Narrow Results

In this paper, we consider a pollution control problem along a river basin where a portion of the pollution emitted by the upstream region can be transferred to the downstream region. Our model has three significant features: first, we take into account the pollution abatement investment, and the stock of pollution abatement capital follows standard differential equation of motion; second, we introduce the emission permits trading system so that each region has the choice between buying pollution permits or pollution abatement investment; third, we consider the pollution compensation mechanism so that the downstream region pays pollution compensation for the upstream region. We explore and compare the optimal decisions of both the upstream and downstream regions under the cases of the cooperative and no-cooperative strategies, respectively. We find that although the flow of emissions can be better controlled by cooperation between the upstream and downstream regions, the pollution abatement investment is not necessarily higher in the cooperative equilibrium. Further, a sensitivity analysis is also conducted on the parameters of the transboundary river basin pollution.

In this paper, we study the (strong) time-consistency property of the core for a linear-quadratic differential game of pollution control with nonzero absorption coefficient and real values of the model parameters. The values of parameters are evaluated based on the data for the largest aluminum enterprises of Eastern Siberia region of the Russian Federation for the year 2016. The obtained results are accompanied with illustrations.

The heavy haze at the beginning of 2013 makes the PM_2.5 once again a popular topic and sounds the alarm of China's environmental governance. Feedbacks from monitors show that PM_2.5 pollution in China has the characteristics of high level, evenly distributed, complex components, etc. Chinese government has carried out measures to control air pollution including PM_2.5, embarked on the toughest restriction policy of atmospheric pollutants emission, and made some progress. However, due to the complexity of PM_2.5 governance and China's rapid economic development and urbanization process, the PM_2.5 pollution control in China's cities is still faced with some problems. This paper gives the analysis and presents some suggestions.

China’s ecological environment construction has undergone three phases, i.e. the agriculture-based development phase with low productivity not long after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.), the industrial development phase after the adoption of reform and opening-up policy, and the phase toward ecological civilization, each of which has its own features, challenges, responsive measures and achievements. From the year 1949 to the adoption of reform and opening up policy, the Chinese society was characterized by farming culture on the whole, facing problems such as frequent natural disasters, shortage in food production and low urbanization level. To jump out of the Malthusian Trap, the founders of the P.R.C. led people to prevent floods by water control, water conservancy projects and reclamation of wasteland, which alleviated but did not solve the problems because China still suffered poverty and backwardness, and failed to shake off the Malthusian Curse. After the adoption of the reform and opening-up policy, the rapid progress in industrialization and urbanization has liberated farmers from land and greatly improved labor productivity; meanwhile, some lands were released from farmers’ hand, which not only made the value of land resources much higher but also enabled land rehabilitation and ecological self-restoration. Although rapid industrialization and urbanization enormously boosted productive forces and accumulated immense amount of material wealth, but since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s development has been drawn near to the ecological red line, environmental threshold and resources upper limit of industrial development, constantly challenged by sustainable development. After 2010, China has initiated the transformation to ecological civilization, featuring ecological protection, pollution control and resource conservation, aiming to promote the harmonious development between man and nature.

This paper is concerned with the dynamics and optimal harvesting of a prey–predator system in a polluted environment in the presence of scavengers and pollution control. Toxicants, released from external sources and the dead bodies of prey and predators, pollute the environment, which affects the growth of both prey and predators, resulting in a decline in the economic revenue from harvest. We assume that scavengers reduce pollution by consuming dead bodies. Further, we consider pollution reduction through depollution efforts as an alternative to enhancing revenue. We propose and analyze a prey–predator–pollutant model and study the optimal harvesting problem. We investigate the persistence of the ecosystem, and we solve the optimal harvest problem using Pontryagin’s maximum principle. The results indicate that uncontrolled prey harvesting and a high rate of pollution drive the system toward the extinction of both species. A moderate amount of pollution and the reasonable harvest efforts allow the system to persist. The optimal harvest strategy highlights that investing in pollution reduction enhances the persistence of the system as well as economic revenue. Numerical examples demonstrate the significant outcomes of the study.

Technical and legal terms are introduced for resources engineers and scientists. Being the former Federal and the State government officials/consultants for many years, the authors have compiled and edited these glossary terms in this book mainly based on the technical information from the governments and the professional associations. More technical and legal terms in the selected field are continuously collected and edited and will be added in the future new editions of this book.