Economics of Rivalry, Conflict and Cooperation

The following sections are included:

• Foreword

• Contents

The following sections are included:

• Violent Conflict as a Profiteering Industry/Business

• Globalization and Diffusion of Market Principles and Homogenization of Economic Cultures

• The Dynamics of Violent Conflict

• Managing Conflicts and Promoting Peace Through Cooperation

The following sections are included:

• Competition and Collusion in a Segmented Industry: Introduction

• Baseline Model
  • The model of a segmented banking industry in Australia
  • Endogenous alliance formation/merger

• Mimicking as a Low-Cost Entrant: An Extension of the Model
  • Discussion

• Measuring Endogenous Collusion: The Traditional Approach
  • Traditional measures of competition in the Australian banking sector
  • Degree of competition: Background of the conjectural variations approach
  • Degree of competition and conjectural variations model
  • The data

• Collusion in the Australian Banking Industry
  • Evidence of collusion in the Australian banking industry: A simple analysis
  • An extension: Chaotic discrimination as a colluding strategy in the banking industry
  • “Chaotic discrimination” as an optimal colluding strategy: The basic model
  • Definitions and preliminary results
  • Discussion

• Is the Collusion Feasible and Stable?

• Why are Secret Discounts Chaotic?

• Politics, Conjectural Variations, and Degree of Rivalry
  • Basics
  • The model
  • Stage II: Nature of competition in the product market
  • Stage I: Electoral equilibrium
  • Electoral equilibrium and nature of competition
  • Comparative statics
    • Comparative statics (under alternative assumption)
  • Discussion and comments

• Concluding Comments

• Appendix A

• Appendix B

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• The Model

• Comparative-Static Properties

• Campaign Contributions and Endogenous Mergers in a Myopic Model
  • Endogenous mergers

• Mimicking a Low-Cost Entrant and Endogenous Mergers

• Concluding Comments

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• A Modeling of Social Capital and Formation of Group Norms
  • The main intuition
  • Preliminaries

• Managerial Returns from Firm Size and U-Shaped Costs: Fragility and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium Integration
  • Sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium integration and its stability properties
  • Bifurcation of the equilibrium
  • The supermodular game of social capital and extremal equilibria and indeterminacy

• Discussion

• Conclusion

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• Retail and Wholesale Markets Relationships — Successive Monopolies

• The Case of Cooperative Investment

• Cooperative Investment Analysis

• The Tragedy of the Commons

• The Case of Wholesale Monopoly and Retail Duopoly

• Comparing Outcomes of the Two Case Scenarios

• Concluding Comments

• Appendix

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• The Model

• Discussion

• Empirical Findings
  • Empirical methods
  • Differences in demand elasticities
  • Degree of competition/rivalry in localized markets
  • Simple model of regression
  • Data sources
  • Results

• Conclusion

• Appendix A

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• Size Asymmetry and Endogenous Mergers: The Baseline Model
  • Evidence from Portugal

• A Brief Note on the German Industry Since 1994

• Collection of Data and Data Sources

• Empirics of Endogenous Merger Models in the Light of German Mergers and Concentration

• Concluding Comments

• Appendix A

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• A Static Model of Vertical Markets
  • An outline
  • The static framework
  • Cournot–Nash equilibrium of the duopoly in the static market

• The Threat of Foreign Entry and Strategic Entry Deterrence
  • Post-entry competition in the retail market
  • Entry prevention by upward price distortion

• Is Upward Price Distortion an Optimal Strategy?
  • The integrated home incumbent and upward price distortion
  • The non-integrated foreign incumbent and upward price distortion
  • Trigger strategy equilibrium

• Concluding Comments

• Appendix A.1

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• Evolution of Central Banking

• Inescapable Pitfalls
  • Inflationary bias and the conflict between rules and discretion
  • The trade-off between inflation and growth
  • On the presumed inverse relationship between central bank independence and inflation

• Optimal Contract and Independence

• Activism Price Stability and Accountability
  • Activism and anticipatory monetary policy
  • The rationale for a dose of secrecy in central banking

• Independence Without Accountability: The Road to Conflicts and Central Bank “Bashing”

• Concluding Comments

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• Intellectual Property Rights and Global Forum

• Formalization of the Model
  • Ecological footprints of economic progress: The relevance of knowledge assets
  • Vertical markets and regulatory issues: A digression

• The Optimal Royalty
  • An outline
  • The sequential game and the Cournot–Nash equilibrium in the downstream market
  • Stage II: Cournot–Nash equilibrium of the duopoly in the downstream market
  • Stage I: The optimal royalty and the perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential game

• Comments and Discussion

• Ethics in Cooperation: An Australian Case Study
  • The Competition Policy in Australia
  • Roles of cooperatives in Australia

• The Impact of Australian Competition Policy on Cooperatives

• The Australian Competition Policy and Cooperatives

• Conflicts and Cooperatives: The Role of Ethics
  • Private benefits and public costs
  • Conflicts between insiders and outsiders
  • Tactical rent-seeking
  • Ethics, morality, and the prisoner's dilemma

• Concluding Comments

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• The Model
  • Local government
  • Central government
  • Equilibrium configurations
  • Fiscal instability and fiscal reforms

• Conclusion

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• The Economy
  • The macro picture
  • Equilibrium national income

• Tax Competition and Production-Location Decision of Multinationals

• Wage Bargaining in the National Arena

• Multinational Investment and Wage Bargaining

• Concluding Comments

The following sections are included:

• Introduction

• Relevant Issues of Globalization

• Theoretical Underpinning

• The Model
  • The precise sequence of moves
  • Budgetary allocations of Stage II and payoffs functions
  • Electoral framework of Stage II

• Conclusion

In Chapter 1, we examine various forms of rivalry, conflict and collusion in oligopolies with market segmentation. The primary intuition is that market segmentation creates an opportunity (potential rivalry) for a business firm to enter into other markets that can have a serious impact on the overall equilibrium configuration through the effects of potential entry on the incentives of and constraints on incumbent firms. On a similar note, market segmentation offers new scope for cooperation among incumbents to forestall entry and potential rivalry. There is little literature on this important issue examined in Chapter 1. Entries and exits, through their effects on the cost asymmetry in a segmented market, can trigger a series of endogenouslydriven changes in a market…

The following sections are included:

• Bibliography

• Index