China’s Policy Toward Afghanistan and Its Impact on India

Introduction

Afghanistan is a battle-scarred country located at the crossroads of Central and South Asia. After the withdrawal of U.S.-led NATO troops and the subsequent Taliban takeover, the country’s security situation looked increasingly precarious, raising fears that theocratic rule might once again become a source of domestic instability and regional tensions. Among all the regional stakeholders, China and India are the most concerned parties when it comes to the political, economic, and security outlook of a post-secular Afghanistan. New Delhi fears it may lose ground to Beijing in terms of geopolitical influence and diplomatic leverage.¹ India has provided significant amounts of economic and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan since the beginning of the Hamid Karzai presidency and maintained good relations with the country’s secular administrations. The Taliban’s return may spell greater instability for the subregion and fuel sectarian strife within India.² Concerns are also mounting that New Delhi may be further isolated economically and politically by its two hostile neighbors, Pakistan and China.³

Beijing, on the other hand, also has to make high-stakes decisions on what role it should play in a changing subregional landscape and how deep it should get involved in a Taliban-led Afghanistan. With diminished U.S. presence, Beijing must devote more strategic attention and resources to the security dynamics lest domestic problems in Afghanistan and border disputes with India hobble its broader economic and political objectives in the region. Beijing is also looking to raise its profile in South Asia, to not only meet the rising expectations of regional stakeholders, but also present its credentials and credibility as a responsible great power. As some leading international relations experts suggest, Beijing has to promote a deep pluralism based on consensus while dealing with actors having diverse political systems like India and Afghanistan.⁴

Beijing had made its policy clear following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. In late October 2021, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi laid out a four-point policy proposal regarding Afghanistan’s development and security. First, form a more open and comprehensive political architecture to accommodate every single ethnic groups. Second, enact moderate, judicious reforms, including ensuring the security and genuine freedoms and interests of women and children. Third, make a clean break with all terrorist groups, including the Islamic State and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and go to great lengths to unflinchingly battle them. Fourth, seek a clear international strategy and live as one with different countries, particularly its neighbors.⁵

The previous Afghan government policy toward China was that of diplomatic and economical cooperation. After the Taliban takeover, the deteriorating situation was further worsened by different factors like the pandemic and soaring inflation.⁶ The Taliban looked for help from China and other regional actors like India and Pakistan for tackling the situation. In that regard, the Taliban government has somewhat amended its policies to present a softer image by adopting fundamental principles of regional stability, economic cooperation, and security agreement. In doing so, they have signed bilateral trade and security agreements with China and other actors to safeguard their government in the region against the prevailing threat of civil war and opposing factions in the state.⁷ The Taliban might have some reservations about Beijing’s religious policy, but they have, nevertheless, stepped up engagement with neighboring countries to earn greater international recognition, focusing on a more resilient and pragmatic relationship with Beijing.⁸

India could face adverse effects of China’s policy toward Kabul and the overall situation in Afghanistan. China’s policy could isolate India in the region, threatening its security and blocking its access to Central Asian countries. China’s policy of economic cooperation in Afghanistan will be seen as a positive gesture by the Taliban.⁹ India, which is perceived as a U.S. puppet by the Taliban, could face a three-pronged threat emanating from the troika: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China.

Before the Taliban takeover, India’s policy to Afghanistan was based on the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) under which both sides worked out the needs and tasks where Afghanistan required India’s assistance.¹⁰ After the U.S. withdrawal, New Delhi has been trying to present a softer image, including signing an agreement with the World Food Programme to distribute wheat in Afghanistan. In 2022, Indian government also allocated 27 million dollars in its budget to assist Afghanistan. The Taliban also started to engage with India due to its assistance. Afghan ambassador to India, Farid Mamundzay, praised the Indian efforts to help Afghanistan in a delicate moment.¹¹ China and India both have strong interests in cooperation on economic and environmental issues and reforms. Thus, hard balancing is not an option for Sino-India relations.¹²

Applying the stag hunt model and using strategic realism as the analytical framework, this paper explores the policy options available to China, Afghanistan, and India in the post-U.S. hegemony era in South Asia and argues that in a three-player matrix, all parties could maximize their strategic payoffs by enacting the right mix of policies, including, for example, improving communication, building mutual trust, and fulfilling obligations.¹³ The authors lay out the conditions in which all players, which otherwise may prefer risk-averting hare strategies, may find opportunities to derive maximal political, economic, and security gains from bolder actions. To be more specific, after the U.S. withdrawal, the stag strategy for China is to safeguard its economic and security interests by ramping up engagement with Afghanistan, while its hare strategy is to keep up deterrence against India by exhibiting its growing capabilities. The Taliban-led Afghan government’s stag strategy is to prove its governing credentials and earn the widest possible recognition on the world stage, while its hare strategy is to obtain aid and assist any extremist groups to gain credibility as a formidable force wielding religious authority. Lastly, India’s stag strategy is to forestall a three-pronged threat by safeguarding its security and economic interests and its hare strategy is to maintain deterrence by fending off China at its borders with greater U.S. support.

Theoretical Framework: Strategic Realism and Stag Hunt

Since its inception, strategic realism has long been regarded as one of the most useful theoretical framework to explain the behavior of rational actors in international politics. As Thomas Schelling, a leading intellectual on strategic realism put it, “strategic analysis is usually about the situation not the individuals—about the structure of incentives, of information and communication, the choices available, and the tactics that can be employed. It cannot proceed from the point of view of a single favored participant. It deals with situations in which one party has to think about how the others are going to reach their decisions.”¹⁴

The stag hunt is sometimes referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemmas, or the game of mutual interest. The problem of stag hunting was introduced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality.¹⁵ In Rousseau’s account, two hunters should independently choose whether to chase a stag or a hare without informing each other. In any case, the two hunters know that the best way to effectively chase a stag is with the assistance of each other. A hunter can get a hare without the other hunter’s help, and with less exertion and less time. However, it is worth noting that the hare has undeniably less meat than the stag. Subsequently, Rousseau accepted that it would be better for every hunter acting alone to surrender total independence and negligible gamble, which would yield just a small prize as the hare. All things being equal, every hunter ought to separately pick the more aggressive and remunerating objective of getting stags, subsequently surrendering some amount of independence in return for collaboration and added might. A mathematical model of the stag hunt matrix derived by Todd Sandler and Keith Sargent on the basis of Rousseau interpretation is given above in Figure 1.¹⁶

There are two equilibriums in this game: One in which both sides hunt stag, and one in which both sides hunt rabbits.¹⁷ These equilibriums in the game are called Nash equilibriums. Nash equilibrium is the point in the game where no player (hunter) can improve his/her payoff by changing his decision unilaterally. Both sides want to make sure they can reciprocate the other’s actions.¹⁸ This paper adopts the Nash equilibrium because it helps a player to obtain the best payoff by considering not only its own choices but also the choices of other actors involved in a certain scenario. This study makes use of Nash equilibrium to elaborate the strategy adopted by the states involved in the region. Some critics fault the equilibrium saying that sometimes players do not act rationally or they do not have enough information to choose the best responses to others’ choices. But the critique does not apply here as the actors involved are states rather than individuals and a state in an international scenario more often than not acts as rationally as it can. Moreover, the unavailability of sufficient information is not an issue here because these states are not in a state of war, and the information and strategy adopted by one state are made clear to other states by their foreign affairs officials. Figure 2 shows a general example of the payoff matrix modeled after the stag hunt.¹⁹

Here, A represents the maximum payoff when stag strategy is chosen by both players. B is the payoff that is less than the maximum payoff. Payoff B is achieved when one player cooperates and the other player does not and this payoff represents the player that gains in this strategy. C represents the payoff when both player choose not to cooperate. This payoff can be equal to or less than payoff B. Payoff D is the minimum payoff in the stag hunt game. This payoff is obtained when one player cooperates and the others do not and this payoff represent the player that is at a loss in this strategy.

The Equilibrium in a Three-Way Stag Hunt

Here, the payoffs are hypothetically generated based on the above-mentioned Sandler and Sargent two-player game matrix where cooperation decisions indicate stag hunt and do not cooperate decisions represent hare hunt.

Two Nash equilibriums are obtained in China, Afghanistan, and India stag hunt game. When all three states cooperate, that gives payoff maximum or stag strategy, and when all three do not cooperate that provides the risk minimization or hare strategy, and the payoff associated with these are (2,2,2) and (1,1,1), respectively.

Suppose the payoff is as such if all the states involved in the scenario cooperate, then each state receives a payoff of 2. Next, if two states cooperate and the third state does not cooperate, then the payoff of the state that cooperates is 0 and the one state that did not cooperate is 1. Then, if two states do not cooperate and one state cooperates, then the state that does not cooperate will receive payoff of 1 and the state that cooperates will receive payoff of 0. Lastly, if all the states in the matrix do not cooperate, then the payoff received by all the states is 1. As Nash equilibrium is based on the rational behavior of the actor and the choice of the other player involved, the equilibrium applied here considers the rational choice of the state to maximize their payoff to be able to cooperate.

China’s payoff in choosing to cooperate and not to cooperate is shown by the first number in each box of Figures 3 and 4. China’s strategy is determined by comparing the payoff of the 2nd row which represents the cooperation decision of China with the 3rd row payoff which represents the noncooperation decision of China in Figures 3 and 4. Afghanistan’s payoff in choosing to cooperate and not to cooperate is shown by the second number in each box of Figures 3 and 4. The strategy of Afghanistan is determined by comparing the payoff of the 2nd column which represents the cooperation decision by Afghanistan with the 3rd column payoff which represents the noncooperation decision of Afghanistan in Figures 3 and 4. India’s payoff in choosing to cooperate and not to cooperate is shown by the third number in each box of Figures 3 and 4. And the strategy of India is determined by comparing the payoff of each box in Figure 3 which represents the cooperation decision by India with the payoff of each box in Figure 4 which represents the noncooperation decision of India. Finding out three-player Nash equilibrium is relatable to two-player Nash equilibrium taking into account that it just involves a few extra steps. Thus, Nash equilibrium can be found out by considering the choices taken by all the states involved in the scenario one by one.

China’s Strategy

Figure 3 suggests that if Afghanistan and India choose to cooperate, then the decision taken by China will be to cooperate as it gives better payoff of 2 than to not cooperate that gives the 1 payoff. Next, if Afghanistan decides not to cooperate and India decides to cooperate, then China will decide to not cooperate as it gives a payoff of 1, and then to cooperate give a payoff of 0. Figure 4 suggests that if Afghanistan’s strategy is to cooperate and India’s strategy is not to cooperate, then China would decide not to cooperate as it gives a payoff of 1 compared with the 0 payoff when it chooses to cooperate. Lastly, if Afghanistan and India both choose not to cooperate, then China would decide to not cooperate as it gives a better payoff of 1.

Afghanistan’s Strategy

Figure 3 suggests that if China and India choose to cooperate, then Afghanistan would decide to not cooperate as it gives a payoff of 1, which is better than the scenario in which it chooses to cooperate. If China decides not to cooperate and India decides to cooperate, then Afghanistan would decide to not cooperate as well because this decision payoff is 1 which is better than 0 payoffs received by cooperating. Figure 4 suggests that if India decides not to cooperate but China decides to cooperate then Afghanistan would decide to not cooperate as it gives a better payoff of 1 than to receive 0 payoffs by cooperating. Next, if China and India both decide not to cooperate then Afghanistan would also decide to not cooperate as it gives a better payoff of 1 than to cooperate which gives a payoff of 0.

India’s Strategy

Lastly, India’s strategy can be seen by comparing Figures 3 and 4 payoff. If China and Afghanistan decide to cooperate, then India will also decide to cooperate as it gives a better payoff of 2 than the 0-payoff in the scenario where it does not cooperate. Next, if China decides to cooperate but Afghanistan decides not to cooperate, then India will decide to not cooperate in this case because the payoff by not cooperating is 1, better than the payoff of 0 by cooperating. If China decides not to cooperate and Afghanistan decides to cooperate then India will also decide to not cooperate as it gives a better payoff of 1 rather than a payoff of 0 obtained by cooperating. Lastly, if China and Afghanistan both decide not to cooperate, then India will also decide to not cooperate as it gives a better payoff of 1 than the 0-payoff obtained by cooperating.

Problem Associated with the Game and Solution

In real-world scenarios, states, in order to avoid risk, tend to choose a risk-minimizing strategy that gives less payoff but more stability. Thus, the study have taken into account the following considerations applied by different scholars and implemented them in these scenarios. For all players to choose cooperation, stag hunt needs to look at the relative value of the proceeds. Manipulating these relative returns can encourage players to pursue payoff-maximizing strategies.²⁰

Therefore, punishment can be imposed on the defecting player such that no one will trust him in the next hunt, which will ultimately lead to cooperation.²¹ In stag hunt, communication and verification were the main elements.²² Besides, international treaties and agreements are powerful tools, which address the absence of communication and commitments in stag hunting. Global deals might experience the ill effects of a first-mover weakness, which is not a central hindrance and may vanish over the long haul.²³ Thus, by application of these sets of rules, the actor’s shift from risk-averting strategy to payoff maximum strategy can be obtained.

To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate

Over the last few years, South Asian geopolitics has taken a shift due to the U.S. exit from Afghanistan and the following Taliban takeover. Beijing is also changing its regional strategy, focusing on maintaining a favorable balance of power and ensuring general stability by stepping up engagement with Afghanistan and Pakistan.²⁴ China, as the major player in the region, has until recently approached the world with a geoeconomic strategy, seeking greater economic influence on the international stage. The Taliban began to soften their confrontational approach in 2013 after years of conflicts with the United States and other U.S.-aligned domestic and international actors, and has moderated some of its policies and positions on some social and religious issues to win over the Afghan populace.²⁵

After the U.S. withdrawal, New Delhi has also gradually shifted its strategy, putting more emphasis on pragmatic economic cooperation and lowering geopolitical tensions, as a way of counterbalancing Beijing’s growing regional influence.²⁶

China, as a major power, played an important role in establishing the consensus that Afghanistan’s destiny should be determined by the Afghan people. Beijing advocated the Afghan-led peace initiative to solve the issue through peace talks. But question arises as to why China is increasingly engaging with Afghanistan, though since establishing diplomatic relations in 1950, the monetary and political collaboration between the two countries has been minimal. It was after the establishment of the Hamid Karzai government in 2001 that these two countries started meaningful engagement with each other, especially in collaborative exploration of Afghanistan’s resource-rich regions, drawing constant Western criticism.²⁷ In the last few decades, China has been actively engaging with both democratic governments as well as with other ethnic groups in Afghanistan.²⁸ After the U.S. withdrawal, it has started to play a significant role in addressing Kabul’s economic and security concerns.²⁹

The main motivation behind China’s involvement in Afghanistan is its security concerns in the Xinjiang region, as Beijing remains vigilant about the ever-present possibility of a revolt incited by extremist elements within and across the border such as Al-Qaeda and East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The extremist elements are present in Afghanistan and the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) areas of Pakistan.³⁰

In addition to security concerns, Beijing’s deeper involvement in Afghanistan can also be attributed to Kabul’s geographic location. Afghanistan lies at the intersection of Central Asia and South Asia, an advantageous location that helps Kabul earn the reputation as a way station on important trade routes. Beijing is trying to revive its economic links via its western regions and secure long-term energy supplies from Central Asia and the Middle East via Afghanistan routes.³¹

China had early on made it clear that it would engage with the Afghan government to achieve its long-term interest. As the peace talks between the Taliban and U.S. coalition forces began, China also started engagement with the Taliban in Afghanistan. In 2019, as peace talks unfolded, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi reaffirmed Beijing’s policy position that the settlement of the Afghan issue must be an open and inclusive one, accommodating to the concerns and interests of all major stakeholders. All groups engaged with the Afghan issue ought to regard the desire of the Afghan public and the Afghan government. In discussing the new security developments in the region, Afghan national security adviser Hamdullah Mohib expressed his gratitude for Beijing’s long-running contributions to Afghanistan’s development, territorial integrity, and stability.³² Through proper communication and trust building, Beijing ensured that Kabul reciprocate and adopt a cooperative strategy, committing to protecting the former’s security and economic interests in Afghanistan. In exchange, China assured Kabul that it will continue to provide economic and humanitarian assistance.

China’s cooperative standing was also advocated by Pakistan. This added to the guarantee considering that a large Pashtun population also resides here and the religious background that Pakistan and Afghanistan share. As the strategic dialogue held by the foreign ministers in China made clear that China and Pakistan both supported the ongoing efforts at peace and reconciliation. They also urged all sides to show flexibility to find a durable solution to the Afghan conflict.³³

In his meeting with President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan in 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping made clear that Beijing would continue to assist Afghanistan in national reconciliation and economic development. Xi also said that he expected the Afghan side to continue to support Beijing’s effort to counter the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).³⁴

Even as it continued friendly cooperation with the Ghani administration, Beijing remained open-minded when it came to dealings with other parties in Afghanistan, including the Taliban. As Wang Yi put it, “We hope the negotiation between the United States and the Taliban can lead to a deal that is conducive to the peace process.” After the Taliban takeover, China did not withdraw its support for Afghanistan. In a meeting between the Chinese foreign minister and Mullah Abdullah Ghani, then deputy to the Taliban’s supreme leader, Wang Yi said that China, as Afghanistan’s biggest neighbor, respected Afghanistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, promising that Beijing would adhered to its noninterference policy and pursue a mutually beneficial policy. Mullah Abdullah said China had always been a dependable companion of the Afghan public and recognized Beijing’s positive role in Afghanistan’s tranquility and peace process.³⁵

After the establishment of the Taliban government, China actively pursued the cooperative strategy. A series of meetings showed that China, in pursuit of long-term interests, would collaborate patiently. A senior diplomat made clear that the friendship between China and Afghanistan had remained strong for many years. His Taliban interlocutor Molvi Abdul Hanafi also answered with a positive gesture, pledging that the new government would not permit any power to utilize the Afghan land to do anything against Chinese interests. He also pointed out that the Taliban would go to all possible lengths to guarantee the security of Chinese organizations and staff in Afghanistan.³⁶ These events clearly showed that the strategies adopted by both actors were cooperative, providing Beijing and Kabul with maximum payoffs.

Due to China’s cooperative policy, the Taliban, to achieve their long-term goal of stable governance and international recognition, adopted a cooperative strategy. The Taliban also perceived cooperation as the better option than relying on immediate and short-term interests by taking up a noncooperative position toward Uighur Muslims, which achieved less payoff. Foreign Minister Wang Yi reassured Amir Khan, foreign minister of the Taliban-led government, of Beijing’s continued support for Afghanistan in areas deemed to be Kabul’s core interests. In exchange, China expected Afghanistan to back Chinese interests as well. Amir Khan said that Afghanistan appreciated China’s noninterference policy and would work for better communication and all-around collaboration with China.³⁷

Even as China increased its engagement with Afghanistan, India was also not that far away. As the peace talks began, India’s approach toward the democratic government and the Taliban changed to ensure the security of its interests in the future. A spokesperson at India’s external affairs ministry rebuked Pakistan’s statement that “India does not have any role in Afghanistan,” emphasizing that Afghanistan is a sovereign state that would make its own policy choices concerning its own development and security.³⁸ India also adopted the strategy of cooperation and engagement toward Afghanistan to better safeguard its long-term interests. India could not afford enmity from Afghanistan because of its bad relations with Pakistan and China in the region. To avoid a three-pronged threat, New Delhi resorted to a pragmatic strategy in its neighborhood.

India maintained communications with the Ashraf Ghani government and also supported the peaceful resolution of the Afghanistan–U.S. conflict with the Taliban. Prime Minister Modi reaffirmed India’s responsibility as a reliable companion and neighbor to a unified, sovereign, and prosperous Afghanistan. He declared that India would help on a fundamental level with an Afghan-driven, Afghan-possessed, and Afghan-controlled comprehensive peace process. He emphasized that as Afghanistan’s essential partner, India would continue to work closely with Afghanistan to guarantee the advancement of the region’s security. As both countries were U.S. partners, President Ashraf Ghani answered in kind. He accentuated the craving to fortify the collaboration between the two countries.³⁹ This strategy of cooperation with Ghani’s government in Afghanistan proved to be essential in securing the long-term interests in forestalling a three-pronged threat to India’s security and economy.

When the Taliban started taking over Afghanistan, India again showed a neutral posture and presented a cooperative strategy toward all sides in Afghanistan. In that aspect, the humanitarian and economic crises in Afghanistan likewise presented a chance for India to redefine its strategic approach. Since the Taliban takeover, India has provided Afghanistan with wheat and other basic food items and 500,000 doses of COVID-19 vaccines as humanitarian aid. To advance this engagement, the Indian government has announced 27 million dollars in financial aid to Afghanistan.⁴⁰ Although India and China did not formally recognize the Taliban government, they had extended a helping and cooperative hand toward the Taliban. The humanitarian and financial aid provided by India to the Afghan Taliban helped build a certain degree of trust between the two actors. Indian announcement for spending of 25 million dollars as development aid in Afghanistan was a move welcomed by the Taliban. Suhail Shaheen, a former member of the negotiating team from the Taliban said that the Taliban appreciated India’s support and would help improve ties and trust between the two nations.⁴¹ India began to shift its rhetoric of noncooperation into cooperation. This is done to ensure the recognition of their long-term interests and to gain the Taliban’s inclusive cooperation. India, through its cooperative strategy, has been working toward a maximum payoff. In response, the Afghan Taliban also adopted a cooperative strategy toward India to ensure their long-term interests.

The relationship between India and China has always been tense, but India and China maintain economic cooperation and engage in trust-building measures through more communication. After the U.S. exit, both countries shifted their strategies to cooperation rather than noncooperation to meet their long-term interests.

Border skirmishes between China and India in recent years have surely affected their policy toward each other, but fear of noncooperation in the future as punishment have led both states to adopt a pragmatic strategy of cooperation. Indian public opinion has soured on the bilateral relationship after the May 2020 border conflict. New Delhi responded by banning 59 Chinese mobile apps and strengthening its relationship with other partners like the United States. But while there has been a perceptible shift toward more hardline policies in both countries, high-level engagements between military planners and government officials have never been suspended. To additionally change its ties for long-term collaboration, the Chinese foreign minister said at a gathering in Dushanbe in September 2021 that military and strategic authorities from the two sides ought to proceed with conversations to determine remaining issues along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the disputed region of eastern Ladakh. Both side agreed that during the period of consultation, Beijing and New Delhi must refrain from doing anything that might aggravate the deteriorating relationship.⁴² At the 15th corps commander meeting, the two sides agreed that such a goal would assist with reestablishing harmony and peacefulness in the western district of the LAC and advance cooperation in their relations. China and India also agreed to keep the channels of communication open between the two countries’ military and political leaderships and work with each other to arrive at a commonly satisfactory answer to the issues at an early date.⁴³

Overall, India has adopted a policy of cautious engagement, with a focus on protecting its long-term interests in the region by promoting stability in Afghanistan. To achieve this, New Delhi has provided considerable humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and is actively engaging with the Taliban-led government. To counter Chinese presence in Afghanistan, India has also adopted a cooperative strategy to achieve maximum payoff. New Delhi’s punitive measures against Chinese companies were intended as a political signal rather than part of a broader effort to sever its economic links with Beijing.

Conclusion

The above evidence clearly shows how in international scenarios states in stag hunt games can achieve payoff maximum strategy by adopting a cooperative posture through proper communication and trust-building measures. In the case of China, Beijing’s policy toward Afghanistan is that of cooperation through which it wants to achieve its long-term interests in greater regional stability and expanded economic link. To achieve its goal, it is actively engaging with the Taliban government after the U.S. withdrawal. Border conflicts may occur again in the years ahead, but Beijing would try its best to limit their fallout, as it did in recent years, so that territorial disputes will not generate far-reaching ripple effects that might threaten stability on the subcontinent. In the case of Afghanistan, to attain the long-term goal of international recognition and effective governance, the Taliban-led government has also cooperated with China and other regional actors such as India and Pakistan, which have helped Afghanistan through humanitarian aid and by speaking on behalf of the Afghan Taliban interests in different global and regional forums. For their long-term interests, the Afghan government may let go of their short-term goals of getting aid and supporting any extremist groups to gain credibility as a religious force. In the case of India, for its long-term objective of forestalling a three-pronged threat, New Delhi has to help maintain Afghanistan’s stability and work with Beijing to localize the scale and repercussions of possible border conflicts on the one hand, and broaden its economic links with Beijing and other major economies.

Notes