China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies

The liberal international order has been under heavy strain in recent years. From Brexit to Trump’s presidency, its tenacity is being put to the test. The resultant commotion should be a window of opportunity for China to materially revise the existing order or establish an alternative order under its leadership. However, the puzzle that is unfolding but not yet significantly examined is that China is seemingly not taking advantage of the upheaval in the liberal international order to substantially revise the order or set up a new one. Premised on the metaphor of “following the flow,” this paper argues that there is understandable rationale as to why China is appearing to ignore the opportunity to establish a China-led global order. It then explores the approach in China’s posture as protector of globalization and the liberal international order.

There has been an increasingly heated debate over the origins and prospects of China’s global activism since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) held in late 2012. Some in the West view China’s proactive diplomatic posture as evidence of a rising power’s geostrategic ambition to become the next world hegemon. This article traces the intellectual pedigree and policy relevance of the concept of a “community of shared future for mankind” highlighted in President Xi Jinping’s work report to the 19th CPC National Congress in October 2017. Based on a sober assessment of global trends, and drawing inspiration from traditional Chinese wisdom and the Western civilization, this concept represents China’s vision of a more just, secure, and prosperous world in which China sees itself as an earnest builder of world peace, an important contributor to global development, and a staunch defender of international order. Concurrently, it also marks a transition of Chinese strategic posture from a “hide-and-bide” one to a global activist one. Under this vision, China’s diplomacy has taken on a new look over the past few years. Looking into the future, China is expected to play a more active role in leading international efforts to enhance global governance and exploring new models of cooperation for world development, while attempting to shoulder greater responsibilities as a major emerging power.

Compared with other Chinese-proposed multilateral institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is not yet fully institutionalized. Still, it has been enthusiastically welcomed by many Asian and African countries, though less so by Western ones, Japan, and Russia. This is not only because of the expected economic benefits being Asian- and African-centric, but perhaps more importantly, because of the BRI having potential to be an exceptional Eastern model that may become universal. Up to the recent times, the flow of religions, doctrines, ideas and ideologies has mainly been from the West to the East, often accompanied by Western colonialism. Now, if the BRI is successfully implemented, for the first time in history a model of Eastern origin may affect the West and the rest of world. Unlike national liberation movements which had achieved political but not economic independence, China’s BRI could facilitate an international liberation movement that helps Asian and African countries to achieve growth and development, and thereby become economically independent as well. The innovation of the BRI does not only lie in its direction of influence (from the East to the West), but also in that it will be accomplished in Chinese rather than Western ways. That, more than particular economic benefits, explains the BRI’s attraction.

With the world’s largest number of netizens, China has been engaged in the ever more intense global competition for cyber governance over the past decade. Based on some preliminary studies, this article discusses China’s position, approach and contribution to global cyber governance, as well as the understanding gap on major issues between China and developed countries in the cyber arena. In the past decade, China has made significant contributions to the reform of global cyber governance utilizing a “patch-work” approach, and it will try to play a more active role as a constructive participant in global cyber governance while enhancing its own cyber capacity. Unlike many developed countries that advocate “Internet freedom,” China will continue to uphold the principle of cyber sovereignty. Yet in the meantime, China will try to work with other countries to build a “Community of Shared Future in Cyberspace,” in order to promote freedom, democracy and transparency in cyberspace in an incremental, stable and reasonable way.

Based on the analytical framework of securitization, this article argues that cooperation between China and the United States on climate change will not lose momentum despite President Trump’s seemingly passive stance. A securitization process on the climate issue has been ongoing in China since President Xi Jinping took office and proposed the Overall National Security Outlook (ONSO). Climate security was thus integrated into China’s political discourse as a key component of ecological and common security, leading to a period of China-U.S. cooperation during the Obama administration. Similarly, in the United States, climate policy has been cemented in security planning and assessment of various federal agencies. The U.S. security sector seems to be largely unaffected by the White House decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. A growing number of Americans treat climate change as a security threat and many U.S. states and cities, in collaboration with business leaders, have taken on a role in international climate diplomacy. Combined with existing intergovernmental collaborative projects, robust market forces and innovative local initiatives will continue to push China-U.S. climate cooperation forward. As a necessary step to sustain its ties with the United States on climate issues, the Chinese government needs to propose a renewed bilateral framework on energy and environment cooperation under the China-U.S. Comprehensive Economic Dialogue.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), one of the largest investment institutions in the world, was established in 2015. The launch of the China-initiated AIIB generated intense debate among scholars and politicians over the functions and potential economic and political implications of the institution. This paper aims to examine the AIIB from a normative perspective, investigating its role as a cursor for structural changes in China’s foreign policy conceptualization. It goes on to hypothesize that, over the past few years, there has been a gradual transformation in China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries, which indicates a shift from a traditional “South-South” model to a “North-South” model. It observes that as Beijing continues to promote its own brand of frameworks and institutions, the emerging North-South paradigm will likely be further emphasized, transforming China’s position vis-a-vis other nations and groupings. Nevertheless, China as an emerging Northern country will continue to experiment on and develop this new North-South interaction in a way that is distinct from the orthodox North-South dyadic relationship.

This paper categorizes intervention activities into two types, namely, coercive and supportive ones. Both means are usually applied together in resolving internal conflicts of a fragile country, yet Western powers tend to employ coercive intervention more frequently, while developing countries prefer supportive intervention. By comparing the roles that the United States and China played in the Darfur crisis as a case study, this paper explores how different means of intervention interact and how the means adopted by one party influence the other’s policy orientation. The mutual construction of national interests, national capacity and international values of different intervening powers constitute the analytical framework of this paper. In the case of Darfur, coercive intervention was found to impose more influence on the supportive one, while the latter played an indispensable role in facilitating the peace process in Darfur. As a leading power in favor of supportive engagement, China should learn to better deal with the coercive means of Western powers while working with all parties concerned to resolve internal conflicts of the target country by a pragmatic approach.

Economic growth and arms race are interesting phenomena in Southeast Asia. Contrary to the view of a majority of scholars that arms race has generally negative impact on economic growth, this article argues that the arms race between China and the United States in the South China Sea helps to create a balance of power, which reinforces regional political stability and further drives economic growth. Thus, in an indirect way, the arms race aids economic growth in Southeast Asia. Elaborating on a discourse that arms race is a natural reality in international politics which must be responded to by a positive approach, this study aims to open a new space for debate and further research and offers a new perspective to understand the phenomenon.