Uniting Europe

The following sections are included:

• PREFACE

• CONTENTS

• LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Some day historians will probably rank Europe's peaceful integration achieved in half a century of sustained efforts among mankind's major achievements. Other parts of the world — East Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab world — envy our old quarrelsome continent to have accomplished such a remarkable degree of unity, solidarity and common purpose against all odds. There is truly no historical equivalent. Yet, how come that Europe's integration is seen by many, if not most, contemporaries and even quite a few active participants as tedious, wearing and somnific, if not as annoying and threatening the accustomed way of life and of politics proper?

If British and French businessmen meet in Japan they probably discover quickly and with relief, common values, beliefs and ways of behaviour in the difficult bureaucratic and corporate environment of an alien civilisation. On the other hand, if they are off duty on the beaches of Spain, they will probably hardly bother to discover their shared values and roots but rather stick to their own countrymen and friends.

How are great empires created? You can settle down in more or less empty spaces — like in North America, Australia or in the South and East of Czarist Russia. In feudal days you could marry successfully — as the Hapsburgs famously did. In the modern age, without much empty space or effective marital diplomacy left, military conquest to achieve supremacy was attempted by Napoleon I, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. Due to the collective resistance of the conquered subjects, these exploitative empires remained very transitory. Most collapsed within a decade. With its more effective repressive mechanisms, only the post-Stalinist empire managed to survive half a century, before it ultimately imploded between 1989 and 1991.

Reflecting on the poorly designed treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, it finally dawned on the European Council that nights of drinking and shouting matches were a suboptimal way of arriving at yet another treaty addressing the shortcomings of the previous one. Hence a more inclusive convention consisting of member state appointed worthies and a handful of MEPs was dreamt up. As mentioned, its proceedings were chaired by the venerableGiscard d'Estaing, who, two decades earlier, had already modestly declared himself to be a suitable president of Europe.

Are European institutions and their staffers important? The Monnet method consisted of almost conspiratorial networking among people in high places to get historical decisions underway. Political memoirs of Commissioners, from Hans von der Groeben to Lord Arthur Cockfield, confirm this view, presumably an inevitable feature in this genre. Glenda M Rosenthal, an American political scientist, in her classic The Men Behind Decisions, which covered the origins of the Lomée Agreements, produced a respectable academic theory for the small networks of old boys enlightened in the right places at the right moment. It is probably not difficult to find evidence for similar EU decisions originating at middle or even junior management levels, given the right moment and circumstances. This author's claim to (fairly transitory) historical fame results from producing a documentation and a synoptic table which proved and convinced his British director that Estonia and Slovenia were in fact at least as well, if not better, prepared for EU membership back in 1996 as were the standard front runners at the time: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. My director took my table and convinced our Commissioner, Hans van den Broek, who in turn walked into President Santer's office with my tables. This then became a Commission proposal, which the Council quickly accepted. Like many colleagues, I had also worked through friends in the Danish, German and Austrian permanent representations to prepare some of the ground, if this was needed. The rest is history, but it shows that people and institutions are important.

Lord Arthur Francis Cockfield (1916–), the creator of the EU's single market, in his professional recollections recalls the background of this unlikely success story. When he was appointed internal market commissioner in the first Delors Commission in 1985, the sense of Eurosclerosis was overwhelming. The previous Thorn Commission (1981–1984) had spent most of its energy and political capital for the solution of the protracted British budget dispute with Mrs Thatcher.

The coins, with their different national backsides, have become an unlikely collector's item. The sport is to collect all eight coins starting from one cent to two Euros from all 12 Euro countries, but also the much rarer mints from the Vatican, San Marino and Andorra, where the Euro has been in circulation since January 2002.

There is a case to be made for agricultural protectionism, and it runs as follows: agriculture is different from all other sectors. There are millions of small-scale producers producing fairly standard commodities, like cereals, milk, sugar, fruit and meat. But, courtesy of the weather and the good Lord, they have little influence over the actual quality and quantity of their output, or over their sales prices which are, if left unattended, being determined in large measure by a handful of computerised commodity brokers on the world market. Food products are different also from other goods as demand is fairly inelastic. We can live with shortages of toilet paper, shaving cream and newsprint, but we cannot go without food for more than a fortnight.

The EU's fisheries policy has always been considered the smaller stepbrother of the mighty CAP. Although the original policy objectives were similar (increase productivity and producer incomes, modernise the sector), the policy similarities are deceiving. The basis of the business ethic and the public control needs are fundamentally different.

Normally host countries show their best sides and shiniest sites to visiting dignitaries. When Bruce Millan, then the EU Commissioner for Regional Development, visited the East Austrian province of Burgenland back in 1993, he was treated to a rare spectacle. His convoy travelled the bumpiest country road imaginable. He was invited to witness a folk dance performance of the local Croat minority in a creaky old barn. Later rustic lunch was served in a historic farmhouse which also served as a makeshift barracks for young soldiers patrolling Austria's Eastern border. This was followed with a briefing by the regional governor, Karl Stix, a former school teacher who explained to his patiently listening guest, a fellow socialist, the tales of historical woes which had befallen his home state: originally part of German-speaking West Hungary, the Hungarian military had occupied the area's larger towns in 1919 when the borders were to be redrawn. During a plebiscite this prevented the German cities to vote in favour of accession to Austria, which was joined consequently only by their rural hinterland, renamed Burgenland.

Industrial policies have been part and parcel of Europe's economic development since the days of mercantilism with benevolent monarchs promoting local manufacturing and foreign exchange earnings. The sophistication of instruments probably increased, but the principle of public intervention in the market mechanism remained.

Fair competition — or “level playing field” in US parlance — is clearly essential in any free trade arrangement, customs union and even more so in a common internal market. Already the Treaties of Rome, with wise foresight, prohibited any abuse of monopolistic positions and cartels, subjected public enterprises to competition rules, and permitted public subsidies only if they had been notified to the Commission and approved as not distorting competition. The objective was to permit the smooth operation of markets, to enhance consumer choice and to reduce prices. After 17 years of Council deliberations, in 1990 merger control provisions were also added to the arsenal of the EU's trust busters. In 2002, however, a series of defeats in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which threw out several of the Commission's antimerger decisions on account of their sloppy economics, made a reform of the system and its procedures imperative.

It was the European Court of Justice which, back in 1985, put the common transport policy on track. Already the Treaties of Rome had postulated a common policy, but for the next 28 years nothing happened. Member states and their bureaucrats happily tended their highly protected over-regulated national patches and at Council meetings cheerfully agreed to disagree. The Court, reacting to a complaint brought by the EP, found inaction not good enough and condemned the Council to remove all national discrimination of operators. The judgement came in good time for the internal market. Transportation after all is an essential factor of production. The more cost effectively it performs, the better for an EU-wide division of labour within well organised economies of scale.

Energy as a subject of EU policy suffers the fate of human primary needs: once satisfied people gladly lose interest, all the more so if their object of erstwhile concern turns out to be overly complicated and subject to an inordinate amount of misinformation.

The protection of Europe's environment aptly illustrates the case for multiple and complementary interventions by different levels of actors. In many problem areas of cross border pollution and risks, EU policies play a significant role: they concern emissions into the air (affecting forests up to the ozone layer), emissions affecting water quality (both ground water and surface waters—rivers and then oceans), solid waste, noise and radiation risks. The preservation of natural habitats and the protection of endangered indigenous species similarly have a continental European dimension.

Critics of the lack of anEUsocial policy had, for a long time, a fair point. The Treaties of Rome ignored social policy reflecting the neo-liberal belief that economic growth would automatically generate welfare. In the rebellious 1960s, the Community then acquired an image of being a capitalist stooge only of benefit to the fat cats, an image which stuck for a long time.

Directly related to the functioning of the internal market is consumer protection. With some justification consumers have come to expect the same level of protection when purchasing in other EU countries as back home. This is of particular relevance when unscrupulous traders sell their unsuspecting victims overpriced and essentially unwanted products and services while preying on their carefree holiday mood or their ignorance of local laws. The purchase of time-share property in Spanish resorts is a classical case. The single market triggered a regulatory need and the Community institutions reacted timely and comprehensively.

Few will dispute that 1 billion Euros invested in applied research or educational exchange is a better investment than the distillation of table wines or export subsidies for milk powder. Yet the principles of subsidiarity and academic freedom should require careful policy decisions prior to the launch of EU-wide initiatives in the sciences, education and culture. This is not always the case. Notably when summits fail to achieve agreement on substantial policy progress, substitute action in the “soft” intellectual areas with pious rationales seemingly beyond dispute are being sought to dress up one more “success” for public consumption. It is useful therefore to take a short hard look at the plethora of policy initiatives in the sciences and technologies that have crept up during the last decades.

The curious nature of the political animal that is the EU is clearly illustrated by its fiscal policy constraints. It is neither fish nor flesh. It has no taxation rights, nor can it (luckily) go into deficit. It has to stick to multi-annual spending plans to avoid annual budget conflicts in the Council. Its spending patterns, with their dominance of redistributive agricultural and structural expenditure, are reminiscent of an outsized village economy.

Europe's integration is a legal construction borne out of treaties, their annexes and their protocols: the Treaties of Rome (1957), the Single Act (1987), the Treaties of Maastricht (1992, in force since 1993), of Amsterdam (1997, in force since 1999), and of Nice (2000, in force since 2002). They and the various accession treaties, once properly ratified by all parliaments, establish EU primary law. The treaties aspire to integration through peace, law, democracy and social justice (unlike the violence of WWII or the Napoleonic wars). They established the fundamental economic freedoms of the internal market and principles of social solidarity, respect national identity, and since a European Council declaration of 1977 have made the “European Convention on Human Rights” (1950) a general principle of Community law.

Once the Customs Union was achieved, it made sense to negotiate trade and commercial issues in unison towards third partners. With a mandate given by the Council then a unified position would also enhance the EU's bargaining strength and leverage. The common commercial policy survived its baptism of fire successfully at subsequent multilateral rounds: “Dillon” (1959–1962), and “Kennedy” (1963–1967). As a more consolidated major player, the Commission then operated at the Tokyo (1973–1979) and Uruguay (1986– 1993) rounds, which all helped to reduce tariffs (including the Union's common external tariff) as a significant obstacle to world trade, and to set up multilateral disciplines on a range of non-tariff barriers in order to minimise their harmful effect on optimal global factor allocation.

When the EU (then EEC) was founded in 1957, most member states were still proud, if somewhat shaken, masters of colonial empires. France held onto vast territories north and south of the Sahara, Belgium to Congo and to Rwanda/Burundi, Italy to Somaliland and the Dutch to the Antilles. At French insistence these colonies, prior to and after independence, were formally associated with the EU to promote their economic and social development. The Jaounde Association Agreements (1963–1975) then provided limited OAD for Francophone Africa. When the UK entered the common market (with Commonwealth countries fearing for their imperial tariff preferences), most of the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa joined, plus a few Caribbean and Pacific Islands.

More so than taxation, currency, immigration and justice, foreign and defense policies touch the heart of national sovereignty. Ultimately they need to rely on national consensus and solidarity to use the military, meaning the sacrifice of the lives of young men (and women) to achieve common strategic objectives. To achieve this, the EU has still a long way to go from the piles of mostly inconsequential declarations that stayed unread on the desks of a small army of COREU correspondents in embassies and foreign ministries.

The script is a nightmare for any director short of the talents of an Ingmar Bergman. There is little prospect for a box office hit. It is not a pretty sight. An old quarrelsome couple of no particular sophistication (no Richard Burton, no Elizabeth Taylor), suburban lower middle class at best. He is resourceful, tough, bossy, insensitive and ignorant beyond his immediate concerns. She is from a better family, with little current achievements to show, resentful, nagging, disorganised and full of unachieved aspirations. There is an unending series of petty quarrels, culminating in periodic fits of hysteria and noisy threats, which however inevitably recede without consequence in sullen silence and daily routines. A divorce is not imminent. There is no visible unfaithfulness and little risk of Latin lovers, Russian or Oriental brides eloping with either of them. Yet fault lines are visible which are deeper than the usual wear and tear of an old couple. Incantations of the past (“When we did postwar reconstruction”, “when we were in Korea together”) won't help. Can there be a happy ending? You are the marriage counsellor, what do you do?.

In December 2002, the Copenhagen summit concluded four years of accession negotiations with eight Central/Eastern European countries and two Mediterranean islands, the capitals of which some EU heads of governments perhaps had difficulties in identifying, let alone in spelling. Bill Clinton could be forgiven when in 1999 during his visit to Ljubljana he confused Slovenia with Slovakia. But when Hans van den Broek, then Commissioner in charge of Enlargement, got Poland and Hungarymixed up during the official opening of the accession talks back in March 1997, this was more auspicious. In spite of differentiations, as promised by the Commission and demanded by the Council, in subsequent treatment by the Commission (most visible once Guenter Verheugen took over the enlargement portfolio in 1999) a large convoy was assembled from which only the heavily limping and obviously unprepared Bulgarians and Romanians were decoupled.

The scene may be familiar to any travelling missionary on European integration matters: while you drone on and on about the win-win situation of shared sovereignty, your student audience inevitably dozes off (except for the unavoidable handful of Europhobics who remain on high alert), and after a while not even your incessant attempts at cracking Euro jokes (a rare species!) will wake, let alone cheer them up. It is only when you casually mention job prospects “in Europe” at the end of your over-long speech, that everybody suddenly gets jolted into high attention. Attractive girls put on their most winning smiles and ask for your telephone number when inquiring about “stage” prospects in the Commission. Prospects of easy riches, generous expatriate packages in a stimulating international work environment, with wide discretionary powers at a young age over a whole continent emerge. This and plenty of global business travel will surely compensate for the Brussels rain.

What is a capital? Niamey is a capital and so is Ulan Bator. There were transitional capitals like Bonn or Vichy. There are also artificial ones like Canberra and Brasilia, or currently still more fictional spots like Abuja (Nigeria) or Astana (Kazakhstan).

The following sections are included:

• BIBLIOGRAPHY

• INDEX