Examining the Geoeconomic Implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for US Preeminence in the Horn of Africa
Abstract
Focusing on the US–China rivalry in the Horn of Africa (HoA), this study investigates the geoeconomic implications of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on long-standing US preeminence, using offensive realism as a theoretical lens. Based on an in-depth literature review and using a qualitative research approach, the authors examine Beijing’s growing geoeconomic engagement with the HoA and its consequences for great power competition on the African continent. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of President Biden’s Build Back Better World (B3W), a development initiative designed to counter China’s BRI economic influence on the HoA. The study concludes that both the BRI and B3W initiatives and their implementation strategies demonstrate that both Beijing and Washington have strong national interests in the HoA regions, resulting in fierce geopolitical competition.
Introduction
The rivalry between Beijing and Washington is much more intense in the Indo-Pacific region; however, it also stretches to the Horn of Africa (HoA), as the region is strategically significant in safeguarding commercial activities across the Red Sea-Suez Canal shipping corridor.1 Owing to its proximity, the HoA region provides leverage to safeguard maritime life, which is suitable for exerting influence and yielding significant geopolitical advantages to major powers. What distinguishes the growing Sino-American contest in the HoA is that it is economic rather than military, unlike the US–Soviet rivalry during the Cold War.2 Several indicators justify China’s economic engagement.3 First, unlike the Soviet Union, China is connected to the global market economic system and leverages these advantages to gain influence rather than to compete with the United States through military power. This approach is evident in the HoA, in the sense that Beijing is exploiting both Chinese state and private sector achievements, as well as floating potential access to the Chinese market and debt through development loans, to influence the HoA.4 Second, Beijing offers generous loans and other forms of economic assistance to Africa as a means of offsetting Washington’s advantages in strong military alliances and extensive security and intelligence cooperation with the HoA governments.5 The third element is China’s limited strategic ambitions. Other than on a number of core issues like Taiwan and Xinjiang, Beijing does not seek to impose its values on HoA nations or try to shape their strategic orientations.
These circumstances provide an opportunity for China to expand its economic imprint by building industrial parks, telecommunication networks, and infrastructure such as highways, trains, and hydroelectric power plants.6 These sectors have significantly increased China’s access to natural resources and local markets.7 For example, in Kenya, the Chinese financed the Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway, which was built by the China Road and Road Corporation. The Kenyan government handed its most significant port, Mombasa, as collateral control to China.8 This project, together with Lamu Port development, aims to connect Kenya to the South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project. This will enable China to assist in the smooth import and export of products through the ports.9 Furthermore, Beijing holds 21% of Kenya’s foreign debt, the region’s largest debt, followed by Djibouti and Ethiopia. However, as Kenyan National Treasury Cabinet Secretary Ukur Yatani stated, the Chinese have equal provisional rights to operate the port and its benefits. This subsequently raised a maritime threat, given that the US naval and air base at Manda Bay are in close proximity.10
Similarly, China has invested considerably in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Sudan. In Ethiopia, China has invested heavily in infrastructure and raw material production, particularly in the development of oil resources in the Ogaden region. Furthermore, Chinese finance helped Ethiopians build projects spurned by the West, such as the construction of the Gibe III Dam.11 Beijing is the largest source of foreign direct investment in Ethiopian industrial parks, accounting for 60% of all the sources. Beijing owns 50% of the Ethiopian national debt.12 Likewise, China also invested in Djibouti and held more than 57% of Djibouti’s debt, the largest in the HoA.13 The major Chinese investment that challenges US predominance is in telecommunications networks, particularly those connecting Djibouti and Pakistan via the Indian Ocean, which may allow China to monitor intelligence operations and communication activities by the United States and other major powers. Furthermore, the Ethio-Djibouti railways provide China with a transportation corridor for smooth movement of products. This will make it easier for China to trade across HoA countries. Although the political rift between Sudan and South Sudan hampered China’s engagement, Beijing was eventually able to invest in South Sudan, which today accounts for 2–5% of Chinese oil imports. Sudan also received military assistance (140 tanks) from China, mainly under the Omar al-Bashir administration. Sudan owes China a debt of over 6.4 billion dollars.14
In contrast, US attention to Africa was low after the end of the Cold War as US officials believed that Africa’s geopolitical relevance had faded. However, Chinese engagement prompted Washington to reengage with an enhanced foreign policy approach in Africa. Washington began offsetting the Chinese engagement through structured strategies. Key offsetting strategies were clearly mentioned in the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS).15 The 2017 NSS document identified China as a strategic competitor, with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorists as the largest threats to American supremacy. The document specifically emphasized Chinese involvement in Africa and proposed a strategy to limit China’s influence in the political, economic, military, and security domains.16 However, in a more qualified manner, the 2018 NDS acknowledges an increasingly complex global security environment, featuring major threats to the current US-led international order and the resurgence of geostrategic competition. Therefore, the Pentagon calls for attention to its rivals, primarily China and Russia, than to second-tier security threats.17 Subsequently, the Biden administration had the same level of understanding of China’s rising threat to the global order. The US government released a new document called the Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa (STSA) and branded China as the primary strategic rival for US national interest in the region. With this new strategy, China receives more attention than Russia, as Washington seeks to “out-competing China and constrain Russia.”18
Indeed, the United States has a military and security edge over China in Africa, with 30 military installations across 15 African countries, 13 of which are permanent and 17 temporary.19 This put Washington ahead of Beijing in accessing key intelligence to maintain its preeminence. From an economic standpoint, the United States also launched Build Back Better World (B3W) initiatives for developing countries to address their infrastructure deficits, with the aim of making them free from Chinese influence. However, B3W has shortcomings compared to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). What makes their rivalry fierce in the region is that Beijing understood its limitations and started using its economic engagement as an offsetting strategy against US dominance.20 This study was designed to empirically and theoretically investigate China’s geoeconomic engagement with the HoA and its impact on regional power dynamics. It also analyzes the Chinese BRI scheme in the HoA from a geoeconomic standpoint to examine whether China’s BRI scheme reinstates bipolarity with the United States. This study also seeks to examine the relevance of B3W initiatives as Washington began to employ a counterbalancing strategy to limit Beijing’s expanding influence in the region.
Methodologically, a qualitative research approach is adopted along with an extensive literature review. The reason for using this approach is that it is appropriate to study patterns of events scientifically, allowing researchers to examine state behavior and interactions between states.21 To achieve this goal, the researchers employed an explanatory technique to provide a full and extensive explanation of the subject under investigation.22 This strategy is useful for analyzing ideas, concepts, written documents, and official statements of governments and organizations.23 Relevant books, journals, official documents, and other archival materials are analyzed, and thematic data analysis approaches are also used.
Theoretical Framework: Offensive Realism and Power Dynamics
This study adopts John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism as a theoretical lens to examine the geoeconomic implications of China’s BRI for US preeminence in the HoA. Offensive realism provides an in-depth explanation of state behavior and how power structures in the current world order shape top decision makers’ strategic choices.24 The theory is based on five major assumptions to explain the behavior of major powers and their interactions in global politics. To begin with, international politics is conducted within an anarchic system, whereby “no governing agency above governments” imposes rules with absolute authority. In addition, states exhibit offensive behavior that enables them to wage wars against one another. Moreover, states never trust each other and often fear each other. Additionally, states often prioritize their existence over all other goals and consider their survival as a driving motivation to attain other goals. Last, states are rational actors, thereby analyzing their cost-benefit calculation before their actions against one another.25 Based on this rationale, offensive realist scholars argue that the maximization of power is a dependable way to ensure state survival in an anarchic environment, with the eventual objective of being a hegemon.26
As Professor Mearsheimer points out, nations always strive to increase their power and influence at the expense of their rivals to overcome the risks arising out of anarchy.27 For offensive realists, international politics is a zero-sum game in which states compete for resources and power, and those who control the system often block others from accumulating wealth as it threatens their interests. To overcome this structural barrier, rising powers frequently adopt diverse power-gaining techniques, because the system requires them to deal with great powers.28 The aim of applying various strategies is to exert influence on the established order to serve their interests.29 From this standpoint, offensive realists’ analysis of international politics prioritizes the importance of power as a core ingredient for states to serve their interests in anarchic systems.
According to this theory, both Beijing and Washington are aware of the significance of power in dictating international politics. As anarchy is an inherent component of global politics, both powers openly seek various ways to accumulate power elsewhere in the world with the intention of becoming regional or global hegemon. In this regard, Washington acts as a guardian of the existing structure, as the system ensures its interests, whereas Beijing feels less served and acts as a rising power to alter the existing power dynamics. This claim is also supported by William Wohlforth, who argues that rising powers will always challenge the status quo in international politics, as they seek to alter the distribution of power in their favor.30 Hence, both powers used the anarchic structure of the international system as a gray zone to advance their interests over one another, particularly by controlling or influencing key geostrategic areas, such as the HoA region. This dynamic creates a fierce power-driven geopolitical rivalry between the two powers in the region.
China’s Geoeconomic Engagement and Regional Power Dynamics
Post-Cold War Chinese engagement in Africa is not new; it dates back to colonial times. China actively supported African countries’ struggles with colonialist movements.31 Due to these historical linkages, China was able to establish substantial economic and political collaboration with African countries in the post-Cold War period.32 Chinese enterprises have access to almost all the African markets. Currently, over 1000 Chinese enterprises operate in Africa, and approximately one million Chinese nationals reside on the continent.33 Furthermore, Chinese firms have significant flexibility in operating in Africa in market terms.34 China’s trade with African countries began growing significantly from 2005. For example, in 2019, Chinese exports to Africa amounted to 113 billion dollars, while imports from Africa totaled 78 billion. Approximately 30% of Chinese FDI in Africa is directed toward infrastructure and construction, with the remaining 25% directed toward mining and raw material extraction.35
China’s economic engagement has theoretical underpinnings, as Professor Mearsheimer emphasizes that international politics is a zero-sum game that drives states into fierce rivalry for resources and power. Consequently, states frequently strive to increase their resource reservoirs at the expense of their rivals to overcome anarchy that threatens their survival. From this perspective, Chinese economic involvement appears to be a rational choice, as the domain provides the privilege to accumulate resources and compete with its opponents at a level that secures its national interests. Hence, scholars have begun to justify China’s economic involvement in Africa in three dimensions: export markets for manufactured Chinese goods, access to the continent’s resources, and economic stability for China to safeguard its citizens and pursue economic and commercial interests.36 Indeed, Beijing’s economic growth has increased demand for raw materials. As a result, targeting key geostrategic areas in Africa is a logical choice for China because Africa has abundant natural resources and export potential owing to its low levels of technological advancement.37
There are various reasons why China’s economic involvement has been effective in Africa. The most crucial aspect that made a difference is that China provided alternative trading preferences for African countries. As a major economic partner, Beijing has gained an extra market for exports and imports. This allowed African nations to broaden their foreign commerce and become less reliant on trade with the United States and West. China has also used this advantage for its own sake. Beijing has been served less by the currently established order. To overcome these structural barriers, China has often used various strategies to enhance its capabilities. In this regard, China, using this economic success to lure African governments’ votes in the UN and other multilateral political flora, either to maximize its interest or to alter the established order in its favor, has a direct impact on US supremacy.38 Therefore, China’s actions in geostrategic areas, including the HoA, suggest using geoeconomic influence as a strategy to shift power. For Beijing, the power shift will provide the privilege to expand to other spheres of influence, such as security and military.39 In contrast, the United States appears to resist China’s attempts to become a regional rival by weakening China’s impact through its competitive edge.40 From this standpoint, competition is fierce in areas where BRI projects are being implemented.41
Another aspect of China’s economic expansion is the BRI. Beijing’s investments in Africa have been redirected within the scope of the BRI scheme and have targeted geostrategic regions of the continent, such as the HoA.42 Therefore, countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have been targets of the BRI. Doraleh Port was built and financed by China’s Merchant Holdings International in Djibouti. Doraleh Port ensures China’s connectivity with Djibouti’s resource-rich neighbor, Ethiopia. The railway from Addis Ababa to the Djibouti Port has already been completed. Additionally, Beijing is attempting to link the Ethiopia–Djibouti railway with the Kenya Standard Gauge Railway, with the goal of incorporating South Sudan into the route. The development of the Mombasa Port aims to connect Africa’s inland market systems by linking Kenya with South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. Kenya and China agreed to a 3.6 billion dollar loan for this purpose during the BRI Forum in May 2017.43 This investment indicates that Beijing wanted to make the HoA region its BRI node to expand its investment across Africa. Therefore, with the BRI projects, China is expanding its infrastructure connectivity and, thereby, its market destination in the region. This massive economic involvement in the post-Cold War period uplifts the geopolitical significance of the region as well as a geostrategic factor for the return of great power competition. In this regard, Professor Wohlforth noted that rising powers often challenge established orders, as they seek to alter the distribution of power in their favor.44 In the HoA scenario, Washington acts as a guardian of the existing order, as the system ensures its interests, whereas Beijing feels less served and acts as a rising power to alter existing power dynamics. From this standpoint, China’s actions suggest using geoeconomic influence as a strategy to shift power. For Beijing, a power shift will encourage the expansion of its footprint in other spheres, such as security and military, where Washington has a comparative preeminence.45
US Offsetting Strategy and Its Regional Supremacy in the Horn of Africa
As anarchy is a structural element of international politics, superpowers frequently try various strategies to acquire wealth of any form with the goal of becoming regional or global hegemons. The HoA provides geostrategic leverage for major or rising powers to establish proper geographical positioning as the region is closer to the Red Sea-Suez Canal shipping corridor and oil-producing Middle Eastern countries. Thus, access to natural resources is critical for wealth creation, and proximity to international shipping routes provides leverage to protect regional commercial interest. These geopolitical dynamics drove China and the United States to compete with one another.
From an offensive realist perspective, major and rising powers, including the US, EU member states, China, Japan, Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf States, are establishing military bases in the HoA region, mostly in Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea. However, in contrast to the others, the Chinese were pioneers in the region to engage in economic-centered involvement, which led to the formation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. China founded FOCAC to promote multilateral cooperation between China and African countries to achieve deeper cooperation. This platform helps Beijing improve its trading relations with Africa as a whole. Notably, prior to the FOCAC agreement, China’s commerce with Africa was less than 10 billion dollars, but following its creation, trade between China and Africa soared to 220 billion. China’s growing economic engagement in the region began to create pressure on US domination as Beijing’s economic success compels Washington shift its relations with Africa from aid to trade and investment.46 Washington followed the Chinese footprint and established the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit (ALS) in 2014, with the aim of promoting democracy, trade, and investment in African countries. However, China’s foreign investment has expanded exponentially, helping transform the continent’s physical and political landscape. This significantly undermines Washington’s long-standing political and diplomatic influence, pushed the United States to label China a long-term strategic rival.
As William Wohlforth noted, power is elusive in nature and is difficult to quantify. Military capabilities, economic growth, level of innovation, population, resources, and level of R&D are used as references to measure power exertion capabilities among states in global politics. Indeed, the rivalry between Beijing and Washington is multifaceted but is primarily motivated by the desire for economic dominance and technological superiority. It is widely expected that Washington retains its military and security superiority in the years ahead. However, this sphere of dominance will no longer provide a guarantee as China competes by providing alternative benefits to many African countries through FOCAC and other cooperation forums. This new development obviously threatens US influence while triggering a power shift between the two powers.47 In fact, power is difficult to measure until states begin to exercise it. This makes it difficult to precisely measure the pace of the power transition between the two powers. However, the exertion capabilities of states can be measured when they compete with one another. From this standpoint, efforts indicate that Beijing is committed to delivering more benefits to African countries under the FOCAC and BRI schemes to maintain its economic influence.48 By doing so, Beijing accumulates economic power, allowing it to compete with Washington for some type of bipolar arrangement in the years ahead.49 Therefore, existing evidence shows that China is developing a competitive edge through economic means to bring about a power shift in the HoA. However, China’s ability to transform its economic influence into hard power capabilities to threaten the US sphere of influence will take time as China’s technological advancement still lags behind. However, unless Washington devises a suitable counterbalance strategy, Chinese economic influence will gradually push power toward symmetry sooner or later.
According to Waltz, international politics is a competitive realm, in which the fate of one state is determined by the actions of others.50 From this perspective, Beijing has already established a large infrastructure link known as LAPSSET among the HoA nations to form a market chain that upholds its economic influence. By contrast, since the start of the global financial crisis, US influence on trade in African countries has declined. This created an opportunity for China to become a key trading partner in the African states.51 To offset China’s growing influence on global affairs, the United States has implemented a variety of counterbalancing efforts, including reviving the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and launching the Summit for Democracy. As a continuation of these counterbalancing initiatives, Washington, together with G-7 allies, launched the B3W initiative in 2021 to address major infrastructural deficits in many developing countries by 2035.52 The B3W program aims to raise bilateral, multilateral, and private sector financing for investments in low-income countries. Furthermore, the B3W plan is designed to be inclusive, depending on a wide range of local organizations, donors, and recipient countries, with the aim of aligning development strategies to narrow the infrastructure deficits of low-income countries. As the initiative’s lead partner, Washington agreed to mobilize the private sector, including the Development Finance Corporation, USAID, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency to finance projects.53 The Biden administration intends to make B3W a capable initiative to offset the BRI by addressing infrastructure deficits in low-income countries, where China’s BRI impacts are evident.
The United States identified 10 projects valued at 600 billion dollars immediately after the B3W was unveiled in 2021.54 In practical terms, Washington, using B3W, wants to compete with Beijing’s BRI objective. The BRI aims to connect Asia, Africa, and Europe through land and maritime networks, thereby increasing China’s market shares and economic growth.55 B3W’s main goal is to broaden its geographical scope, with a primary focus on developing countries in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, a detailed examination of B3W reveals that it is an extension of the Blue Dot Network (BDN) formed in 2019 by the United States, Japan, and Australia. The primary goal of the BDN is to bring together governments, entrepreneurs, and civil society to meet the defined standards for worldwide infrastructure development. From this perspective, B3W is old wine in a new bottle, as its main goal matches that of the BDN.56 However, what distinguishes B3W is that there is still an opportunity to increase its membership, as the initiative also aims to recruit pivotal countries like India, Australia, South Korea, and South Africa in an attempt to establish a global coalition to expand its influence vis-à-vis China.57
Despite such a strong start, B3W encounters hurdles in mobilizing resources from the private sector. The BRI project was successful because it was funded through bilateral loans and investments from commercial and state-owned banks such as the Export–Import Bank of China, China Development Bank, and Silk and Road Fund.58 By contrast, the corporate sector in the United States remains wary of mobilizing resources for B3W activities. For instance, Bechtel Corporation agreed to build a highway connecting Nairobi and Mombasa. However, the Bechtel and Kenyan governments did not reach an agreement on the payment terms.59 The company rejected Kenya’s proposal to refund payments in packages, whereas Bechtel sought direct payments. This indicates that US firms have reservations about the B3W’s public–private partnership approach. This is an impediment to B3W progress in Africa, as African governments are unable to provide financing for projects on cash; rather, they prefer to pay debt over the long term.
Another barrier to B3W’s efficacy comes from its member countries. Some G-7 members, such as France, Germany, and Japan, remain unsure about the B3W’s prospects, and are unwilling to give full-throated support for fear of losing trade relationships with China. Furthermore, B3W is heavily reliant on the private sector for implementation, making it difficult to persuade stakeholders to raise funds. Consequently, B3W lacks precise planning for implementation capabilities, particularly from the African perspective. Although B3W is a more recent initiative than BRI, it faces substantial obstacles in its early stages. However, managing the program’s sustainability is crucial for G-7 member countries to maintain their competitive edge in Africa, as China’s economic influence has recently expanded. To address this deficit, Washington is using its military and security edges to counter China’s geoeconomic influence, just as offensive realist scholars have predicted that major powers engage in offensive behavior to oust their rivals before becoming a real threat. Thus, it is a rational choice for the United States to use its military and security edges to gain access to crucial intelligence to maintain its interests until B3W matures enough to offset the BRI. Additionally, the tragic events of 9/11 significantly boosted American geostrategic control of the region. The United States established a firm control over regional issues under the banner of the “Global War on Terror.” This places Washington in a comparatively better position to maintain predominance.
According to power transition theory, the international system is structured in a series of hierarchical orders established by hegemonic powers. Major powers use their power to formulate social structures and institutions that advance their interests.60 As long as the major powers are unchallenged, the international system that they create remains intact. However, the rising powers can upend established orders if they achieve sufficient economic growth. This is because they often find themselves in a disadvantageous position because the system is not organized for their benefits. In such cases, rising power feels dissatisfied with their position and compelled to challenge hegemonic power with the intention of revising the international order to better suit their interests. Given China’s growing economic influence in the HoA in the post 2000s, it is foreseeable that Beijing will challenge long-standing US dominance to maintain its economic benefits in the region. As a result, China will attempt to elevate its own status in the anarchic structure of the international system to allow itself to pursue specific interests and make choices that benefit them.
Undoubtedly, Chinese economic involvement has sparked debate among multiple African communities. Chinese investment in the African infrastructure sector as a part of the BRI has been both transformative and contentious. While Chinese BRI investments have helped Africa overcome its infrastructure gap, they have also highlighted concerns about Africa’s excessive debt levels. For example, BRI projects have stimulated economic development in Ethiopia by offering employment opportunities for skilled and unskilled workers. As a result, Ethiopia’s socioeconomic status has improved. China is also building roads and railways as part of the BRI program to connect landlocked Ethiopia to the Gulf of Aden, which will serve as the country’s lifeline. On the other hand, China accounted for 12% of Africa’s private and state external debts, which increased more than five times to 696 billion dollars between 2000 and 2020. According to a World Bank assessment, seven African nations are at risk of debt crisis as a result of Chinese lending. Among these countries, Djibouti and Kenya are frontrunners in the debt-distress category.
Beijing’s desire to expand its economic sphere of influence appears to be a calculated approach given that Washington is not actively engaged in the region. There are various explanations for why Americans invest less in Africa than China. The major challenge is related to Africa’s economic fragmentation and varying levels of development, which makes Africa less appealing for large-scale investments. Americans have been more interested in investing and trading in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia where its geostrategic influence remains predominant. Finally, concerns about political stability, governance challenges, and corruption in many African countries remain obstacles to be overcome before American businesses start to show real interest in operations in Africa.
Although pushbacks come from Washington, China’s geoeconomic exertions remain strong. The BRI in Africa opens high-level investment prospects for China. In the HoA, BRI advancement can be seen in infrastructure development, particularly roads, highways, and railway connectivity. Countries such as Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia have begun to host substantial Chinese investments. For example, in Kenya, the key BRI projects include the expansion of Mombasa Port, the construction of a modern port in Lamu, and the construction of a standard gauge railway. Kenya and China agreed to build a Kenyan pipeline in the years ahead as part of the BRI project, which will connect Kenyan ports to Uganda and South Sudan oil reserves. However, Djibouti hosts BRI projects. China has supported infrastructure projects in Djibouti, including the Ethiopia–Djibouti railway and the 300 million dollar water pipeline system that transports potable water from Ethiopia to Djibouti. Similarly, the BRI is expanding and influencing the Ethiopian economy. The Chinese have upgraded the 752-km railway connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti. Ethiopia generated over 20 million dollars in export revenue in six months from goods produced at the country’s flagship Chinese-built Hawassa Industrial Park.61 As a result, Chinese investment has significantly improved infrastructure, economic productivity, livelihoods, and employment conditions in the region. However, it is too early to assert that the power shift has been completed even as Chinese economic-driven involvement gives Beijing a strong foothold to advance its interests.
Conclusion
Owing to the historical ties between China and African nations, Beijing has managed to establish substantial economic and political collaboration with African countries over the last two decades. Over 1,000 Chinese firms now operate in Africa, providing job opportunities for local residents.
The BRI is another aspect of China’s economic influence in Africa. Recent Chinese investments on the continent have been redirected within the scope of the BRI scheme and have targeted geopolitically significant areas of the continent, including the HoA. Countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda serve as BRI nodes for expansion across the continent. Roads, rails, industrial parks, power grids, and other infrastructural projects across HoA countries are mainly financed and built by the Chinese. Consequently, the Djibouti-Ethiopian railway, the LAPSSET transport corridor, and the Kenyan Standard Gauge railway became a lifeline for HoA communities. Furthermore, dozens of industrial parks were established by Chinese companies under the BRI projects in the region.
There are several reasons for China’s economic success in Africa compared with the United States. Market flexibility for Chinese enterprises as well as financial support from the Chinese government contribute significantly to Beijing’s success. The ready availability of Chinese products in every local market, access to the continent’s resources, and China’s willingness to take risks in politically unstable environments all contribute to their success in expanding economic influence. On the other hand, possible explanations for American firms’ lower economic involvement are related to Africa’s economic fragmentation and varying levels of development. Americans were interested in trading in places such as Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia after the Cold War, believing that Africa’s geopolitical relevance had faded. Concerns about political stability, governance challenges, and corruption in many African countries also make American business firms wary of operating in Africa.
Amid intensifying great power rivalry, the United States is using the B3W project to counterbalance China’s BRI influence in the region. But as a new scheme compared with BRI, B3W faces serious hurdles in its early stages of implementation, chief among them is resource mobilization by the private sector and allies’ uncertainty about B3W’s prospects. Therefore, managing the initiative’s sustainability is crucial for Washington to maintain competitiveness in Africa. China’s expanding geoeconomic influence in the HoA in the post-Cold War era is a manifestation of the return of great power competition between Beijing and Washington.
Notes
1 Earl Conteh-Morgan, “The United States and China: Strategic Rivalry in Africa,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter 2018), pp. 39–52.
2 Hansen Stig Jarle, “Dragon Rising? Evaluating Chinese Power in the Horn of Africa,” MES Insights, Vol. 12, No. 3 (June 2021), pp. 1–9.
3 Sammy Mwangi Waweru, “China and US in Africa: A Case of Exaggerated Rivalry,” Korea and Global Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2019), pp. 151–182.
4 Hansen Stig Jarle, “Dragon Rising? Evaluating Chinese Power in the Horn of Africa,” MES Insights, Vol. 12, No. 3 (June 2021), pp. 5–7.
5 Sammy Mwangi Waweru, “China and US in Africa: A Case of Exaggerated Rivalry,” Korea and Global Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2019), pp. 160–167.
6 Yan Wan et al. “Djibouti: From a Colonial Fabrication to the Deviation of the ‘Shekou Model’,” Cities, Vol. 97 (February 2020), 102488, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.102488.
7 Mukesh Shankar Bharti, “The Sustainable Development and Economic Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Ethiopia,” East Asia, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2023), pp. 175–194.
8 Njiraini Muchira, “Kenya: China Cannot Seize Port of Mombasa if Debt Default Occurs,” Maritime Executive, March 16, 2021, https://maritime-executive.com/article/kenya-china-cannot-seize-port-of-mombasa-if-debt-default-occurs.
9 Macharia Munene, “Geopolitical Dynamics in the Horn of Africa Region,” Horn Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January/February 2022), pp. 1–11.
10 Njiraini Muchira, “Kenya: China Cannot Seize Port of Mombasa if Debt Default Occurs.” Maritime Executive, March 16, 2021, https://maritime-executive.com/article/kenya-china-cannot-seize-port-of-mombasa-if-debt-default-occurs.
11 Claudia J. Carr, River Basin Development and Human Rights in Eastern Africa — A Policy Crossroads (Cham: Springer Nature, 2017).
12 Daniel Kibsgaard, “Sino-Ethiopian Relations from Meles Zenawi to Abiy Ahmed: The Political Economy of a Strategic Partnership,” China Currents, Vol. 19, No. 219 (2020), https://www.chinacenter.net/2020/china-currents/19-2/sino-ethiopian-relations-from-meles-zenawi-to-abiy-ahmed-the-political-economy-of-a-strategic-partnership/.
13 “China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan,” Asia Report No. 288, International Crisis Group, July 10, 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/288-china-s-foreign-policy-experiment-south-sudan.
14 Hansen Stig Jarle, “Dragon Rising? Evaluating Chinese Power in the Horn of Africa,” MES Insights, Vol. 12, No. 3 (June 2021), pp. 1–3.
15 Zhou Jinghao, Great Power Competition as the New Normal of China–US Relations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).
16 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2017), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
17 “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competition Edge,” U.S. Department of Defense, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
18 Gaas Mohammed Husein and Hansen Stig Jarle, “The New US Strategies: What they Mean for the Horn of Africa,” Policy Brief 301, Raad Peace Research Institute, 2022, https://www.rapri.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/RAAD-Policy-Brief-The-New-US-strategies-and-the-Horn-of-Africa-1.pdf?fbclid=IwAR038lT9CieYoY_jtJe1vaOpmb6pHqWFUjE29mvG9m47lDOFguHARz-y88E.
19 “Dossier No. 42: Defending Our Sovereignty: US Military Bases in Africa and the Future of African Unity,” Monthly Review, July 6, 2021, https://mronline.org/2021/07/06/dossier-no-42-defending-our-sovereignty-us-military-bases-in-africa-and-the-future-of-african-unity/.
20 Ryan C. K. Hess, “Counterbalancing Chinese Influence in the Horn of Africa: A Strategy for Security and Stability,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, November 18, 2021, https://www.960cyber.afrc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2848080/counterbalancing-chinese-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa-a-strategy-for-securit/.
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