International Trade and Labor Markets

The following sections are included:

• Author Bio
• Contents
• Introduction

The standard competitive trade model, extended to include many goods and factors, is used to analyze the effect of goods and factor market integration on average international disparities in the real returns of internationally immobile factors. It is shown that goods market integration decreases international real return differentials for all factors. We derive sufficient conditions for this result to hold for the subgroup of internationally immobile factors as well. While there is a presumption for similar results to hold with international factor market integration, we show that this is true for international migration but in general not for international investment.

We develop a two-country general equilibrium model, in which heterogeneous firms offshore routine tasks to a low-wage host country. In the presence of fixed costs for offshoring the most productive firms self-select into offshoring, which leads to a reallocation of domestic labor towards less productive uses if offshoring costs are high. As a consequence domestic welfare may fall. The reallocation effect is reversed and domestic welfare rises if offshoring costs are low. The aggregate income distribution, comprising wages and entrepreneurial incomes, becomes more unequal with offshoring.

This chapter derives and compares the welfare effects of tariffs and import quotas in the presence of involuntary unemployment. The framework used is the standard model of a competitive small open economy with many goods and factors. Optimum levels of the respective trade policy instruments are derived, as well as welfare increasing reform strategies. In all cases, the labor intensity of the import competing sectors turns out to be a crucial variable for deriving the welfare effects.

This chapter analyzes the effects of tariff reforms on welfare and market access in a competitive small open economy that is characterized by involuntary unemployment due to non-market clearing wages that are fixed either in terms of the numeraire or in real terms. We show that recent tariff-reform results can be extended to integrated reforms of tariffs and the wage rate, and that the inherent tension between reforms that increase welfare and market access carries over. We also derive welfare increasing tariff-reform strategies that keep the wage rate constant, and show that this tension may be attenuated.

This chapter shows in a general framework the broad applicability of the Le Châtelier Principle in international trade theory and policy. By stressing the formal similarity between a small open economy and a price taking multi-product firm, the chapter generalizes earlier applications of the Le Châtelier Principle in the trade literature. In addition, it is shown how some of the Le Châtelier results, which in their established form are locally valid only, can be generalized to discrete parameter changes.

We develop a two-country, multi-sector model of oligopoly in which unionized and non-unionized sectors interact in general equilibrium. The model is used to study the impact of trade liberalization, deunionization and firm entry on wages in unionized and nonunionized sectors, and on welfare. We find that a shift from autarky to free trade increases non-union wages and welfare, whereas the effect on union wages is ambiguous. We also show that partial deunionization leads to higher wages in both unionized and non-unionized sectors, but only increases welfare when the proportion of unionized sectors is sufficiently low. Finally, wages in non-unionized sectors necessarily increase with firm entry, while the response of union wages and welfare depends on the trade regime.

We study how globalization affects sector-specific wages, employment levels and welfare in a model of general oligopolistic equilibrium with partly unionized labor markets. Globalization is modeled as either reducing trade costs in open sectors or opening up shielded sectors to trade. Both forms of globalization increase union coverage and lead to lower union wage premia in shielded sectors. Trade cost reductions furthermore lead to higher union wage premia in open sectors and to lower aggregate welfare, while an increased number of open sectors lowers the union wage premium in open sectors, and may increase welfare.

This chapter analyzes the effects of global and national technological change on employment and relative wages in an integrated two-country world (“Europe” and “America”), where both countries are characterized by equilibrium unemployment due to fair wage constraints. The asymmetry between the countries arises from country-specific preferences towards wage inequality, with Europe’s preferences being more egalitarian. Furthermore, we look at integration between this two-country world and a third country (“low wage sout”). We derive an analytical tool, the Virtual Integrated Equilibrium, that allows us to adapt Dixit and Norman’s Integrated Equilibrium approach to a situation where both countries have endogenous unemployment levels.

In this chapter, we introduce the fairness approach to efficiency wages into a standard model of international fragmentation. This gives us a theoretical framework in which wage inequality and unemployment rates are co-determined and therefore the public concern can be addressed that international fragmentation and outsourcing to low wage countries lead to domestic job-losses. We develop a novel diagrammatic tool to illustrate the main labor market effects of international fragmentation. We also explore how preferences for fair wages and the size of unemployment benefits govern the employment effects of outsourcing and critically assess the role of political intervention that aims to reduce unemployment benefits under internationally fragmented production.

This chapter develops a model that incorporates workers’ fair wage preferences into a general equilibrium framework with monopolistic competition between heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003). By assuming that the wage considered to be fair by workers depends on the productivity and thus the economic success of the firm they are working in, we can study the determinants of profits, involuntary unemployment and within-group wage inequality in a unified framework. We use this model to investigate the effects of globalization. In a benchmark case with identical costs of entering domestic and foreign markets, there are gains from trade accompanied by distributional conflicts, which have so far not been accounted for in the literature: A simultaneous increase of average profits and involuntary unemployment as well as a surge in within-group wage inequality.

This chapter analyzes the effects of redistribution in a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms in which a fair-wage effort mechanism leads to firm-specific wage payments and involuntary unemployment. The redistribution scheme is financed by profit taxes and gives the same absolute lump-sum transfer to all workers. International trade increases aggregate income and income inequality, ceteris paribus. If, however, trade is accompanied by a suitably chosen increase in the profit tax rate, it is possible to achieve higher aggregate income and a more equal income distribution than in autarky, provided that the share of exporters is sufficiently high.

We develop a model of international trade between two symmetric countries that features inter-group inequality between managers and workers, and also intra-group inequality within each of those two groups. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their managerial ability, and firms run by more able managers have a higher productivity level and make higher profits. There is rent sharing at the firm level due to fair wage preferences of workers, and hence firms with higher profits pay higher wages in equilibrium in order to elicit their workers’ full effort. We show that in this framework international trade leads to a self-selection of the best firms into export status, with exporting firms having to pay a wage premium. Aggregate welfare increases, but there is also larger inequality along multiple dimensions: Involuntary unemployment and income inequality between managers and workers increase, and so does inequality within these two subgroups of individuals, as measured by the respective Gini coefficients.

We develop a two-country model with heterogeneous producers and rent sharing at the firm level. We identify two sources of a multinational wage premium: A composition pay higher wages, and a firm-level wage effect, because a firm makes higher global profits and thus pays higher wages in its home market when becoming multinational. With two identical countries, the wage premium is fully explained by firm characteristics. Allowing for technology differences between countries, a residual wage premium exists in the technologically backward country, but not in the advanced country.