Doing Science

The following sections are included:

• PREFACE
• CONTENTS
• INTRODUCTION

To engage in research of any kind is to work on a problem or a cluster of problems of some kind — cognitive, technological, social, artistic, or moral. In imitation of John’s gospel, we may say that in the beginning was the problem. So, those wishing to start doing science must find or invent a problem to work on, as well as a mentor willing to guide them.

Original research is of course what scientists are expected to do. Therefore the research project is in many ways the unit of science in the making. It is also the means towards the culmination of the scientists’ specific activities and the reward for their work: the original publication they hope to contribute to the scientific literature. The scientific project should therefore be of central interest to all the students of science, particularly the philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science…

So far we have discussed the reasons for surmising that a given research proposal is worth pursuing. Supposing that its results are in, how shall we evaluate them? Only such evaluation may tell whether the effort was worth doing — supposing that the outcome is definite rather than inconclusive.

The classical historians of ideas have rightly been criticized for focusing on peaks rather than on mountain ranges, which is like confining a city to its skyscapers. By contrast, Marxists and the postmodernists have tended to exalt teamwork at the expense of individual talent, and even to claim that “society thinks through the individual,” as if societies had collective brains with their full complement of memories and theories.

Usually we think in a logically disorganized manner: we do not distinguish basic from defined concepts, assumptions from consequences, or constitutive from regulative principles. When proceeding in this spontaneous fashion we can advance quickly, but we may inadvertently introduce or conceal controversial or even false assumptions, that imperil the whole construction. Axiomatics is intended to avert such catastrophes or repair buildings erected in a hurry.

The problem whether something is real or imaginary may be existential or academic. Suffice it to recall that the so-called sacred scriptures of the monotheistic religions mandate killing anyone denying or even doubting the existence of God; that claims to the existence of atoms, the aether and phlogiston, action at a distance and spontaneous generation, evolution, and genes, have split scientific communities for centuries; that the myth of the existence of the vaginal orgasm was exploded as recently as 1966; and that the possibility of free will is contested as vehemently as when Augustine asserted it 15 centuries ago…

Usually we solve daily life problems by resorting to either custom or authority: the subordinate consults his supervisor, the sick person her physician, the teacher her textbooks, the believer her confessor, and so on. Only research scientists, innovating technologists and the like check their principles and rules before applying them…

Many of the most spirited and protracted controversies in modern intellectual history concern the reality of certain entities. Let this sample suffice: Do supernatural entities exist? Is there life after death? Do space and time exist out there and by themselves? Do atoms and the aether exist? Do chance and force fields exist? Are there Schrödinger cats? Are the strings and membranes of string theory for real? Are there centrifugal and actions at a distance forces? Are there alternative worlds? Did the Big Bang and abiogenesis occur? Are biological species real? Are there goal-directed biological items? Are there biological laws? Are there talented and criminal genes? Do innate knowledge and telepathy occur? Do the self and free will exist? Do concepts exist, or only signs? Do the Oedipus complex and collective memory exist? Has socialism ever been practiced? Do rational egoism and collective rationality exist? Is anthropogenic climate change for real?

Materialism is the set of philosophies according to which all the constituents of the universe are material rather than spiritual. Although materialism is sometimes confused with realism, the two are logically independent from one another, since materialism is an ontology, whereas realism is an epistemology. Consequently, the four possible combinations <M,R>, <not-M,R>, <M,not-R>, and <not-M,not-R> are logically possible…

Scientism is the thesis that all cognitive problems are best tackled by adopting the scientific approach, also called “the scientific attitude” and “the scientific method.” While most contemporary philosophers reject scientism, arguably scientists practice it even if they have never encountered the word.

Everyone uses the word ‘technology,’ but not everyone means the same by it. Some people identify it with engineering, others with an assemblage of tools and machinery, and still others with the specialized knowledge used for making or altering things in a rational way (see Agassi 1985, Quintanilla 2005). We shall understand ‘technology’ in the latter way. That is, we define ‘technology’ as the body of knowledge used to make or change things with the help of science. In other words, whereas scientists study reality, technologists design, repair, or maintain artifacts.

Free will (FW) was originally conceived as a dualistic and Neoplatonic notion, and these foundational properties pervade current views rooted in cognitive neuroscience. In an attempt to foster progress beyond those traditional tenets, here we propose an unorthodox neurocognitive approach to the construct. First, we explicitly assess three traditional assumptions that should be avoided for FW to be fruitfully explored, namely, that FW is (a) categorical in ontological terms (an all-or-nothing capacity); (b) intrinsically dependent on consciousness; and (c) rooted in deterministic or non-deterministic principles. We analyze prototypical neuroscientific claims suggesting that FW is illusory and show that these considerations rely on the three classical assumptions listed above. The boundaries and dualistic foundations of classical accounts of FW can be considered misleading, or at least non-scientifically motivated. Conversely, a renewed neurocognitive conception of FW can rest upon the following principles: (a) like several other cognitive and affective domains, FW is not an all-or-nothing faculty; (b) conscious activity underlying FW is a non-contradictory, emergent property of unconscious mechanisms; and (c) processes rooted in both determination and self-determination coexist in the neurocognitive underpinnings of FW. These reconsiderations pave the way for a new research agenda, in which FW constitutes the capacity to make flexible decisions (only some of which involve moral responsibility) and reason about ensuing consequences on the self and the environment. To conclude, we update the incipient knowledge regarding brain networks relevant to FW, and call for future research to frame it as a natural, neurocognitive, and situated phenomenon.

The following sections are included:

• Introduction
• The Materialist Metaphysics of Mario Bunge
• Systems and Mechanisms
• Why Many Metaphysical Approaches Are Unsatisfactory
• Zombies and Thinking Machines
• References

The following sections are included:

• REFERENCES
• INDEX