed-layer depth and water depth. This study examined the critical conditions for wave deformation by means of five strings of thermistors deployed at the Dongsha Atoll in the northern South China Sea (SCS). During a two-day experiment, four wave trains consisting of 78 solitons at five sites were identified. The parameters related to soliton transformation were formulated by applying the extended Korteweg–de Vries (eKdV) theory. The results indicated that the soliton energy dispersed dramatically along the sharp bottom slope, likely as a result of bottom friction and turbulence mixing. Large-amplitude depression waves were observed to transform into elevation waves before the thickness of the lower layer became equal to that of the upper layer. The ratio of the wave amplitude to the lower-layer thickness was found to be a good indicator of wave deformation. The critical conditions for the transition of the internal waves (IWs) occurred at the ratio approximately equal to $0.66\pm 0.2$. This means that a bottom-trapped elevation wave could form before passing through the theoretical critical point. The solitons felt the bottom and deformed when their amplitudes approached half of the lower-layer thickness. The solitons existed in the form of elevation waves when the waves were in contact with the bottom.

Wave observations were carried out at the mouth of Danang Bay and off the Key Ha Cape in central Vietnam from April 1997 to February 1998 in a port development study by the Japan International Cooperation Agency. It is the first long-term measurement of waves in the west South China Sea by reliable wave measurement devices.

Wind waves due to typhoons as high as 9m in maximum height were successfully recorded, including those generated by Typhoons 9721 and 9726. Long period waves up to 16 seconds in significant period were revealed to exist. It is proved that the long period waves are swells from a large-scale typhoon remotely located in the west Pacific and propagated through the Luzon Strait to the central coast of Vietnam.

Wave hindcast calculations were made by a spectral method for the past 30 typhoons which affected the area from 1961 to 1997. Through statistical treatment of the hindcast waves, it is assessed that an offshore significant wave with a height of 9.7 m could be generated off Danang in a 50-year return period.

Seasonal wave climate is that the sea is rather calm, except the typhoon and northeast monsoon season specifically from September to November.

China’s massive arms buildups have exerted overpowering psychological effects over Southeast Asian countries. Yet, the world suffers the dearth of objective assessment of China’s warfighting capabilities, and is only ill-informed with partial impressionistic evaluation thereof that is based on the quantity of major platforms and weapons. In fact, China itself appears to have emphasized its military power in that manner, greatly having influenced the world perception on regional military balance of power in favor of China. Here, a Japanese perspective is of growing importance particularly because Japan in tandem with the U.S. has begun playing a larger military role of checking China in the South China Sea. This paper is an attempt to appraise the capabilities based on Japanese-language open source analyses of Japanese non-governmental experts and distill the Japanese strategic thinking in contrast to the Chinese counterpart. It is hoped that this work will enable further in-depth discussion that is underpinned on a cultural-philosophic understanding.

This is a study of learning and socialization in China’s foreign security policy, examining how China has at times been more assertive and in other instances has taken a more accommodating approach in its foreign security policy behavior. This paper argues that China has been “socialized” by its international security environment by exploring Kenneth Waltz’s theoretical mechanism of the “socialization” of states in the international system. The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the early 2000s, the Senkaku/Diaoyutai crises from 2012 to 2015, and the South China Sea in the mid-1990s are all instances in which China has employed force only to suffer strategically. This has eventually led to a less confrontational posture and contributed to the pursuit of a more cooperative engagement strategy with both Southeast Asia (from 1998 to 2008) and Taiwan ($\sim$2006–2016). Variations in China’s assertiveness can be explained by the combination of domestic politics and signals from China’s international security environment.

This paper investigates the increasing use of cyber coercion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) among its core interests: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea. It argues that the PRC’s deployment of sophisticated attacks in the form of cyber coercion continues to be part of its geostrategic playbook to exert its influence and prosecute its wider interests as a rising power in the Indo-Pacific region. However, it observes that cyber coercion will be employed by the PRC in concert with all the other tools — diplomatic, economic, and the political — across the spectrum. The paper has two broad goals: first to unpack the trends or patterns in the PRC-sponsored cyber coercion by accentuating contextual and operational dimensions using Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea as analytical case studies; second, to highlight the opportunities and limitations of using cyber coercion as an asymmetrical capability in the changing threat landscape. The paper concludes that the PRC’s cyber coercion is characterized by blurring the distinction on what constitutes compellence and deterrence. The boundaries are not clear cut, and to a certain degree both are even mutually reinforcing. The in-depth analysis of the case studies reveals the growing prominence of disinformation campaigns in close coordination with cyber operations (malware, phishing, and DDoS attack). This emboldens the PRC with a myriad of coercive strategies in shaping its external environment and realizing its ambition of national rejuvenation across Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea.

Some challenging issues in tsunami disaster mitigation and risk management are raised at the AIWEST-DR2011 in Conjunction with SCSTW-4. Currently there is no enough attention given to potential tsunamis in South China Sea due to the lack of data for historic tsunamis in the area, therefore there is a need to have a joint effort among the countries bordering the South China Sea to collect scientific evidence of historic tsunamis along the border of the South China Sea.

The key technologies for the development of tsunami warning system include the establishment of tsunami database and inversion method for evaluating source parameters of earthquake by monitored wave data. A tsunami model based on the shallow water equations is adopted to simulate the 2011 Tohoku tsunami to validate the numerical model of generation and propagation of tsunami. The numerical results match well with measured data by DART buoys in terms of the wave height and the arrival time of the tsunami. For the potential earthquake source in the Manila Trench, the numerical model is used to compute the elementary wave fields triggered by unit sources of potential tsunami source with unit slip. Using the tsunami database derived by the elementary wave fields, an inversion method for plate slip based on multi-buoy measurements is applied to compute the time series of surface elevation at the given locations around the coasts in the South China Sea region. Through numerical simulations and multi-buoy inversion computation, the inversed time series of wave profile induced by earthquakes with the magnitudes M_w = 8.0, 8.5, 8.8, 9.35 are obtained. The comparisons of the inversion results and direct simulation data show good agreement. It turns out that, the multi-buoy inversion method works well and, according to the numerical results, deploying one or two buoys along the west side of the Manila Trench is necessary to provide tsunami warning information for the west coasts in the South China Sea. It is suggested that we should deploy one buoy between the south part of Taiwan and the north end of the Manila Trench subduction zone so that we could obtain a good predicted wave height at the south part of Taiwan by the multi-buoy inversion method.

As the Manila Trench is becoming the most tsunami-hazardous, it is necessary to ascertain the wave height and arrival time in the South China Sea region through numerical simulation of tsunamis generated from potential earthquake source along the Manila subduction zone. The Okada model is employed to generate tsunami. The surface elevation and depth-averaged horizontal velocity at first 5 min, coming from the simulation of shallow water equations, are then interpolated in the weakly dispersive model (FUNWAVE) to calculate tsunami propagation and far-field impact. The characteristics of tsunami wave height distribution in South China Sea are analyzed for the assessment of tsunami hazard near coasts around South China Sea due to the hypothetical earthquakes with magnitude of $M_w=8.0$ and the worst case scenario ($M_w=9.3$). The maximum wave height distribution computed by the Boussinesq equations is compared with that by the shallow water equations to investigate the dispersion effects on propagation of tsunami in South China Sea. It is found that the dispersion effects of the tsunami waves propagating in South China Sea are not significant if the earthquake magnitude is large enough.

The South China Sea is recognized as an area at high risk of tsunamis. The Manila Trench has long been considered as the regional source of tsunamis that might affect Chinese coastal areas, and considerable analysis of the tsunami hazard has been conducted in this area. However, there has been no consideration of other potential local sources near the coastal area. Thus, the locations of local potential tsunami sources (PTSs) along the southern coast of China and the evaluation of their impact on tsunami hazard assessment require investigation. We identified eight local PTSs for given seismic activity parameters. For the probabilistic tsunami hazard analysis (PTHA), the lower-limit earthquake magnitude was determined as 7.0, based on numerical simulation of tsunami scenarios. Six measured sites in the Pearl River Estuary and Taiwan Strait were selected for PTHA, which were referenced to Macao, Hong Kong, Daya Bay, Shantou, Xiamen, and Quanzhou. The annual rate of tsunami waves exceeding a given height $(h\ge H)$ was calculated for each site. The results show that the upper-limit earthquake magnitude and the relative geographical positions of the measured site of interest and the PTS are two of the most important factors in the PTHA computation. The probabilities of tsunami waves exceeding a given height $(h\ge H)$ within 100 years and their return periods were calculated for each site. The results show that the probability of $h\ge 0.5$m within 100 years is 30–40% in Xiamen and Quanzhou but 5–10% in Macao and Hong Kong. If the Manila Trench were considered as a regional source, these probabilities would be higher. It is concluded that the tsunami hazard on the southern coast of China is very high and that both regional and local PTSs should be included in any future PTHA.

This article provides a summary of China’s new strategic foreign initiatives under Xi Jinping’s leadership. These initiatives include the “One Belt, One Road” proposal, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and calls for a “New Asian Security Concept” as well as for “a new type of major power relations.” In a localized Southeast Asian context, they are operationalized, as projects under the so-called 21st Century Maritime Silk Road proposal, a “$2+7$ cooperation framework for China-Southeast Asia relations,” and the so-called “dual track” approach to the management of the South China Sea disputes. These initiatives are expected to provide a favorable external environment for the attainment of the “Chinese dream” and to pave the way for China to emerge into a position of global power and leadership. The article mainly focuses on what these initiatives may be signaling to China’s neighbors, and the subsequent implications for Southeast Asia and its relations with China. There are, for instance, some doubts as to whether China can be a reliable provider of security and stability as public goods in its own region if China itself is a key party in the territorial contentions and power rivalries that could be likely causes of conflict. The fact that China is still trying to defend primordial territorial and cultural-ideational interests, settle historical scores, and find an effective model for its domestic politics and governance that will serve its increasingly globalized economy, indicates that China may not be ready yet to make the sacrifices and compromises that will be required of regional — let alone global — leadership.

Potential tsunamis in the western Pacific Ocean pose great threats to the Chinese coastal areas. Among all possible tsunami source regions, the Manila subduction zone draws the most attention and there have been many research works on the tsunami hazards in the South China Sea. In this study, we evaluate the tsunami hazard along the Chinese coast by investigating more potential sources, including the subduction zones of Manila, Ryukyu, Nankai, Izu–Bonin and Mariana. Two tsunami scenarios are considered for each subduction zone, a worst scenario of earthquake magnitude 9.0 and a scenario of largest earthquake magnitude known in history in this zone. Earthquake source parameters are calculated using scaling relations that have been shown to be suitable for tsunami generation. Our results show that for the Chinese coast, tsunami hazards from the Manila and Ryukyu subduction zones are severe in the worst scenarios, and tsunami hazards from the Nankai, Izu–Bonin and Mariana subduction zones are mild. Using the largest earthquake magnitude in history, tsunami hazards from all the investigated subduction zones are almost negligible. Through a sensitivity test on earthquake magnitude, we find that earthquakes of magnitude of 8.5 or larger in the Manila and Ryukyu subduction zones cause severe tsunami hazard along the Chinese coast with wave amplitude over 2 m.

This paper traces the evolution of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) from its inception in an ad-hoc manner in 2004 to its current, more formal iteration, beginning in 2017. It asks whether the regional cross-currents, ranging from trade tensions to competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, will give the Quad scope to play a constructive stabilizing role or whether the grouping will simply exacerbate frictions. The interests of the Quad members, together with those of ASEAN and China, are highlighted in assessing the extent to which they can be reconciled or leveraged for the benefit of regional stability, security and development. The paper postulates a continuum running from the Quad as irritant to shock absorber or, ideally, springboard to the future and further explains how a broader mission for the Quad, focusing on (i) operational interests and flexible cooperation among like-minded states rather than (ii) “security” and formal membership per se, may be most consistent with the modern approach to balancing sovereignty and collective action and to advancing in real terms the needs and interests of the region.

Chinese actions in the South China Sea are often viewed as proof of an assertive China, despite the Chinese claims that their Confucian values make China a peaceful power. This paper analyzes the South China Sea conflict through a prism of strategic culture theory and examines both the Chinese narrative on the conflict as well as the actual Chinese behavior in the area. Confucian norms and values provide a powerful rhetoric device utilized by the Chinese policymakers to legitimize the Chinese behavior to the domestic and to some extent also foreign audiences. However, the actual Chinese behavior rarely exhibits strong influences of Confucianism, suggesting that in actual behavior China acts in accord with realist predictions.

How do territorial disputes affect bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) between claimant states? Using a difference model, we find that a regime’s position on the South China Sea (SCS) significantly impacts Chinese FDI. We used a novel dataset on firm registrations in the Philippines, finding that the annual number of new firm entrants with Chinese investment significantly increases when maritime border disputes are stabilized. In contrast, we observe that conflictual relations in the maritime borders tend to decrease the number of new firms. We also notice that disputes do not influence FDI from non-claimant states.

The DOC, signed by China and the ASEAN member states in 2002, sets out the objective of adopting a code of conduct in the South China Sea. The parties arrived at the Framework of the COC in 2017, and endorsed the Single Draft Negotiating Text in 2018, and completed the first reading of the text in 2019. The second reading is in progress. In the next phase of the consultation, apart from the procedural matters, the parties need to deal with several substantive issues of foundational importance for further elaborations and adoption of the text, which include, among others, the legal nature of the COC, its geographical scope of application, relationship with DOC, implementation mechanism, and relationship with other countries. Adopting a more substantive and effective COC at an early date serves the fundamental interest of the countries and peoples in the region as well as the international community.

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Over the past 20 years, China and ASEAN countries have established an institutional cooperation process based on a multi-level institutional framework, consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) and practical maritime cooperation to implement the spirit of the DOC, and have actively built a maritime order of lasting peace, win–win cooperation and rule-based governance in the South China Sea. However, there is still debate in academic and policy circles about the institutional effectiveness of the DOC and its implementation. One of the reasons for the debate cannot be ignored is the lack of an analytical framework for assessing the effectiveness of the mechanisms for implementing the DOC. This chapter attempts to put the security situation in the South China Sea, institutional strategy, and institutional cooperation tension into an evaluation framework, and by examining the historical process of the establishment and development of the implementation mechanism of the DOC, it reveals the effectiveness and limitations of institutional cooperation between China and ASEAN countries in the construction of regional order in the South China Sea, which will provide policy enlightenment for China and ASEAN countries to shape the regional order in the South China Sea in the future.

Achieving sustainable peace in the South China Sea requires both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China to overcome tensions created over the issues of sovereignty and maritime claims in the South China Sea among all claimant states which have been considered the most complex regional flashpoint. Failure to prevent tensions and without effective ways to restrain the disputes in the South China Sea, hard-earned peace in this region can erode and conflict is becoming eminent. In this regard, ASEAN and China have a collective duty to collaborate to promote a friendly, peaceful, and harmonious environment in the South China Sea and to enhance regional stability, economic growth, and prosperity in order to ensure that the South China Sea is indeed a sea of peace and stability. Recognizing these challenges, ASEAN and China have made strenuous efforts overtime to prevent the escalation of tensions from brewing up into conflict including adopting the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002, and working together, despite slow progress, toward the conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). This chapter will reflect, after 20 years of DOC, on the effort made by ASEAN and China in developing the DOC and COC while assessing their merits and discussing their deficits. The chapter will then highlight priorities for an effective implementation of the DOC before concluding with a set of considerations for ASEAN and China to work together to address their differences to conclude the COC negotiations, so as to ensure sustainable peace in the South China Sea.

The economic dynamics underlying the South China Sea (SCS) disputes are pivotal to understanding the region’s stability. The SCS, a crucial maritime area, supports approximately one-third of global shipping, holds substantial hydrocarbon reserves, and ranks among the world’s most productive fishing zones. These economic assets drive the territorial disputes involving China and four ASEAN member states (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam). The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), although non-binding, seeks to manage these disputes through peaceful means. Despite its limitations, the DOC has played a significant role in maintaining dialogue and reducing conflict risks. The document’s inability to fully prevent unilateral actions under-scores the necessity of establishing a binding Code of Conduct (COC). Furthermore, cooperative initiatives in marine resource management and environmental conservation are critical for long-term peace and stability in the region. These measures are essential to sustain the socioeconomic development of East and Southeast Asia, ensuring that the SCS continues to serve its vital economic functions without escalating conflicts.