The International Journal of Accounting

We examine the relation between tax aggressiveness and firm value. Using a tax enforcement change in Taiwan that limits firms’ abilities to pursue aggressive tax strategies, we document that the relation between tax aggressiveness and firm value becomes more negative after the regulatory change. Further analyses reveal that the negative change is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to be targeted by the stricter tax enforcement. In addition, we do not find strong evidence on the impact of corporate governance in moderating the main relation. Our results seem to be consistent with the argument that potential increases in regulatory costs may outweigh the benefit of the stricter tax enforcement in constraining insiders’ income diversion, intensifying the conflict between aggressive tax positions and shareholder wealth in our research setting.

We examine the association between CEO cash and equity compensation and non-GAAP disclosure practices in a responsive regulatory and opaque compensation reporting environment. Our empirical evidence, based on a sample of public companies in New Zealand, shows that CEO cash compensation is associated with the likelihood and frequency of non-GAAP disclosures, whereas equity incentives are not. Our results document evidence of an increase in the frequency of non-GAAP disclosures and a decrease in the provision and quality of reconciliation between non-GAAP measures and closely related GAAP measures around CEO cash compensation. In particular, managers use these disclosures when their GAAP earnings benchmarks are missed. A marginal decrease in opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures following the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) indicates little change in reporting behavior following adoption of IFRS. Our findings suggest that managers disclose non-GAAP measures with opportunistic intentions motivated by compensation and points to the need for regulators to set policy about clear reconciliation standards.

We examine the caste affiliation of the auditor selected by the corporate boards of directors of Indian firms. The history of the caste system in India is one of discrimination and inequity. The constitutionally mandated quota system in the public sector has shown improvements, but has not trickled into private sector leadership. We find that nearly 96% of Indian corporate boards are dominated by a single caste. The auditing firms are also dominated by the forward castes. Lastly, we find that when boards are dominated by one caste, they select an auditing firm that is also affiliated with that same caste. We examine the board and auditor relationship because they both play an important monitoring role in corporate governance. However, auditor effectiveness can be undermined when there is a lack of independence between them and the firm. The existence of a strong shared social network like caste affiliation compromises that independence.

We investigate the impact of an informal social attribute on cost behavior. More specifically, we examine the effect of generalized trust (trust in others) on cost stickiness. Using a large international sample from 44 countries, we find that generalized trust significantly increases cost stickiness. Important rationales for this result are that managers in more trusting societies are more optimistic and are committed to stable, long-term employment relationships. This study makes a significant contribution in understanding cost stickiness differences across the globe. Our results further complement prior research which has found, to the contrary, that trust and cost stickiness are negatively associated at the local level. Hence, our study corroborates the importance of distinguishing between local social capital and global generalized trust concerning their effects on economic outcomes.

Researchers and practitioners have expressed concern that matching has declined over time, as evidenced by a decreasing association between revenues and expenses. They attribute this decline to the shift in financial reporting from a revenue–expense view that emphasizes matching to an asset–liability view that emphasizes the measurement of economic resources that incorporates more fair values. When revenues rise with inflation but the expenses remain tied to historical costs, the two streams tend to diverge. We hypothesize that upwardly revaluing the long-lived fixed operating assets resets the expense stream; thus, changes in revenues will be more closely associated with changes in expenses for firms that revalue than firms that do not upwardly revalue. Based on a sample of United Kingdom firms, we find evidence supporting our expectations, particularly in those higher inflationary industries.