Narrow Results

The impact of information improvement on local stability is examined for continuous dynamics. It is conventionally believed that removal of uncertainty always brings additional stability to an existing equilibrium. This paper shows that the relation between information and equilibrium stability may not be monotonic. Removal of information lag may sometimes destabilize the otherwise stable continuous model. Economic applications to Cournot and Bertrand competition are examined where the role of improved information on stability is shown to be cost-structure specific. Elimination of lags may cause stability loss. The conclusion drawn on two-dimensional continuous dynamics is briefly generalized to multidimensional system.

This paper presents a conceptual framework for analyzing the outcomes of potential competitive strategies and their expected payoffs for container terminal operators in the container handling industry. The framework is based on the integration of Bowley's linear model of aggregate demand of product differentiation with Porter's "Diamond" model. It focuses on the number of containers handled, prices charged, and profits earned to analyze a variety of strategies that could be employed by container terminal operators to enhance their competitive position. The findings suggest that strategies to build complementary relationships and stimulate greater demand are more desirable than alternatives because they generate benefits that accrue to the entire container port cluster. Conversely, strategies that are intended to raise entry barriers, employ strategic pricing mechanisms, and/or involve collusion are found to lead to the formation of insular clusters and retard competitive advantage in the long-run.

Despite the enormous growth in Islamic banking, most studies, using DEA/Stochastic Frontier Analysis, find Islamic banks are either equally or less productive than conventional banks. We apply the Olley–Pakes (OP) and Ackerberg–Caves–Frazer (ACF) approaches for estimating the production functions of conventional, Islamic and mixed banks in Bahrain and Malaysia between 1990 and 2011. The ACF results are the most plausible. Though Islamic banks tend to be less efficient than conventional banks the difference is not statistically significant. In Malaysia, mixed banks are significantly more productive than other banks and tend to have faster productivity growth.

This paper studies the evolution of a fish stock that is exploited by an n-country oligopoly. A feature of the economic structure is that the countries exploiting the fish stock experience time lags in obtaining and implementing information on the fish stock. The local asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium is analyzed, including asymptotic stability, instability, and cyclical behavior. Under the assumption of symmetric countries, two special cases are examined in detail. In the first case identical time delays are assumed, and in the second case it is assumed that one country has a different time delay from the others. This semi-symmetric case gives some insight into the consequence of asymmetry of the countries on the asymptotic behavior of the fish stock.

We consider a repeated regulation model in an oligopoly under asymmetric information with pollution. An iterative procedure is proposed where the regulator designs stationary taxes, and firms are not required to be perfectly rational. They can form and update simple beliefs about their competitors' aggregate output at each period. Two versions of the mechanism are provided depending on whether firms behave adaptively or with perfect foresight. Conditions under which the procedure converges to a unique steady state are provided. It is proved that there exists a suitable stationary tax policy that enables the firms to adjust to socially optimal choices in the long run. The tax rates of both versions are typically strictly less than the ones that result from a full information, Nash implementation. Moreover, in the myopic case, the tax rate decreases as the number of firms increases. We discuss problems relating to the potential implementation of the procedure.

The effects of uniting separated markets, each monopolized by a producer, into a globalized oligopolistic market, which is regarded as a noncooperative game, or as a Cournot oligopoly game, are investigated. The cases where such globalization degrades the profits of all producers coincidently, are examined. Linear demand and production functions are considered. It is shown that in complete symmetry, the degree of such coincident profit degradation is strongest (the worst-case ratio), where the degree means the most modest ratio of the profit degradation among all producers. The system is in complete symmetry when the values of parameters describing all producers and markets are identical. On the other hand, in producer symmetry, the degree of coincident consumer surplus improvement is highest (the best-case ratio), where the degree means the lowest of the ratios of consumer surplus improvement among all (previously separated) markets. The system is in producer symmetry when the values of parameters describing all producers are identical.

The model proposed in this paper investigates a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource exploitation, in which each firm may exploit either its own private pool or a common pool jointly with the rivals. Firms use a deterministic technology to invest in exploration activities. There emerges that (i) the individual exploration effort is higher when each firms has exclusive rights on a pool of its own, and (ii) depending on whether each firm has access to its own pool or all firms exploit a common one, the aggregate exploration effort is either increasing or constant in the number of firms.

This paper considers the problem of searching for information equilibria in an oligopoly market in the case of Stackelberg leaders. A framework considers the reflexive behavior of three agents, and linear agent’s cost functions with different coefficients (i.e., marginal and fixed costs) are considered. The results of the study are as follows. First, models of the reflexive games for a triopoly that consider a diversity of agents’ reasonings about environmental strategies are developed. Second, formulas for calculating equilibria in the games with three agents for arbitrary reflexion rank are derived.

When an outside innovating firm has a cost-reducing technology, it can sell licenses of its technology to incumbent firms, or enter the market and at the same time sell licenses, or enter the market without license. We examine the definitions of license fees in such situations under oligopoly, one outside innovating firm and several incumbent firms, considering threat by entry by the innovating firm using a two-step auction.

The so-called “Win-Continue, Lose-Reverse” (WCLR) rule is a simple iterative procedure that can be used to choose a value for any numeric variable (e.g., setting a price or a production level). The rule dictates that one should evaluate the effect on profits of the last adjustment made to the value (e.g., a price variation), and keep on changing the value in the same direction if the adjustment led to greater profits, or reverse the direction of change otherwise. Somewhat surprisingly, this simple rule has been shown to lead to collusive outcomes in Cournot oligopolies, even though its application requires no information about the other firms’ profits or choices. In this paper, we show that the convergence of the WCLR rule toward collusive outcomes can be very sensitive to small independent perturbations in the cost functions or in the income functions of the firms. These perturbations typically push the process toward the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. We also explore the behavior of WCLR against other strategies and demonstrate that WCLR is easily exploitable. We then conduct a similar analysis of the WCLR rule in a differentiated Bertrand model, where firms compete in prices.

As consensus grows for low-carbon development, innovation becomes vital for green growth, given the substantial technology adoption needed for long-term environmental targets. This paper explores market-driven incentives for green product innovation in an asymmetric duopoly using a game theory approach without relying on direct government intervention. The roles that market dynamics and rivalry have on the supply of green or brown products are explored in simultaneous and sequential scenarios, considering technology costs, demand-creating effects, rivalry gains, and information availability. Results reveal that a fully green market is contingent on low innovation costs, depending especially on the magnitude of demand creation effects. Notably, product differentiation occurs only under extreme cost asymmetry. Recommendations underscore the importance of incentivising low-cost innovations, assessing the impact of product differentiation and diversity, especially concerning lower-income consumers, and proposing measures to improve the transparency of firms’ strategic choices.

In a North–South vertically differentiated duopoly we analyze (i) the effects of parallel import (PI) policies on price competition and (ii) the interdependence of national PI policies. Prices can be higher in the North if both countries permit PIs relative to when only the South does. If governments maximize national welfare and demand asymmetry across countries is sufficiently large, the North forbids PIs to ensure its firm sells in the South and international price discrimination — the South’s most preferred market outcome — obtains. When demand structures are relatively similar across countries, the North permits PIs and uniform pricing — its most preferred outcome — results.

We examine the consequences of foreign direct investment (FDI) policies in a general equilibrium setting with several oligopolistic industries. By shifting labor demand across countries, FDI raises the wage in the host country and lowers the wage in the source country, thereby raising profits of source country firms at the expense of host country firms. The extent of cross-ownership of firms, the relative number of firms and the relative supply of skilled labor alter the impact of FDI policy on national welfare. The tension between profits and wages determines whether the optimal policy is designed to encourage FDI.

In an n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (n ≥ 3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Under the non-cooperative tariff equilibrium, each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption by each country improves world welfare by eliminating this trade diversion. Under linear demand, MFN adoption by the country with the average production cost is most desirable. High cost countries refuse reciprocal MFN adoption with other countries and also lose even if others engage in reciprocal MFN adoption amongst themselves.

Despite the negative international externalities that they generate, export cartels are legal in many countries. We use a repeated game approach to analyze cooperation between a low-income country (LIC) and its high-income country (HIC) trade partner where the HIC agrees to prevent its industry from organizing as an export cartel in return for a combination of improved market access (i.e. a tariff reduction) and a transfer from the LIC. If the LIC is subject to a tariff binding (say because of an existing trade agreement), the transfer it pays to the HIC increases and the scope for bilateral cooperation declines.

Cruising for leisure purposes, whether on the ocean, along coasts or rivers, has demonstrated consistent growth as a tourism activity. Cruising can be divided into a number of sub-markets, within which most supply is oligopolistic in nature, and concentration is increasing. Cruise lines pursue various strategies, but it is shown that pricing is not the most significant, as demand, cruise products and prices are amorphous. Unlike fixed-location tourism, cruising is a footloose product, where factor inputs may be sourced globally and cruise lines may have little connection with port destinations served on itineraries. Operationally, economies of scale, capacity and revenue management are important tools for operators, as vessel sizes increase and operational management and marketing become more sophisticated. The impacts on local and national economies are in many ways analogous to those of tourism in general.

We study the impact of legal principles on the design and the effectiveness of antitrust fines. Modern antitrust enforcement obeys four basic legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these principles into a Bertrand oligopoly model, where bankruptcy considerations ensure abnormal cartel profits. We discuss the optimal legally-constrained fine schedule that achieves maximal social welfare under these legal principles. This fine schedule induces collusion on a lower price by making it more attractive than collusion on higher prices. This fine structure depends on the characteristics of competition, legal restrictions, and market conditions and can be related to price-cap regulation implemented in several sectors, such as electricity and telecom. We analyze the welfare implications of limited liability restrictions and minimum fines. We conclude that regulations aiming at either reducing legal ceilings or raising minimum fines reduce social welfare and should better be avoided.