China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies

One interesting fact to note about China’s expanding partnership network is the inclusion of many security allies of the United States. China’s partnership network (CPN) and the U.S. alliance system (UAS) are quite different in nature, with the former emphasizing economic cooperation and the latter focused on security deterrence. Due to such factors as the geographical locations of U.S. allies, strategic positions, and perceptions of external threats, China’s partnerships with U.S. allies are generally more successful in Europe than in the Asia-Pacific. Based on an analysis of the dynamics of interaction between CPN and UAS, this article categorizes their past interaction into two basic models: coexistence (both easy and hard) and confrontation. With regard to the growing uncertainties in the global economy and global politics, the interaction between CPN and UAS may either create a platform for enhanced cooperation or an arena for escalating contention among related countries. To avoid the latter scenario, China must remain prudent in expanding its partnership network, and try to strengthen mutual security reassurance with the United States and its allies through more win-win cooperation in all areas.

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th U.S. President earmarks a new beginning of American domestic and foreign policies, to which his populist thinking and unconventional approach have caused great uncertainty. While recognizing the challenges that President Trump may bring to the world in general and China-U.S. relations in particular, the Chinese government under the core leadership of President Xi Jinping firmly believes in the world’s general trend for sustained progress, remains committed to the track of win-win cooperation with other countries, and is adopting both reactive and proactive attitudes toward the great changes in global arenas while taking every precaution against the worst possible scenario. To better manage China-U.S. relations at this critical juncture of world development, it is imperative for both countries to adapt to various new changes, deepen their mutual understanding of each other’s diplomatic philosophy, and continue sharing the dividends of peace and development. If the two countries can manage to pass the first few rounds of tests through more active conceptual matching-up and pragmatic cooperation, they will be in a better position to realize their respective national agendas of “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “making America great again.” Otherwise, both countries and even the whole world may fall into devastating confrontation and escalating conflicts.

There are two prevailing arguments among international observers about China’s role in the Middle East. One is that China has been a “security free-rider;” the other is that China is fundamentally a business-seeker. Yet neither of the two is well-grounded. If viewed comprehensively rather than in terms of military engagement alone, China’s contribution to stability and security of the region is enormous, and its role in the Middle East can be described as a combination of a major economic partner, a low-profile mediator and a modest but important provider of security public goods. As China has proposed various new concepts and initiatives as guidelines of its foreign policy, its future policy toward the Middle East can be best understood through its increasing efforts to promote the “Belt and Road” initiative, to develop a new-type major-power relationship, and to uphold justice and pursue shared interests with all related countries. With ever more Chinese engagement in the region, China’s Middle East policy is expected to be delivered in a more comprehensive way. However, China is not likely to seek dominant presence in the region in the foreseeable future.

China’s understanding of the Arctic covers two major dimensions. One is that the Arctic is an international sphere, and the other is that China should be regarded as a “near Arctic state.” Based on such understanding, China’s Arctic policy has been evolving along a variety of considerations, such as securing investment and resources, pursuing sea-lanes of communication and trade, and facilitating strategic reach and power projection. China seeks to increase its strengths by carrying forward its own national initiatives including scientific research, trade and investment, and power projection, as well as through participation in bilateral and multilateral cooperation and collaboration schemes. As China views the Arctic from the perspectives of both low and high politics, it is anticipated that China will be further engaged in Arctic affairs with a conceptually and materially sound Arctic strategy, under which a closer partnership with Arctic states, especially Russia, is a necessary step.

In recent years, China has embraced the idea of soft power with ever more keen interest. Today, soft power is Beijing’s key strategy in international politics, albeit not in the way the concept is understood and applied in the West. However, this strategy can hardly be said to have yielded fruit in Africa despite China’s growing visibility and presence over the last two decades. This article aims at probing this issue by examining how China’s soft power is manifested in Tanzania. In an attempt to show that soft power is not entirely a new practice in international politics, the article first applies a historical perspective to illustrate that it has been part and parcel of Chinese diplomacy, long before the term was coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. The article then analyzes Chinese activities in Tanzania and how they have shaped perceptions of Tanzanians of China in the era of globalization. These activities are structured in line with three traditional sources of soft power as postulated by Nye, namely culture, political values and foreign policy. As a supplement to Nye’s definition, however, elements of hard power are also included in the article, such as the use of economic inducements to produce, bolster and wield soft power. In general, China has made headway in its soft power ambitions by gaining positive reviews in Tanzania. While the current achievement is crucial as an initial step, there is still a long way to go for China in consolidating its soft power. Although China has earned admiration in some quarters of Tanzanian society, it is still premature to assume that in the long run Beijing will continue to enjoy increasing soft power in the country. Indeed, in some cases, such admiration only exists in verbal recognition. In the meantime, activities that damage China’s image have further complicated matters and undermined China’s soft power in Tanzania.

In order to explore the roots of contemporary Sinophobia in Central Asia, this article combines historical analysis with ethnographically informed interviews. It shows that Sinophobia is widely spread through conspiracy theories especially in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Based on the territorial acquisitions made by China in the immediate post-Soviet period, conspiracy theories suggest that China is planning to “take over” Central Asia. However, a diachronic view of relations between China and Central Asian states demonstrates that these acquisitions were part of an attempt to resolve colonial disputes dating back to the late 19th century, and that China has already significantly reduced its territorial claims. Fears of contemporary Chinese territorial expansion are therefore greatly exaggerated. This article concludes by endorsing a proactive stance on tackling Sinophobia in Central Asia, both for the Chinese government and for regional states. Other than the many economic initiatives it funds in Central Asia, China must put more efforts to enhance its soft power so as to assuage the century-long Sinophobia in the region.

Since the Tohoku earthquake and Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011, Japan’s energy policy has undergone great changes, resulting in closer energy cooperation with the United States. To serve its own national interests, the United States also began to emphasize the significance of energy cooperation under the U.S.-Japan alliance. Consequently, both countries have made strategic breakthroughs in terms of energy politics, energy economics and energy security, and a U.S.-Japan energy alliance is now taking shape. The progress of U.S.-Japan energy cooperation, on one hand, will help reduce the cost of China’s natural gas import and create favorable conditions for China to promote domestic reforms in the energy sector. On the other hand, it will also present new challenges to China’s geopolitical environment and its global role. While the United States continues to increase its export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Asian markets, China should make full use of the opportunity to speed up the development of its own shale gas resources, optimize its energy consumption structure, promote domestic energy reforms, and diversify its energy import sources. In the meantime, it should try to work with the United States and Japan to foster an all-inclusive, long-term mechanism for energy cooperation among all countries in the Asia-Pacific.

The core idea of the European Union (EU) is to foster economic and political integration among its member states based on liberal principles, a common market, and the establishment of a business-friendly environment. What is surprising is the new rhetoric originating in Brussels and connected to the “Energy Union” that portrays its energy dependence on Russia as a potential threat. One important dimension of this newly launched “Energy Union” is the replacement of the EU’s market orientation in its energy relations with Russia by a “securitization” of Russia’s intention vis-à-vis Europe. These securitizing moves culminate in a vigorous and costly diversification strategy for natural gas supply. The construction of new liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and gas storage, as well as a new gas mega pipeline passing through Central Asia is part of this new strategy. The recently inaugurated “Energy Union,” at the same time, includes improved infrastructure connections and the approval of domestically produced shale gas. As a result, natural gas has gained the status of a “bridge fuel” while related large-scale infrastructure would lock European economies into a fossil path that ultimately undermines the EU’s goal toward a decarbonized economy. Analyzing the European Commission’s emphasis on natural gas, produced either by conventional or unconventional extraction methods, bears critical insights for China’s energy strategy. As the EU appears to have shifted its emphasis from sustainability to energy security, a vacuum would be left for China to fill, thus rendering it eligible to play the role of the next global leader in climate politics.