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This study examines the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 Global economic crisis on the capital structures of Korean non-financial listed companies. Using a panel data covering 1,159 Korean listed non-financial firms from 10 industrial sectors over a 31-year period (1985–2015), this study investigates the patterns of firms’ capital structures before and after the crises and identifies their speeds of adjustment toward the optimal leverage. This study finds different effects of the two crises on both capital structures and adjustment speeds. The average debt ratio fell significantly after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The distance between the optimal and the observed debt ratios shrank after the Asian crisis, while the speed of adjustment increased two-fold. Unlike the Asian financial crisis, the global economic crisis of 2008 had a positive effect on companies’ debt ratios and the speeds of adjustments toward the optimal leverage. Our empirical analysis shows that, on average, the Korean non-financial listed companies decreased their debt ratios over the entire period of observation, with the leverage being the highest before the Asian financial crisis and lowest after the global economic crisis. Our results also show that the debt ratios of Korean chaebols were higher than that of non-chaebols. Moreover, we find that the high level of leverage of Korean firms was associated with tangible assets, income variability, size and age of the firm, non-debt tax shield and uniqueness.

In this article, the dependence structure of the asset classes stocks, government bonds, and corporate bonds in different market environments and its implications on asset management are investigated for the US, European, and Asian market. Asset returns are modelled by a Markov-switching model which allows for two market regimes with completely different risk-return structures. Using major stock indices from all three regions, calm and turbulent market periods are identified for the time period between 1987 and 2009 and the correlation structures in the respective periods are compared. It turns out that the correlations between as well as within the asset classes under investigation are far from being stable and vary significantly between calm and turbulent market periods as well as in time. It also turns out that the US and European markets are much more integrated than the Asian and US/European ones. Moreover, the Asian market features more and longer turbulence phases. Finally, the impact of these findings is examined in a portfolio optimization context. To accomplish this, a case study using the mean-variance and the mean-conditional-value-at-risk framework as well as two levels of risk aversion is conducted. The results show that an explicit consideration of different market conditions in the modelling framework yields better portfolio performance as well as lower portfolio risk compared to standard approaches. These findings hold true for all investigated optimization frameworks and risk-aversion levels.

The aim of this work is to build a class of financial crisis indicators based on the spectral properties of the dynamics of market data. After choosing an appropriate size for a rolling window, the historical market data inside this rolling window are seen every trading day as a random matrix from which a correlation matrix is obtained. Our goal is to study the correlations between the assets that constitute this market and look for reproducible patterns that are indicative of an impending financial crisis. A weighting of the assets in the market is then introduced and is proportional to the daily traded volumes. This manipulation is realized in order to give more importance to the most liquid assets. Our financial crisis indicators are based on the spectral radius of this weighted correlation matrix. The idea behind this type of financial crisis indicators is that large eigenvalues are a sign of dynamic instability. The out-of-sample predictive power of the financial crisis indicators in this framework is then demonstrated, in particular by using them as decision-making tools in a protective put strategy.

This paper examines the factors that determine banking flows from advanced economies to emerging markets. In addition to the usual determinants of capital flows in terms of global push and local pull factors, we examine the role of bilateral factors, such as growth differentials and economic size, as well as contagion factors and measures of the depth in financial interconnectedness between lenders and borrowers. We find profound differences across regions. In particular, in spite of the severe impact of the global financial crisis, emerging Europe stands out as a more stable region. Assuming that the determinants of banking flows remain unchanged in the presence of structural changes, we use these results to explore the short-term implications of Basel III capital regulations on banking flows to emerging markets.

Formal models of currency crises have shown that inconsistencies between countries' domestic and exchange rate policies are a major cause of currency crises. To understand why such prolonged inconsistencies exist, we need to go beyond standard economic models and take political economy and behavioral considerations into account. We sketch out ways in which such considerations can be taken into account and highlight recent research that is useful for this project. We also offer some directions for future research and a brief guide to the empirical identification of currency crises and to the measurements of some of the relevant political and economic policy variables.

Shocks to global interest rates or risk cause capital outflows for countries outside the core of the global financial system. These outflows lead to downward pressure on exchange rates and financial sector stress, in addition to having general contractionary effects. To defend the exchange rate, the appropriate internal response is a fiscal/monetary contraction. To maintain full employment and financial stability, the appropriate internal response is fiscal/monetary expansion. The contradiction in these policy responses implies policymakers prioritize hitting either internal or external targets after these shocks; but how do they decide? Using a fixed effects model and data from 100 emerging market and developing economies from 1990 to 2012, we show that the relative sensitivity of interest groups to these policy responses influences which response occurs. We find some evidence that this effect is stronger in the presence of more political-institutional constraints. Using a strategic probit model, we also find some evidence that this policy response influences the relative likelihood of banking crises versus currency crashes after these global shocks.

We critically analyze and compare the analytical structures of the international monetary and financial trilemmas. The first structure says that countries cannot have all three of fixed exchange rates, free capital mobility, and monetary autonomy. The second argues that countries cannot have all three of financial globalization, absence of financial crises, and financial autonomy. While the monetary trilemma is often described as being based on the Mundell–Fleming model, this is true only under the assumption of perfect capital mobility. Imperfect mobility can be caused by factors other than capital controls and in this case the constraints of the monetary trilemma need not be binding in the short run. In order to have a mechanism to provide balance of payments equilibrium, however, the theory of economic policy demonstrates that the monetary trilemma must be binding in the long run. While pointing to an important issue the financial trilemma formulation does not provide the most useful way to analyze the tradeoffs generated by financial globalization. More useful for this purpose is the literature on international externalities and public goods. We also argue that for many countries, giving up monetary autonomy will be more costly than giving up financial policy autonomy.

The deterioration in credit quality of General Motors (GM) and Ford to junk status in the spring of 2005 caused a wide-spread sell-off in their corporate bonds. Using a novel dataset, we document that this sell-off appears to have generated significant liquidity risk for market-makers, as evidenced by a significant imbalance in their quotes towards sales. We find that simultaneously there was a substantial increase in the co-movement between innovations in the credit default swap (CDS) spreads of GM and Ford and those of firms in all other industries, the increase being the greatest during the period surrounding the actual downgrade and reversing sharply thereafter. We show that the corporate bond market makers' imbalance towards sales in GM and Ford bonds explains a significant portion of this co-movement. These results linking liquidity risk and correlation risk are consistent with models in which market prices are episodically determined by the limited risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries.

We assess benefits and costs of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) based on theory, data, and empirical research to date. TARP was intended to attenuate systemic risk and improve the real economy, and we focus on these as the most important potential effects of the program. Evidence suggests mostly short-term social benefits in reducing systemic risk and improving the real economy. However, long-term evidence is limited — suggesting relatively long-lasting real economic improvements that might be offset by long-term increases in systemic risk. We give TARP a grade of “incomplete,” pending further research, and suggest some directions for this research.

This paper is amongst the first to investigate weak-form efficiency of the most developed (G-20) countries in the world. It also measures the impact of the 2007 financial crisis on the stock markets of these countries, in terms of their efficiency. Serial correlation test, ADF unit root test, Lo and MacKinlay (1988) variance ratio test, Chow and Denning (1993) RWH test and Wrights' 2000 ranks and signs based multiple variance ratio test were utilized to carry out this analysis. The entire study period was divided into a pre-crisis period (January 1, 2005 – August 8, 2007) and a during crisis period (August 9, 2007 – Deccember 31, 2011). Strong contemporaneous effects emerged across all international markets (except Saudi Arabia) as a consequence of the 2007 crisis. This may be due to increased international intra-day activity across the world markets. It was concluded that the "Samuelson dictum," which states that "while individual stocks are efficient, the market index is inefficient," seems to hold good on a global level by analogy. This is evident on the premise that, on the whole the 2007 crisis reduced return and increased volatility, even though individual markets became more efficient. The most robust result from the analysis is that most of the individual markets are weak-form efficient. Following the crisis of 2007, the methodology used indicates that on the whole, the market efficiency of individual stock markets improved.

Hence, during the pre-crisis, volatility was low but heteroskedastic. However, during the period of the crisis, volatility was high but homoscedastic. The heightened volatility and low return that are a consequence of the crisis coupled with improved market efficiency, due to market vigil and control, ensure that abnormal returns and persistent arbitrage possibilities are wiped out. This appears to be a paradox of a crisis.

Real estate booms have regularly occurred throughout the world, leaving painful busts and financial crises in their wake. Real estate is a natural investment for more passive debt investors, including banks, because real estate's flexibility makes it a better source of collateral than production facilities built for a specific purpose. Consequently, passive capital may flow disproportionately into real estate and help generate real estate bubbles. The preference of banks for more fungible real estate assets also explains why real estate is so often the source of a financial crisis. Real estate bubbles can be welfare enhancing if cities would otherwise be too small, either because of agglomeration economies or building restrictions. But given reasonable parameters, the large welfare costs of any financial crisis are likely to be higher than the modest benefits of extra building. The benefits of real estate bubbles are welfare “triangles,” while the costs of widespread default are welfare “rectangles.”

Financial institutions’ heterogeneity, a high degree of dissimilarity across multiple dimensions, including business focuses, correlated asset holdings, capital structures, and funding sources, reduces systemic risk. We empirically test this hypothesis using a bank holding company (BHC) level heterogeneity index based on granular balance sheet, income statements, cash flow statements, and off-balance-sheet information for U.S. bank holding companies over a sample period spanning the second quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2021. We find that the BHC-level heterogeneity negatively correlates with BHC-level systemic risk, SRISK, measured both at the global and local levels. We also construct a sector-heterogeneity index and demonstrate that a reduction of heterogeneity occurred in the U.S. financial sector prior to both the Great Recession (2007–2009) and the COVID-19 Recession, especially for the largest BHCs. As such, a declining level of financial sector heterogeneity may exacerbate the consequences of systemic shocks.

Unlike traditional macroeconomic analysis on financial crises, this paper investigated the relationship between the effects of propagating negative messages, which leads to deterioration of the economic situation over time. The theory of financial crises generated by the spread of investors’ panic is analogized by an infectious disease model. The basic reproduction number is thereafter calculated to determine the propagation of negative messages in a group of investors, the maximum number of investors that can be influenced by negative messages and the maximum threshold value of influenced investors before a financial crisis occurs. The calculations demonstrated that the number of investors influenced by negative messages when governments publish relevant policies, such as monetary policy, financial policy etc., to prevent financial crises is clearly lower than the number of investors influenced by negative messages when governments take no action. Therefore governments’ interference in financial uncertainty can effectively reduce the possibility of financial crises occurring.