Narrow Results

This paper develops the Two-Country HANK model to analyze the impact of tariffs on economic variables and wealth distribution from both macro and micro perspectives. In Macro analysis, trade wars are likely to only exist in situations of asymmetry between the two countries. In Micro analysis, differences in consumption, investment, and labor decisions between the poor and the rich, resulting from different capital stocks, reshape the wealth structure. In a symmetric economy, on the investment side, the rigid constraint imposed by the level of capital stock leads to inconsistent investment behavior in illiquid assets between the poor and the rich. On the consumption side, tariff increases primarily suppress the consumption of imported goods by the poor, while their impact on the consumption of the rich is limited. In an asymmetric economy, the widening gaps in consumption and labor resulting from differential tariff sensitivity between the rich and the poor exacerbate wealth distribution. This paper suggests the implementation of differentiated policies to navigate the economy out of recession.

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Utility managers must design rate structures that meet multiple objectives: full cost recovery, fairness, economic efficiency, and resource conservation. To reach these multiple goals, the design of an optimal rate structure would ideally include detailed information on cost of service, demand elasticity, and preferences of the customer base within each utility. However this information is often unavailable, especially when analyzing utilities at regional or national scales. In this absence, the comparison or benchmarking of rate structures across utilities may reveal insights regarding the features, management, or performance of one utility relative to another. We review the metrics and methods available to water utility managers for comparing rate structures with publicly available information. By presenting the full range of metrics available to utility managers, we aim to facilitate the comparison of water rate structures, and ensure that the analysts can select the metric that best fits their needs. To illustrate how these metrics may help generate insight, we use them to compare the rate structures of five municipalities in Canada. Despite the contextual differences, we find that the rates tend to converge at a single metric, the Canadian standard of 25m³/month, suggesting that there is a “looking over the shoulder effect” in which managers are probably cognizant of the metrics used to compare them to others. We suggest that the design or re-design of rate structures can be informed by the metrics that compare rates across utilities, despite the limitations of working with only publicly available information.

This paper focuses on a regulator's choice between setting a pure, horizontal technical barrier to trade (HTBT) or a tariff in a linear, Cournot duopoly, where a foreign firm competes with a local rival. Where a country is free to impose a tariff, it will not impose a HTBT. Only under a limited set of circumstances will the profit-shifting effect be sufficient to lead to total exclusion of the foreign firm: in other conditions, the country will set a tariff yielding some revenue. By contrast, if tariffs are constrained by international agreement, then the importing country will set an HTBT to exclude the foreign firm if and only if tariffs are reduced below a threshold level. Trade liberalisation agreements which only cover tariffs can reduce, rather than increase global welfare.

Developing countries now account for a significant fraction of world trade and two-thirds of the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many are still individually small and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed economies even though as a group they would be able to do so. We show that this coordination externality generates asymmetric outcomes under agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade retaliation – such as the WTO – but not under agreements extended to include certain financial instruments. In particular, we find that an extended agreement generates improvements in global efficiency and equity if it includes the exchange of bonds prior to trading but not if it relies solely on ex post fines. Moreover, a combination of bonds and fines generates similar improvements even if small countries are subject to financial constraints that prevent them from posting bonds.

We analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the WTO’s current dispute settlement system that permits injured member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs. We show that, ex-post, monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties but fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the use of tariffs alone. Furthermore, the exchange of bonds between symmetric countries also does not improve enforcement relative to retaliatory tariffs.

In an n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (n ≥ 3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Under the non-cooperative tariff equilibrium, each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption by each country improves world welfare by eliminating this trade diversion. Under linear demand, MFN adoption by the country with the average production cost is most desirable. High cost countries refuse reciprocal MFN adoption with other countries and also lose even if others engage in reciprocal MFN adoption amongst themselves.

We analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the WTO’s current dispute settlement system that permits injured member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs. We show that, ex-post, monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties but fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the use of tariffs alone. Furthermore, the exchange of bonds between symmetric countries also does not improve enforcement relative to retaliatory tariffs.

Developing countries now account for a significant fraction of world trade and two-thirds of the membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, many are still individually small and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed economies even though as a group they would be able to do so. We show that this coordination externality generates asymmetric outcomes under agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade retaliation - such as the WTO - but not under agreements extended to include certain financial instruments. In particular, we find that an extended agreement generates improvements in global efficiency and equity if it includes the exchange of bonds prior to trading but not if it relies solely on ex post fines. Moreover, a combination of bonds and fines generates similar improvements even if small countries are subject to financial constraints that prevent them from posting bonds.

This paper reviews the history of tariffs imposed by the six Australian colonies during the nineteenth century. In each of the colonies, we identify the starting dates for the first tariffs, first preferences, and other features, and the turning points in the levels of tariffs. We then construct a time series of the average tariff levels in the individual colonies and an average for all six colonies combined. The conclusion notes general features of the pattern of tariffs and how the main features of colonial tariffs, such as the favourable treatment of intermediate inputs, the complex differentiation of tariff rates within industries, and the protection implicit in the excise tax system all carried over to the Commonwealth Customs Tariff in the twentieth century.

This paper discusses the early establishment in Australia of CGE modeling as a major policy tool. As background, it provides a short history of CGE modeling and describes the impetus to the field from: (a) the failure of less theoretically formal approaches; and (b) the recognition that this type of modeling can handle policy-relevant detail. The paper then argues that the CGE approach flourished in Australia because Australia had the right issue, the right institutions and the right model. The final section looks to the future of CGE modeling and the challenge of demonstrating that it really works.

This paper uses trade theory to examine the effects of trade liberalization on countries that do not participate in it. These include both countries that fail to participate in multilateral trade negotiations, and also countries that lie outside of preferential trading arrangements such as free trade areas. The analysis suggests that, while it is theoretically possible for excluded countries to gain from trade liberalization through improved terms of trade, several reasons suggest that they are more likely to lose.

© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The welfare effects of partial restrictions on political competition are investigated in a model in which two candidates receive campaign contributions from import-competing industries in return for tariff protection. Ceilings on allowable contributions per industry may be welfare-worsening, particularly if the "contributor elasticity" is high, because they induce candidates to seek additional contributors. Restrictions that reduce the number of industries allowed to contribute may also worsen welfare, because candidates respond by increasing contributions (and tariff protection) for each active contributor. The results suggest that the ability of candidates to circumvent partial restrictions may eliminate any potential benefits.

We analyze a two country-two good model of international trade in which citizens in each country differ by their specific factor endowments. The trade policy in each country is set by the politician who has been elected by the citizens in a previous stage. Due to a delegation effect citizens generally favor candidates who are more protectionist than they are. The one-candidate-per-country equilibria exhibit a "protectionist drift" owing to this delegation effect. In addition, we find an additional source of protectionist drift that we call the "abstention effect". Not only do candidates wish to delegate to more protectionist colleagues, but these more protectionist colleagues who can win election, prefer still more protectionist candidates than themselves. Therefore, they have an incentive to abstain, that is, not run for election. We show that because of this abstention effect there exists a range of electable citizens all of whom are more protectionist than the median voter's most preferred candidate. We extend the analysis allowing two-candidate equilibria and the possibility that there are costs and benefits of holding office.

This area of research tries, through the introduction of politics in economic models, to explain the existence and the extent of anti-trade bias in trade policy. The two main approaches, namely, the median-voter approach and the special-interest approach are surveyed. Certain applications of these approaches to policy issues, such as trade agreements, the issue of reciprocity versus unilateralism in trade policy, regionalism versus multilateralism, hysteresis in trade policy and the choice of policy instruments, are discussed. Finally, the empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy is surveyed. The new literature that employs a more ‘structural’ approach is emphasized.